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ABSTRACT
The city o f New Orleans in the nineteenth century struggled to find its identity as
an ‘American’ city at the same time that the United States was trying to establish its
national character. Viewing this simultaneous local and national process of
‘Americanization’ through the lens of the New Orleans Free People of Color provides a
fascinating study in the coinciding birth of a nation and southern city.
New Orleans had developed into a bustling urban port city by the end o f the
eighteenth century, the time period in which the Free People o f Color developed into a
distinct social stratum. Much of the difficulty this group experienced during the
nineteenth century is rooted in the city’s eighteenth-century political, socio-economic and
cultural fabric. The contrasting ideologies, social structures, cultural norms/expectations,
and economic activities of New Orleanians clashed with the ‘white’ and ‘black’
Americans who would later flock to the city.
The Free People of Color chose to contest the steady erosion of civil, political and
social rights after Reconstruction through the legal system. This culminated when they
became plaintiffs in the Plessy v. Ferguson case, which the Supreme Court ruled on in
1896. How the Free People of Color struggled against their marginality through
legislative avenues will be examined in light o f the temporal, local and national contexts.

THE NEW ORLEANS FREE PEOPLE OF COLOR AND THE PROCESS OF
AMERICANIZATION, 1803-1896
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CHAPTER ONE
THE NEW ORLEANS FREE PEOPLE OF COLOR IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

“There is no State in the Union, hardly any spot o f like size on the globe, where the man o f color
has lived so intensely, made so much progress, been o f such historical im portance and y e t about
whom so com paratively little is known” (Dunbar-Nelson 2000:41).

The landmark 1896 Supreme Court case, Plessy v. Ferguson, legalized the
constitutionality of racial segregation by declaring that facilities must be ‘separate but
equal.’ The impact of this legally-mandated inequality resonates still in 2005, as the fight
for social justice and equal rights continues. The narrative of Plessy v. Ferguson is not
just one of disenfranchisement and discrimination; rather, it is also an important story of
resistance, vision, and identity formation. The chronicle of how and why the New
Orleans Free People of Color (henceforth ‘FPOC’) staged the arrest o f Homer Plessy and
initiated the Plessy v. Ferguson lawsuit is analyzed in this thesis.
Marginal and liminal individuals and groups help define the mainstream center.
The United States’ history is one fraught with exclusion and discrimination. In the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, regional Indian polities were stripped of land rights,
restrictions on Asian and European immigrant groups—if allowed in at all— coincided
with assimilation and Americanization programs and policies, and African Americans
struggled in a system that once considered them to be only three-fifths of a person. The
destabilization of Indians, immigrants and African Americans has a long legislative
history. The United States’ first full century consisted of policies, media and an economy
that helped define this new state. The key to the nation’s development and power rested
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upon its citizens, who were carefully selected.1 Yet, the Civil War and the African
American, Indian, women and immigrant’s fight for civil, political and social rights
demonstrates that governmental policies and those who opposed them shaped the
nineteenth century.
The nineteenth century is a fascinating time period because the United States was
still finding, defining and molding its boundaries and status quo. The definitive break
from the Old World remained a work in progress as this nation of immigrants turned the
United States from a post-colonial experiment into a full-fledged nation-state. Slave labor
propelled the South’s economies until the Civil War and kept many African Americans
indentured and economically dependent for the century’s remainder. Enslaved and free
African Americans in the North and South struggled within and against a socio-economic
structure that regarded this ‘race’ as subordinate and ontologically inferior. However, as
scholars o f this time period have shown, this system of enslavement colored and
characterized everyone in the nation, not just African Americans. Slaveholding and non
slave holding whites were defined as being not black. ‘Whiteness’ became a property,
status and identity that further separated them from African descendants (Harris 1993:7).
African Americans, whether enslaved or free, by and large had little recourse to
protection or opportunity. Institutional systems o f power, such as land tenure,
governmental representation and involvement, economic independence and legal

1 Here, ‘nation’ refers to the abstract commonalities individuals in a nation polity share, such as patriotic
symbols (national flag), annual rituals (Fourth of July) and a shared consensus o f pride and memory (the
idea that the United States is the most exceptional and best nation on earth). Ideas of nationhood and
nationalism always carry an agenda. O’Leary correctly states: “Although modem nations claim to be bound
together by essential unities and progressively unfolding histories—whether linked to civil or ethnic
narratives— what appears as a national consensus is only accomplished through the articulation of basically
unstable and often conflicting interests and their suturing into a sense of a unified national identity”
(O’Leary 1999:4).
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recourse were designed to fall largely outside of their command. The New Orleans Free
People of Color were the exception to this rule.
A combination of circumstances and fortitude enabled them to become the largest,
wealthiest and most educated group of African descendants in the ante-bellum nation.
Their degree o f political, social, economic, religious and cultural latitude not only tells a
remarkable story but also brings into focus New Orleans’ social structure, prevailing
attitudes and sites o f power. The FPOC’s collective wealth and education did not
guarantee socio-economic stability, however. Their rights and privileges were subject to
pre-emption at any time, and the longevity of their social status remained uncertain. In
fact, their growth and enfranchisement in the late eighteenth century would be steadily
stripped away a century later, after the failure of Reconstruction. The tension that
emerges from this tenuous position formatively shaped this group of people.
The circumstances that permitted the FPOC to grow and develop as a class inbetween enslaved Africans and slaveholding/non-slaveholding whites during the Spanish
colonial period changed abruptly with the 1803 Louisiana Purchase. The FPOC’s most
prosperous years coincided with the nation’s most formative and intolerant years. The
United States’ sense of purpose and identity turned out to be antithetical to who the
FPOC were and what they represented. No degree of wealth and education could grant
them the power and privilege of ‘whiteness.’ There was little room in the United States’
nineteenth-century national fabric for this group to be independent or ‘equal’ to the white
males in power.
The development of New Orleans and its diverse inhabitants during the French
and Spanish colonial periods (1718-1803) are examined in Chapter Two. The cultural and
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political influences o f both regimes on the FPOC’s allegiance and customs will explain
how and why this city culturally and socially paralleled and diverged from its former
British colonial and southern American neighbors. The resistance to American rule in the
nineteenth century is Chapter Three’s theme, and is best understood within the context of
New Orleans’ history and social structure in the eighteenth century. The effects of the
nineteenth-century’s events and political climates on the FPOC, from the ante-bellum
period to the Civil War and the Reconstruction and post-Reconstruction time periods is
Chapter Three’s topic. The FPOC’s definition and maintenance of its ethnic group
boundaries is foregrounded against the increasingly intolerant and narrow institutional
power structure that effectively closes in and shuts out the FPOC (Barth 1969:6). How
the FPOC fought back legislatively with the lawsuit that began Plessy v. Ferguson is
Chapter Four’s focus. The FPOC perhaps stood more to lose in the post-Reconstruction
period than any other group o f African Americans, because they began with the most
property, education and status. How they linked their cause and fight to the general plight
o f African Americans is an important chapter in this country’s history of nation-hood,
citizenship, race relations and the formation of what the American character is.
The democratic and capitalist Superpower status the United States presently
occupies was by no means inevitable. The country’s rise to power took place at the
expense and exclusion of the marginalized, who represented a different kind of nation.
The FPOC is one o f these groups. The first full century of the United States’ political
climate looked very different from the FPOC’s perspective, who stood marginally on the
brink o f power. A corrective history that shifts the historical focus from the privileged to
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the marginalized urges a reconsideration of what this group’s struggle meant for this
country’s development.
The simultaneous local and national process of ‘Americanization’ through the
lens o f the Free People o f Color makes a fascinating study. Before Louisiana became an
American state in 1812, it was a French and colonial territory populated by Canadian
settlers, French, German and Swiss immigrants, African slaves, and Indian polities native
to the Lower Mississippi Valley region. Many o f these individuals came into contact in
New Orleans, which had developed into a bustling urban port city by the end of the
'j

eighteenth century (Ingersoll 1999:xx). Many o f the reasons for which the nineteenthcentury process of Americanization proved difficult for the FPOC (discussed in Chapter
Three) are rooted in the city’s eighteenth-century political, socio-economic and cultural
fabric. The contrasting ideologies, social structures, cultural norms, expectations and
economic activities of New Orleanians clashed with the ‘white’ and ‘black’ Americans
who would later flock to the city. Fundamental differences in the role o f religion,
language, gender and racial/ethnic roles, economic opportunities and civil/political rights
contributed to the painful process of Americanization for many (if not most) native New
Orleanians.
The FPOC began to form a distinct group “within a primarily three-tiered social
order, distinct from whites and slaves” in the last few decades of the eighteenth century,

2

See Trachtenberg’s Shades o f Hiawatha for his paralleled discussion o f ‘Americanization’ processes
various immigrants and Indians were put through during the last few decades of the nineteenth century and
first few decades of the twentieth. He defines ‘Americanization’ as “a set of institutional devices and
regimes that operated with an a priori notion of what and who an American was supposed to be, an
essentialist idea of a presumed cultural nationality” (Trachtenberg 2004:xxii).
3
This region’s Indian polities include the Choctaws, Chickasaws, Alibamons, Tallapoosas, Abehkas,
Taensas, Natchez, and Tunicas (Usner 1992:28).
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under Spanish rule (Hanger 1997:2). It should be noted, however, that their privileged
existence was never guaranteed, and was characterized by an ambiguous status that was
lower than whites but higher than enslaved people (Hanger 1997:1). This polity (whether
considered as a group, class or caste) was not a monolith with identical views on every
issue; many FPOC wanted to be treated like, and accepted as, whites, while others wished
to remain connected to their African heritage and/or enslaved family (ibid.). One attribute
that distinguished the FPOC from enslaved Africans and other contemporaneous free
blacks in the United States was education in, and travel to, France, discussed at greater
length in Chapter Three.4 Many o f the well-to-do free people o f color who became
notable musicians, composers and writers in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries spent their formative education and career years in France. Such strong
connections to the metropole may offer insight into why the FPOC did not immediately
or wholeheartedly embrace other free(d) African Americans who migrated to the city in
the nineteenth century.
With their ‘hearts and minds’ turned more to France than the surrounding
American states and territories, the FPOC’s alliance with the common plight o f African
Americans would be a complicated and enduring process. This is not to say, however,
that one’s African heritage was viewed as shameful (Barthelemy 2000:273). An
allegiance to a major, Old World colonial power contrasted sharply with residents (most
of the population were not considered official citizens after the birth of the American
nation) whose allegiance was solidly rooted in the New World, as evidenced by the

4

See Chapter Seven in Desdunes’ work (1973) for an extended look at FPOC who pursued artistic careers
in France.

American Revolution. Understanding the FPOC’s relationship to what they were fighting
for and why will help set the stage for what was at stake in Plessy v. Ferguson.
Indeed, the allegiance many FPOC had to France formed the backbone of their
identity and ideology. Sybil Kein argues that the FPOC claimed the metropole “as a
spiritual home to which they felt they belonged culturally” (Kein 2000:179). Expatriation
to France for the purpose of education or career advancement was strongly supported by
wealthy white patrons and/or wealthy FPOC families (Kein 2000:181). While impossible
to definitively point to such French connections as evidence o f a decided loyalty to one
country over another, the frequent travel and prosperity talented artistic men and women
enjoyed must surely have had some influence.5 This practice o f patronage and
expatriation enabled the pursuit of opportunities not available to the majority of
American whites; the ‘land o f opportunity’ existed for some in France, not ‘America.’
Though the FPOC did not attain a distinct population or social stratum until the
end of the eighteenth century, when Louisiana became a Spanish territory, many cultural
elements of the French colonial period survived well into the nineteenth century. These
two periods will therefore both be considered. The paucity o f serious study and attention
scholars have devoted to the economic, political and socio-cultural development of
Louisiana in general and New Orleans in particular belies its historical importance (Kein
2000:xiii). If the writing, cataloguing, performance and selective representation o f history
are deliberate and careful acts, then their absence in written memory reflects their
perceived unimportance and threat (Trouillot 1995:26). The New Orleans Free People of
Color are an important part o f this country’s ideological development as a nation. In the
5 See Fabre’s extensive look at four men of color who benefited from expatriation, including Norbert
Rillieux, Camille Thierry, Victor Sejour, and Edmond Dede in Chapter Eight of Kein’s book (2000).

following chapter, the social organization, power loci, political economy and attitudes
of/in Louisiana in general and in New Orleans in particular will be examined.
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CHAPTER TWO
FRENCH COLONIAL PERIOD: 1718-1762
The French colonization of Canada and Louisiana both began modestly, with
“Canada as a trading post and Louisiana as a frontier garrison (Johnson 1992:30).6
Before the French made serious attempts to expand down the Mississippi River, they first
headed to New France (i.e. much of the territory that makes up present-day Canada). In
contrast to the British strategy of segregating native peoples from the colonizers,
assimilation was the preferred French strategy in New France. Louis XIV’s finance
minister, Jean-Baptiste Colbert, enacted this strategy by launching a ‘one-blood
program.’ Its policy actually encouraged intermarriage between the native Indians and
French colonizers (Johnson 1992:23). This is not to say that the French were necessarily
any more humanitarian or ‘caring’ than the British when native resistance conflicted with
their colonial plans; when events did not go their way, the French retaliated harshly. Two
examples of this are the French massacres of the Iroquois population in New France and
much of the Natchez nation in Louisiana (Johnson 1992:25).
Scholars and tourists alike have referred to New Orleans as the ‘most European’
or ‘un-American’ city in the United States. Whether a cliche or not, the truth in this
statement lies in the different histories, ideals and legacies the French and British left
behind in the United States’ regions they colonized. Unlike other major colonizing
European powers at the time—Dutch, Spanish, British, and Portuguese—the French
empire was more interested in commercial profit than territorial expansion. The
6 Johnson echoes others when he argues that an exhaustive study of the French colonization of Louisiana
has yet to be done (Johnson 1992:12).
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acceptable ways and means o f physical, social and sexual contact with Indians and even
African slaves were fundamentally different between the French and British.7
Although both colonizing powers considered the various Native American groups
they encountered to be ‘savage’ and inferior in some capacity, it was evident that these
native North American inhabitants were a collective force with which to be reckoned.8
The French chose to ally themselves with the various Native American groups in New
France (part o f modern-day Canada) and the Mississippi Region, from Louisiana to
Mobile, Alabama. The French partnership with Canadian Indians enabled them to survive
and profit handsomely from the fur trade. By and large, the Jesuits, coureurs-de-bois, and
other French colonizers recognized Indians as allies and partners, and did not object to
some cultural overlap and integration. In contrast to this French assimilationist ‘impulse,’
British Crown policies favored complete separation from the Indians they encountered
(Johnson 1992:15-16, 24). The difference in funding may also have played a key role in
the differing purposes and motivations o f the colonial ventures.
An in-depth look at the contrasting ways the French and British perceived Indians
ontologically is unfortunately beyond the scope of this thesis. There is, however, an
argument to be made for disparate values, lifestyles and customs that distinguished the
inhabitants o f the French territory ‘Louisiane’ from residents of other southern and
former British colonies such as South Carolina. Differences along linguistic, religious,

7

It should also be noted that the French and British enjoyed thirty years of peace that ended with France’s
involvement in the war against Austria in 1744 (Eccles 1998:192). However, for pragmatic and symbiotic
reasons, France and England agreed not to take over the other’s territorial holdings in the Caribbean (Eccles
1998:193).
g
Dickason argues that this image and notion of savagery enabled colonists to ignore the intricate New
World societies they encountered and instead superimpose European culture, religion, language and
socioeconomic dominance (Dickason 1984:59).
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ideological and cultural lines play a major role in how and why native New Orleans
creoles—both white and black— clung to a French ancestry. Specifically what they were
clinging to will be examined in greater detail in Chapter Three.
Louisiana’s population was a polyglot from the very beginning.9 The coureursde-bois (literally, “runners of the woods”), illegal French traders who regularly cohabited
with the surrounding Native American populations in Canada, played a major role in the
settlement and development of Louisiana (Johnson 1997:30). Many of the Frenchmen
who established Louisiana came from French territorial settlements in Canada, which has
an unique history o f its own. It has been argued that Louisiana, at least initially,
“represented an extension of the French experience in Canada” (Johnson 1997:19).
Recognizing the value o f the Indians’ knowledge and military prowess, brothers
Pierre le Moyne d’Iberville and Jean-Baptiste le Moyne de Bienville implemented a
version o f the one-blood program that viewed Indians as partners and allies. Bienville set
a tone of alliance-making. Indeed, the French colonists depended heavily upon the Indian
inhabitants o f Louisiana for survival; scarce food supplies, disease and an unfamiliar
climate left many o f the French unable to fend for themselves (Johnson 1992:32).
The French abandoned the assimilationist strategy of negotiation with the surrounding
Indian nations was abandoned when it was realized in the late 1600’s that “Canada’s
French were turning into Indians both in culture and in blood at a far more rapid rate than

9

The culinary metaphor of gumbo is useful here as an example of how various cultures melded to form
something new: “The colony’s ‘foodways’ also display evidence of cultural metissage. New Orleans
consumed European wheat flour brought down from the Illinois, com purchased from local Natives, rice
which Africans had been instrumental in introducing to the delta wetlands, green vegetables grown by
German settlers, okra favoured by black slaves, and bear grease (for cooking) purveyed by interior Indians”
(Greer 2003:108).
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the Indians were becoming French” (Johnson 1992:28). Once these undesired effects
became apparent, the one-blood program was abandoned, and expansion south of Canada
became more seriously considered.
French settlement in Louisiana and New France differed most strikingly in their
systems o f land tenure. Unlike New France’s heavily bureaucratic system of seigneurial
tenure, land was granted directly to planters in Louisiana (Greer 2003:106). A major
contrast between French colonial Louisiana and the French West Indian colonies was the
practice o f slavery. Whereas Saint-Domingue, France’s largest and most prosperous West
Indian colony, revolved mostly around the labor slaves produced and social hierarchy
slavery reinforced, it never dominated Louisiana’s society (Greer 2003:107).10 More
common than the grands blancs estate owners of Saint-Domingue were the small-scale
plantation owners who worked side-by-side with their slaves and engages (ibid.).
The many national, ethnic and racial groups that made up New Orleans’
population in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were far from homogenous. French
religious missionary leaders and settlers, and German and Swiss immigrants made up the
varied European population o f the French colonial period.11 Massive migrations from
Saint-Domingue during and after the Haitian Revolution greatly increased the city’s
population in the early nineteenth century, particularly the FPOC population. The

10Eccles argues that slavery in Louisiana can be seen as “intermediate” in centrality between New France
(where slavery existed but in very small numbers and slaves consisted mainly o f Indian captives) and SaintDomingue, where the number of slaves vastly outnumbered the French colonists (Eccles 1998:165).
11 Capuchins and Jesuits comprised the religious leaders in Louisiana (Eccles 1998:189). Their severe
disapproval of concubinage, plagage, and intermarriage (not to mention other examples of amorality) was
largely to no avail; such practices would continue throughout the French and Spanish colonial period
(Eccles 1998:190).
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importance of New Orleans’ demography is discussed to a greater extent in Chapter
Three.
Realizing that the geographically strategic location of Louisiana could potentially
slow or halt British and Spanish expansion in the area, the French began heading south in
the late 1600’s. Control over the Mississippi Region would afford the French an
uninterrupted route from Canada to the Gulf o f Mexico, and on to the Caribbean islands
(Poesch 1997:9). French colonial priorities began to shift from French dominated Canada
to British dominated North America, in order to prohibit the Spanish or British from
dominating the region. Maintaining a strong French colonial presence in the southern
part o f North America was important at the turn of the eighteenth century, because it was
unclear who would inherit the throne of Charles II of Spain—and thereby Spanish
territories in North America (ibid.).
The strategic attempt to connect French territories in present-day Canada, the
lower Mississippi Valley Region and the French Antilles “was combined with an
improbable plan to induce a fiscally naive aristocracy enervated by royal absolutism to
adapt overnight to a new world o f commercial capital” (Ingersoll 1999:6). On April 9,
1682, explorer Robert Cavaelier de La Salle claimed ‘Louisiane’ for the king of France
Louis XIV (Poesch 1997:3). In 1699, Pierre Lemoyne d’Iberville, one of the primary
French colonists in Canada, established with a group o f French Canadians a temporary
camp on Biloxi Bay (Eccles 1998:178). They had been successful together in leading
French colonial efforts throughout New France. In 1701, just two years later, Mobile was
settled and became the region’s “administrative center” until this function was moved to
New Orleans in 1722 (ibid.).
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Both Iberville and Bienville believed in the assimilationist tradition of French
colonization, and therefore did not discourage Indian and French relationships, which
produced mixed, or ‘creole,’ offspring. French colonists in Louisiana were not well
equipped militarily to deal with resentful Indian nations (Eccles 1998:187). Alliances
were soon established, however, thanks to Bienville’s skillful ability to negotiate with
initially hostile Indians (Eccles 1998:186). Had it not been for the Cherokee, Choctaw
and Alibamous Indian allies, the French colonists might have lost Louisiana and the
surrounding territories almost immediately (Eccles 1998:187). Indeed, Daniel Usner Jr.
premises his seminal book, Indians, Settlers & Slaves in a Frontier Exchange Economy
(1992) on the life-saving alliance between the Choctaw Indians and French colonists. The
Choctaws not only helped the early French colonists survive by providing subsistence,
but they also provided military protection against the British-allied Chickasaw Indians.
The colony’s economy finally began to thrive with the key participation of the
Choctaws in the deerskin trade. In addition to its strategic location, it was hoped that the
new territory would yield enough high-quality tobacco to suspend France’s dependency
on the Virginia-grown crop (ibid.). The value of Louisiana-grown and produced tobacco
and indigo decreased. The quality of tobacco grown in Louisiana’s marshy soils could not
compete with Virginia Chesapeake tobacco, and the labor-intensiveness o f indigo proved
not to be cost-effective (Berlin 1998:342).
The French attained official land grants in the bayous around Mobile in 1708
(Bureau 1968:9). Gaining control over major ports along the Mississippi River would
enable the French to effectively bar British westward expansion.

16

If Louisiana’s strategic usefulness was evident, its economic value was a different
story entirely; the territory was wholly dependent financially on the less-than-enthusiastic
French crown for subsistence.

19

In fact, Louisiana proved to be such an economic drain

on French state resources that Louis XIV seriously considering abandoning the territory
altogether (Eccles 1998:177). Poor planning was part of the problem, as well as an overly
ambitious vision of what this colonial project could become (Ingersoll 1999:3). Except
for the Indians native to the area, all of the Canadian, European and African inhabitants
were brought, either voluntarily or involuntarily, to the territory. In 1714, the French
constructed a military outpost at Natchitoches. 13
Three years later, John Law received a charter from the Duke o f Orleans to
develop Louisiana as a French territory (Bureau 1968:9).14 The colony was placed in his
care after private financier Antoine Crozat gave up control in 1717 (Usner 1992:32). It
would be “the largest colonial settlement ever undertaken by a European government”
(Ingersoll 1999:6). John Law’s Company of the Indies, before its ultimate collapse, was
the major supporter of French colonists in the New World, sending over 7000 colonists to
Louisiana alone between 1717 and 1721 (Sexton 1993:13). John Law’s presence, vis-avis the Company o f the Indies was so prescient that the earliest plantation in Louisiana is

12

To this effect, Eccles writes that Louisiana “never succeeded in justifying its economic existence”
(Eccles 1998:176).
13
The French expansion of territory in the lower Mississippi Valley inevitably meant encroachment onto
Spanish lands. Resentment o f this threat culminated after Louis XIV’s death when the French and Spanish
briefly went to war, in 1719 (Eccles 1998:185).
14
Law convinced the Duke of Orleans to establish the first national bank o f France and to subsequently
“link it with a joint-stock company enjoying a royal monopoly on overseas trade” (Ingersoll 1999:6). This
venture was part of a larger scheme to encourage the French elite to invest in commercial enterprises,
beginning with the ‘Mississippi’ stock issued for Louisiana (Ingersoll 1999:7).
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credited to the manager of the Company, who commissioned the Natchitoches Plantation
to be built in 1732 (Lane 1996:324).15
The political, economic and social development of Louisiana would officially fall
under the guise of the newly formed Compagnie des Indes—or Company of the Indies—
a decision that proved to be disastrous (Eccles 1998:182).16 The Company of the Indies
was funded by stocks, and when the “‘Mississippi’ stock bubble of 1720 [burst, it] ruined
Louisiana’s reputation,” Louis XV finally took control of the territory, in 1731 (Ingersoll
1999:xxi). Louisiana might well have been abandoned if not for his leadership, because
Louisiana had by then acquired a notorious and unfavorable reputation in France that
discouraged European immigration.
In 1718, Bienville officially established the city of New Orleans under the Duke
of Orleans’ regency (Ingersoll 1999:xxi). Bienville named New Orleans after Philippe,
due d’Orleans (Poesch 1997:14).17 The original city lies within the boundaries of the
Vieux Carre, known today as the French Quarter. With its fortifications, the town looked
very much like a colonial outpost; it was also designed to give the appearance of a stately
and (visually) important city (Heard 1997: l).18 Streets were planned a few years later in
1721, according to a street grid designed by Pierre Leblond de la Tour’s assistant, Adrian
de Pauger. The grid was common of many fortified towns planned in the late seventeenth
15 Today, the Natchitoches Plantation area remains important as the home of Creoles who continue to
recognize their heritage through festivals, tours, parades, and more.
16 Ingersoll aptly describes it as “an all-inclusive trade monopoly, the company o f all companies, based on
publicly traded shares, capitalized at the fabulous level of one hundred million livres” (Ingersoll 1999:7).
17 Many of the streets in the Nouvelle Orleans were given the prefix “St.” before the name to lend “useful
ambiguity between temporal and spiritual authority” (Heard 1997:3). Before much land could be
developed, however, the area needed to be cleared of the thick canebrake and forest that covered the land
(ibid).
18
A French military engineer, Pierre Leblond de la Tour designed the city, known today as the French
Quarter (Wilson 1974:3).
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and early eighteenth centuries (Bureau 1968:9). The city was actually not fortified until
1729, after the Natchez Revolt (Poesch 1997:11).
Bienville was replaced by Etienne de Perier, who served as the second governor
o f French colonial Louisiana. Unlike Bienville, Perier was not interested in maintaining
the relationship the first governor had cultivated and prioritized with the Natchez Indians.
He decided to claim large tracts o f valuable agricultural land from the Natchez Indians.
Perier wanted control over this Natchez-occupied land because the area’s fertile soil was
ideal for tobacco cultivation. Unhappy with this sudden displacement and seizure of land,
the Natchez and a few cooperating African slaves responded by killing 237 soldiers and
settlers (Johnson 1992:37). The French colonial government responded fiercely in 1729,
and in three years’ time, managed to annihilate much of the Natchez nation (ibid.). In
reward for their participation in the punishment of Natchez and, at other times, the
Chickasaw Indians, Perier freed a small number of enslaved Africans (Ingersoll 1999:77).
To make a point to the enslaved Africans who had participated in the revolt, the French
colonists effectively stopped their enslavement of Indians, thereby decreasing contact
(Usner 1992:58).
With the alliance between the settlers and Indians now destabilized, the Company
o f the Indies gave up on the colony o f Louisiana, and Bienville was reinstated once again
as governor (Johnson 1992:38). The Natchez revolt was the consequence o f Perier’s
inability to respect and negotiate with the Natchez Indians, as well as the French
authority’s reluctance to hand complete colonial control over to the local Louisiana
government (Ingersoll 1999:23).
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The shortsightedness of the French Crown caused many grave problems for the
economy and productivity of Louisiana. Even though the geography and climate was
much better suited to sugarcane production than tobacco, the Crown insisted that the
colonists grow the latter crop. The frustrated and starving colonists quickly saw the
futility o f attempting to grow tobacco and tried their hand at indigo instead (Ingersoll
1999:26). Although more successful than tobacco, indigo required much more labor than
was available in the territory (Ingersoll 1999:27). The French Crown refused to send a
large number o f enslaved persons to perform this labor, and the territory’s economy
limped on for much of the French colonial period.19 In the wake o f a labor shortage,
enslaved Africans were trained to perform a wide range o f occupations and became quite
skilled (Usner 1992:55).
Had the early inhabitants o f Louisiana been more familiar with the land and
which crops were best suited to it, or if more o f the earliest European immigrants in the
colony had survived and produced offspring, then perhaps the colonial authorities would
have enjoyed greater self-sufficiency. As it was, however, the first half of the French
colonial period was characterized by rampant disease, malnutrition and political
instability, which contributed to a remarkably high mortality rate.

Early Population
New Orleans was planned such that plantations would stand some distance from
the main commons and Vieux Carre areas. Fortifications were initially built by the
19

Ingersoll observes: “Perhaps the basic problem for Louisiana was the same as in other French colonies:
France was a remarkably traditional society with an inelastic work force, which discouraged both
industrialization and emigration” (Ingersoll 1999:27). ‘Traditional’ here means rigidly stratified along
class/caste lines.
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French, and then later rebuilt several times by the Spanish. The city was never as heavily
fortified as Charleston, South Carolina, however. New Orleans was largely designed as a
cosmopolitan port city, and was comprised mostly of French males in its earliest days.
There was an imbalanced sex ratio of European males to European females in the first
few decades. The lopsided ratio o f European men to women prompted interracial mixing
and a certain power structure between French men and Native American women (Sexton
1993:14). Some Indian women were enslaved and performed both domestic and wifely
duties as the matriarchal head of French colonial households. This “problem” was partly
alleviated with the immigration of more European women to the colonies after 1717
(Usner 1992:235). Over eighteen hundred engages came to Louisiana between 1717 and
1720 (Eccles 1998:183). Recruited from the streets and prisons of France, Switzerland
and Germany, the lower status o f such early settlers “gave Louisiana the foul reputation
of a penal colony,” though this was actually a mischaracterization (Eccles 1998:183;
Ingersoll 1999:13).20
Ingersoll writes that Louisiana’s negative image was further reinforced in Abbe
Prevost’s famed literary work, Manon Lescaut, which was set in the derelict society o f
Louisiana (1999:10).

9i

Louisiana’s social landscape, as described in this narrative,

reinforced the moral flexibility and chaos that may have dissuaded continuous European
immigration.
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Many of the European immigrants died soon after their arrival in

Alice Dunbar-Nelson puts it another way when she writes that Louisiana was “not immoral,” but
“unmoral” (Dunbar-Nelson 2000:5).
21 Ingersoll continues: “Prevost’s voluptuous Manon came to serve not only as a general eighteenth-century
metaphor for the unimproved and degenerative Western Hemisphere but also as a symbol of deprivation,
vice, and tyranny in New Orleans” (Ingersoll 1999:10).
22
Parts of New France also suffered from a low European immigration rate, which may reflect a general
attitude of suspicion to colonial settlement and the questionable fruitfulness of New World migration.
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Louisiana, which may have been a further detractor (1999:13). Ingersoll overemphasizes
the stability and coherence of the ‘white’ slaveholding society, but does provide an useful
classificatory list of immigrant arrivals during the years o f 1718 and 1721: “officers
(military and administrative), concessionaires or their agents, company clerks and
employees, company laborers (artisans), Indentured (unskilled and skilled), White
women, White children, Deportees (farmers and indigents), and soldiers (1999:11).

The

white population at large barely resembled a social structure reminiscent of the Old
World, because there were no immigrants from the richest nobility or poorest peasantry
classes (1999:10,12).
Ingersoll’s characterization of the early ‘white’ immigrant population becomes
suspect when he writes that the colony was actually not made up o f French society’s
undesirables because “for the actual criminals and ‘libertines’ who arrived in Louisiana,
life was short, and ultimately they played a small part in the colony’s history (1999:12).
This statement, and others like it, support Ingersoll’s larger description of the white
planter class as respectable, competent and coherent. His structural-functionalist look at
early French Louisiana is driven by an almost deterministic understanding o f slave
societies, which he deems this territory to be (1999:xv). One o f the difficulties in
analyzing Louisiana’s cultural, socio-economic and political history, aside from the need
to be linguistically and historically fluent in Spanish and French colonialism (and aware
o f contemporaneous American developments) is the need to sift through an
historiography that is often contradictory.
23

This list is taken from Table 1, in which Ingersoll provides the number of how many people made up
each category. Out of a total o f 8,921 people brought to Louisiana in these four years, 1,901 were African
slaves. So many ‘white’ immigrants died, however, that African slaves, arguably better able to adjust to
Louisiana’s sub-tropical climate, soon outnumbered the ‘white’ population (Ingersoll 1999:11).
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Ingersoll’s focus on Louisiana’s social structure blinds him to the agency and
influence of the various groups involved. He is at times overly simplistic and too eager to
draw comparisons, as when he writes: ‘T he basic character o f society was the same in
New Orleans as in Wood’s South Carolina, Kulikoff s Prince George’s County, or
anywhere else where the labor of black slaves was the mainstay o f the economy”
(Ingersoll 1999:xviii).

Slavery and the Slave Trade

The status o f the white planters was directly proportional to how many slaves one
owned (Ingersoll 1999:44). The slaveholding planters had much to worry about. There
were several incidents of ‘slave crimes,’ including running away. Called petit marronage
by the French, it might have been a more common occurrence outside of New Orleans,
on the rural Louisiana plantations, than within the town (Ingersoll 1999:85). However,
there are few documented instances of slave rebellion after the year 1731, which Ingersoll
summarily attributes to the functioning machinery of Louisiana’s ‘slave society’
(1999:95). He attributes the lack of collaboration between non-slaveholding whites and
enslaved persons to “the gemeinschaft character of the New Orleans community”
(1999:103). Portraying the slaveholding and non-slaveholding whites and enslaved
Africans each as a kind o f monolith allows him to draw such sharp distinctions between
groups and predict their behavior, which he implies is socio-economically determined. I
would argue that where Ingersoll writes “gemeinschaft (or community—individually
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focused),” he really means “gesellschaft (or society—structurally focused).” Nothing
connotes an enslaved person’s status as property to be bought and sold more than the
legal side of such transactions. Freeing or buying a slave for a future spouse and/or
leaving enslaved persons to one’s children in a will served as the greatest pronouncement
of a slaveholder’s status (Ingersoll 1999:97). It reinforced the vast divisions between
those who were and were not enslaved. However, analyses o f slavery and enslaved
persons has moved beyond the simplistic idea that a person’s enslaved or free status is the
total sum of that person’s life, culture and behavior. Even under the most oppressive of
circumstances, no two people act or think exactly alike. Ingersoll’s behavioral predictions
precludes the possibility of variance among enslaved persons, which is an outdated and
reductionist conclusion.
The slave trade during the French colonial rule of New Orleans can be understood
against the backdrop o f the slave trade in the West Indies and the rest o f the American
South.

OA

Discussed at much greater length in the section on Spanish colonial rule, the

ability for the FPOC to develop as a group rested on the manner, frequency and
possibility of manumission and/or self-purchase. Manumission was key to the growth of
the FPOC. Since children took on the status o f their mother, the freedom o f women was
usually purchased first (Berlin 1998:334).
The first slave ship to arrive from Africa in Louisiana landed in 1719 (Mosadomi
2000:229). Between the years 1719 and 1731 the Company of the Indies sponsored the
landing of sixteen Louisiana-bound ships from Senegal (ibid.). Unlike other parts of
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Slave labor consisted o f plantation and artisanal/domestic labor (Greer 2003:107).
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North America that received slaves from Africa by way o f the Caribbean, the slaves
brought to Louisiana during this period knew no other part o f the New World .
Ira Berlin, Eugene Genovese, John Blassingame and others have done useful
comparative studies between the political economy, social structure and social relations
in the Upper South, Lower South and Deep South.

9c

How slavery and social hierarchy

functioned in Louisiana affected the formative identity o f the FPOC, and distinguished
New Orleans race relations from elsewhere in the South. There are dangers to such
comparisons, as exemplified by Ingersoll’s interpretation and refutation of the
Tannenbaum Thesis. Sociologist Frank Tannenbaum sparked a debate in his 1947 book,
Slave and Citizen, over the development of race relations and social structures within
slave societies. He argued that “a colonizing nation’s institutions, laws, and traditions
exerted the greatest influence on slave treatment in that nation’s American dominions and
that this treatment in turn influenced the quality o f race relations between free persons
and freedpersons” (Hanger 1997:3). Tannenbaum then went on to rank how enslaved
persons fared. In this continuum, Spain and Portugal ranked the best, France and Holland
fell in the middle, and Britain was ranked the worst (ibid.).
Ingersoll states that New Orleans’ history of French, Spanish and American rule,
respectively, should serve as a suitable test case in which to try out Tannenbaum’s
argument. Ingersoll concludes that the argument does not hold up because “laws or
religion had little or no influence on either the planter class or the condition o f black
slaves or free blacks” (Ingersoll 1998:xviii). Hanger’s Bounded Lives, Bounded
Places argues the opposite. Her book is premised on the direct correlation between
25

See Ira Berlin’s Many Thousands Gone (1998), Eugene Genovese’s The Political Economy o f Slavery
(1988), and John W. Blassingame’s Black New Orleans (1973).
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lenient Spanish laws of manumission and self-purchase (known as coartacion) and the
development of the FPOC. As she reports it, the high degree o f manumission amongst
Spanish colonies played a key role in the ability o f the FPOC to develop into a social
stratum. The reader must discern the consensus and dissent in the historiography, and
decide which ideas are more convincing. Hanger’s analysis and interpretation of
Tannenbaum’s thesis is clearly much more convincing than Ingersoll’s; his
conclusion takes a more positivistic and objective approach that does not allow for
ambiguity.
Another example of a sometimes contradictory historiography is evidenced by the
disagreement among scholars as to who exactly made up the African slave
populations. Ingersoll states that most of the slaves were “either Senegalese, Guineas,
Bambaras, or Ibos” (Ingersoll 1999:69). He argues that it was “relatively easy” to tell
where a slave was originally from by their accents and other linguistic markers, or the
presence o f certain patterns of body scarification (ibid.). Hall argues that two-thirds of
the African slaves that came to Louisiana were from Senegambia, and that their
relative homogeneity helped them ‘Africanize’ New Orleans (Hall 1992:29).
Whether the enslaved persons in New Orleans developed a distinctly ‘African’ or
‘Creole’ culture is beyond the scope of this Thesis. It is important to note, however,
that the direct trading of slaves between the African continent and Louisiana basically
ended by the year 1729 (Hall 1992:43). Henceforth, slaves came via the Caribbean,
through Spanish territories in North America, or from other American states (Kein
2000:168). The slave revolution in Saint-Domingue that culminated in Haitian
Independence prompted the wary Spanish colonizers and paranoid French planters to
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restrict slave trading in Louisiana (Berlin 1998:340; Hanger 1997:6). The importation
of slaves was forbidden by the year 1796 (Berlin 1998:340). Although the slave trade
was banned in Louisiana and nation-wide at various times, slavery itself would not
come to a screeching halt until the Civil War. One way to get around some of the
slave trade restrictions, such as the 1804 United States restriction on foreign-born
slaves, was to import slaves through Spanish-ruled territories (Berlin 1998:340-341).
By the late eighteenth century, the demand for slave labor and Spanish laws that
permitted the slave trade resulted in an increased rate not seen since the 1720s (Berlin
1998:341). The Louisiana population would be predominantly (both enslaved and
free) African American well into the nineteenth century (Berlin 1998:342).
Enslavement would supersede manumission (Berlin 1998:357).

Spanish Rule in Louisiana: 1768-1803

In 1759, the French colony of Quebec fell to the British. Louisiana governor Louis
Billouart de Kerlerec then had more fortifications built, ultimately to no avail. The
French and Indian War, or Seven Years’ War struck a fatal blow to French colonial
ambitions and in effect ended French colonial rule in Canada and Louisiana. With its
military and food resources completely drained, ‘Louisiane’ was surrendered to Spain,
where it became ‘Luisiana’ (Sexton 1993:16). At the same time, French Canadian
territories were falling to the British. Thousands of French settlers who had established
themselves in Acadia were forced out. Many found their way to Louisiana after 1765 and
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formed what is today known as the Cajun culture (Dominguez 1997:101; Usner
1992:109).26
The French Crown was forced to give the British all of their territories east of the
Mississippi River (except New Orleans) that included such important holdings as Baton
Rouge, Louisiana, Natchez, Mississippi, and Mobile, Alabama. The French lost New
Orleans as well in 1768, when it surrendered the city to Spain (Bureau 1968:11).
‘Surrender’ may not be the proper descriptive term here, since Louisiana had been
nothing but an economic drain on the French crown (Hanger 1997:7). The transfer of
Louisiana to Spanish rule was accomplished with the signing of the 1762 Treaty of
Fontainebleau and the 1763 Treaty o f Paris that ended the Seven Years’ War (ibid.). The
Spanish empire in North America continued to expand; the Spanish had claimed
Pensacola, all of western Florida and Natchez (Mississippi), and Mobile (Alabama) by
the year 1783 (Berlin 1998:327).
The transfer of Louisiana from French to Spanish rule was intentionally done in
secret. Most New Orleans residents did not even realize the change in power until several
years after the fact.27 French and Spanish concerns about the population’s reaction and
potential rebellion motivated discretion. The first Spanish Governor of Louisiana,
Antonio de Ulloa y de la Torre Guiral was driven out o f the colony only two and a half
years after he took over by the frustrated French planter class and other non-slave holding
whites (Hanger 1997:8). The Spanish authorities reacted swiftly, sending General
26

For a brief overview of Acadian history and culture, see chapter 6 in Greer 2003, entitled “Beyond
Canada.”
27
Hanger lists the official dates of Spanish rule as 1763-1803 and the actual dates of control as 1769-1803
(Hanger 1997:1). Usner states that Spanish took over Louisiana in 1762 (Usner 1992:105). Hall and
Ingersoll both comment that Spain ‘actually ruled’ Louisiana during the years of 1769 and 1803 (Hall
1992:276; Ingersoll 1999:148).
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Alejandro O ’Reilly in with troops to quell the rebellion and establish order (ibid.). In fact,
once some of the legislative effects o f Spanish colonial rule were felt, citizens began to
rebel. The rebellion was quickly put down, with Spanish rule being firmly and officially
established in 1768 (Bureau 1968:11). The Cabildo, located in the heart of the Vieux
Carre, became the seat o f the Spanish Government. The Spanish did not alter the city
plan to any great extent, but did in 1788 extend New Orleans’ fortifications away from
the Vieux Carre into the Faubourg St. Marie, later known as the American Sector.
As the Spanish assumed control o f Louisiana, they found it much easier to enforce the
de facto and de jure rules the French had already set in place. Not everything remained
the same, however. Two landowning classes were created under Spanish rule: the
peasants or small farmers— who would become “the ‘poor whites’ o f the antebellum and
postbellum South— and estate owners (Dominguez 1997:103). The “Spanish laws
legitimated the differentiation o f rights to land in the New World by identifying
meritocracies and creating aristocracies” (Dominguez 1997:104).
Spain also recognized and documented distinctions between enslaved and free
African Americans, as well as pardo (or light-skinned) and moreno (or dark-skinned)
black persons (Hanger 1997:12). The Spanish separated the Free Black militia into pardo
and Moreno units. These units were very active, serving in each military effort during the
period of Spanish rule (Hanger 1997:109). Free Black militiamen were accorded status,
as well as wages. According to Hanger, this institution was most responsible for bringing
about a common identity and purpose among the FPOC (or the jib r e s j as she calls this
group) (Hanger 1997:134). The Free Black militia became an important avenue of
freedom, as enslaved people were able to use their military wages to purchase their own,
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or someone else’s, freedom. Once free, however, the effects of changes brought about by
freedom could take more than one generation to become manifest (Hanger 1997:17).
Spain recognized the importance o f immigration in this new territory to offset the
power of the antagonistic French, develop the economy and enlarge the military (Hanger
1997:8). In contrast to their intended goal o f bringing Spaniards to the territory, Spanish
authorities actually attracted Anglo-American immigrants (ibid.). Louisiana began to
prosper more and more steadily in the last few decades of the eighteenth century;
although it took nearly three-quarters of a century, the colony finally began to live up to
its economic potential (Hanger 1997:10).

9o
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The Spanish legalized the slave trade; many

enslaved persons came from Saint-Domingue, Cuba, the Bight of Benin, the Bight of
Biafra and Central Africa (ibid.). The revolt in Saint Domingue that began in the 1790s
prompted the Spanish governor Fran9ois-Louis Hector, baron de Carondolet et Noyelles
(known as ‘Carondolet’) closed off the importation o f slaves from this revolution-stricken
colony (Hanger 1997:11). The continuation of the Haitian Revolution prompted
Carondolet to put a ban on slave imports from outside of North America until the year
1800 (ibid.).
All of the various groups populating New Orleans grew tremendously during Spanish
rule; Hanger estimates that the population o f all white residents almost doubled in size;
the slave population grew to be more than two and half times its previous number, and
the FPOC population grew ‘sixteenfold’ (Hanger 1997:21, 23). While the FPOC
population grew significantly during this period, its numerical, social, political and
economic dominance was nowhere near that of the Saint-Domingue gens de couleur libre
28

Hanger writes: “During the years of Spanish rule New Orleans became less of a frontier town and more
o f a cosmopolitan commercial city” (Hanger 1997:23).
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elite (Hanger 1997:55). One commonality between the Saint-Domingue and New Orleans
FPOC was the desire “to reform, not revolutionize, a system that condemned them
outright for being nonwhites” (Hanger 1997:136).

Code Noir and Coartacion
Louisiana’s first French colonial governor, Bienville, introduced the Louisiana
Code Noir, or Black Code, in 1724 as a guideline for how to take care o f slaves (DunbarNelson 2000:6). Modeled after the 1685 French Code Noir first implemented in colonial
Saint-Domingue, it outlined the allowed severity of punishment and stated the provisions
slaveowners were required by law to provide for the survival of their slaves. The
legislated treatment of enslaved Africans shows the role law played early on in shaping
and/or reinforcing interaction between certain groups. As with all laws, its guidelines and
rules were locally interpreted and enacted (Ingersoll 1999:104). In a comment almost
counter to his argument o f rigid social divisions in accordance with the local social
structure, Ingersoll states:

. .the natural propensity of human beings to socialize was a

strong challenge to the regime o f the slaveholding class.. .This is why the code was aimed
at whites and blacks, not at masters and slaves. The rules of race subordination had to be
inculcated in ordinary white people to counter natural human tendencies” (Ingersoll
1999:105). The Louisiana Black Code directly attempted to enforce what the 1685 Code
Noir only hinted at, namely the minimizing of a free black population and incidents of
miscegenation (Ingersoll 1999:139).
Spanish laws drew on the Louisiana 1724 Black Code, as well as guidelines in
Las Sietes Partidas and the Recopilacion de leyes de los reinos de las Indias (or
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Compilation of the Laws of the Kingdoms of the Indies) (Hanger 1997:24). A provision
in the Louisiana Black Code gave freed blacks all of the legal rights of citizenship
(Hanger 1997:25). Although legal rights did not always correspond directly with the local
enforcement of them, the growth of the FPOC gave the laws new meaning. A Spanish
law that began in Cuba and operated in full force in Louisiana was coartacion, or a
slave’s right to self-purchase (ibid.). As with other social divisions that followed a color
line designating greater privilege to lighter-skinned blacks, manumission—required by
law to be initiated by a third-party, which in most cases was the master or a relative who
was free— occurred most often among thepardos. Self-purchase was more common
among morenos. Slaves were sometimes also freed in the slaveholder’s will (Hanger
1997:34). Manumissions were more often granted to females than to males (Hanger
1997:31).

Congo Square and Quadroon Balls

Congo Square, a “century-long market and performance area,” is touted as evidence
o f the strong African influences slaves and freed blacks brought to, and continued in,
New Orleans (Gehman 2000:210). As with the practice of Voodoo/Hoodoo, the events
and exact functions o f Congo Square are shrouded in myth and mystery. Still, it is known
that the slaves used the gathering space to dance, play music, cook, socialize and engage
in market buying and selling. Among the best known dances are the Bamboula and
Calinda (Kein 2000:125). Approximately eighty songs have survived, some of which
may have been played at Congo Square (ibid.).
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Although Congo Square was designated by the local authorities as a permissible
space for slaves to publicly congregate (and therefore be 'supervised’) on Sunday, their
one day off, its infectious music and reportedly lively scene drew other New Orleans
residents. The tradition began in the 1740s and continued into the nineteenth century. As
a public space created and inhabited primarily by slaves and a private, exclusive social
event designed to present the upper echelon of light-skinned free women to potential
white suitors, Congo Square and quadroon balls represent two ends of the African
American continuum (Benfey 1997:36). The fluidity and/or rigid separation between the
various individuals involved in such events as Congo Square Sunday gatherings and
quadroon balls is a central research question that will be explored throughout this work,
because it demonstrates how emphatically divisions of enslaved and free African
Americans were enforced or overlooked.
Though the French language and many other French colonial customs carried
over during the Spanish colonial reign, the Spanish left their architectural mark after two
devastating fires (1788, 1794) created the need for much rebuilding.

Architectural

Spanish additions such as courtyards and the Cabildo, Presybytere and St. Louis
Cathedral buildings added further grandeur and importance.

TO

The transition to American

rule was made much harder for New Orleans residents who saw few radical changes
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In fact, until the major fires of 1788 and 1794, during which over 900 buildings burned down, French
and Spanish buildings looked relatively similar (Poesch 1997: 14). Because so much of the city had been
burned down— four-fifths of the populated city—due mainly to the use of non-fireproof materials, new
regulations were instated that required buildings to be made of brick (Poesch 1997: 37,43).
30
Important buildings such as the St. Louis Cathedral were rebuilt after the previous Spanish church burnt
down in the first fire (Lane 1996: 333). The St. Louis Cathedral, Presbytere and Cabildo were designed by
Father Gilbert Guillemard (Lane 1996: 334). His designs reflected the neoclassicist style popular in both
Spain and France in the second half of the eighteenth century.
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under Spanish rule. The Spaniards did not, for example, insist that the population learn
Spanish or stop speaking French, as the Americans did with their insistence on English as
the only official language.
The FPOC developed into a fully-fledged, albeit numerically small, group under
Spanish rule. Berlin writes that for the free blacks, “the Spanish Crown had been their
most reliable patron, that they owed their freedom to Spanish law, and that the only thing
standing between them and the slave-hungry French planter class was the good will of
Spanish imperial bureaucrats” (Berlin 1998:351). Their population grew significantly and
achieved some political clout (Johnson 1997:52; Berlin 1998:325). The Spanish benefited
from the FPOC’s military abilities to help secure the colony. The FPOC stood to gain
even more, because wages earned from militia service enabled them to purchase many
enslaved people’s freedom (Johnson 1997:54). Carondolet endeared himself to the FPOC
by expanding the free black militia (Berlin 1998:351).
The population of New Orleans increased dramatically during the Spanish
Colonial period, quickly outgrowing its original city plan (Sexton 1993:18). To solve the
problem of land space, exacerbated by the constant flooding o f the river and the lack of
technology in the eighteenth century to drain the levees, plantations were moved upriver
(in what would become the American Sector).31 The area downriver became divided up
into residential Faubourgs, or suburbs, two of which would become known as the Creole
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The city’s biggest topographical challenge was the need to drain excess water that continually threatened
to overtake land. The introduction of levees did much to help alleviate this, and was the eighteenth and
nineteenth century answer to too much water. But it was not until technology was invented in the late
nineteenth and twentieth centuries that enabled the city streets to actually be drained of water that flooding
was brought under control (Sexton 1993:7).
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sectors. Various technologies made Louisiana’s land more suitable for crop cultivation on
plantations.
Berlin summarizes succinctly the influence o f foodways on the colony’s
economy. Cotton remained the major crop in northern Louisiana and the land west of the
Mississippi (Berlin 1998:343). Slave labor provided many of the key commodities and
foodstuffs during this period (1998:344). Areas of Louisiana where sugar was produced
“generated numerous opportunities for skilled workers” (1998:347). Carondolet acted as
a kind of protector for the slaves (1998:352). While slaves dreamed of their freedom,
French planters under Spanish rule dreamed o f more autonomy (1998:351).
At the turn of the nineteenth century, Louisiana’s economy shifted from one
based on trade with newly-formed American states, to one driven by a rising ‘merchant
class’ (Johnson 1997:56). In 1778, the Spanish Governor Bernardo Galvez altered some
o f the terms of New Orleans trade, allowing United States merchants, including
Bostonians, to trade freely (Sexton 1993:18).
Spanish laws did not discourage a distinct tri-partite society that included white
planters and estate owners, free people of color and slaves (Dominguez 1997:24).
Relationships between whites and FPOC were discouraged, although enabling quadroon
balls and such arrangements as plagage expanded and flourished (ibid.). Intermixture
among various groups continued, therefore, without much legislative interference.
Platpage, known also as ‘left-handed marriages,’ were contractual arrangements between
white men and light-skinned, elite free women o f color (Martin 2000:68). Many free
women of color became quite wealthy through property left in white male spouses and
heirs left to their placee in wills (ibid.).
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The quadroon balls that began in the 1790s were the main venue through which these
young women were presented, courted and controlled (Bryan 2000:51).

'i

They were a

way o f showing off available females of color to interested white men. Highly formal and
selective, they often resulted in pla9age, in which the white man became the patron of the
woman (or ‘placee’). As an institution, pla9age endured between the years 1780 and 1850
(Bryan 2000:52). Here, gender played a striking role. Female women o f color had little
social mobility, political clout, economic freedom or legal rights. Pla9age provided social
and economic security and ensured the possibility and continuation of a certain lifestyle
for the placee and any future children.
Laws restricting inheritance/paternity rights and interracial relationships would not be
enforced until Louisiana came under American leadership. As the New Orleans society
became more stratified, physical differences between slaves and FPOC also became more
distinct. Put simply: “It was no accident that the slaves grew darker as the free blacks
grew lighter” (Berlin 1998:349). Berlin further describes the FPOC population as “urban,
female, and light skinned” (Berlin 1998:334). The FPOC in New Orleans owned more
slaves than their free black American ‘counterparts’ anywhere else in the nation (Sullivan
2000:74). Unlike in other slave regions, enslaved workers in colonial Louisiana were
allowed, indeed ‘encouraged,’ to do contract work in addition to their regular duties
(Gehman 2000:210).

32 One of the most important balls was the Bal de Cordon Bleu or ‘Society Ball’ (Martin 2000:65). The Bal
de Cordon Bleu was thrown by the upper-crest elite FPOC whose wealthy families became known as the
cordon bleus (ibid.). This ball was much more exclusive and slightly different in function than quadroon
balls (ibid.).
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The various groups that made up the New Orleans social structure and society had
been put into place by the end of the eighteenth century. The FPOC had become a sizable
group: Hanger calculates that in 1771 FPOC were 3.1% of the total population (3,127
individuals); in 1791 they were 17.1% (5,037 individuals); by 1805, they made up 19.0%
of the total population (8,222 people) (Hanger 1997:18). New Orleans had an
agriculturally-based economy and was developing into a bustling and thriving port. From
the perspective o f the FPOC, the relatively smooth transition from French to Spanish
power in no way prepared them for the abrupt process of Americanization that began in
1803. The socio-cultural identities of the FPOC and French planter class had become
firmly established, though unequally protected, by the end of the Spanish rule. What
happened over the next century was a reflection of the nation’s growing pains
experienced across the country. The struggle over who would control New Orleans, and
the destiny of the country, had only just begun.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE PROCESS OF AMERICANIZATION IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
Fredrik Barth’s introductory chapter to his edited work, Ethnic Groups and
Boundaries: the Social Organization o f Culture Difference focuses on the creation,
shifting and maintenance of ethnic boundaries. In the preface, he emphasizes three key
points that frame his argument about what ethnicity is and how it functions: ethnicity is
essentially “the social organization of culture difference”; “ethnic identity is a matter of
self-ascription and ascription by others in interaction”; and “the cultural features of
greatest import are boundary-connected” (Barth 1969:6). According to such categorical
attributes, the New Orleans Free People of Color (henceforth ‘FPOC) were an ethnic
group. This particular group of individuals formed an exclusive and distinct culture that
adhered to certain values, loyalties and milieux.
Individuals bom in Saint-Domingue, New Orleans and elsewhere made up the
FPOC, proving Barth’s first point about ethnicity as organized cultural difference. Some
were bom as slaves and acquired freedom through self-purchase and manumission (made
all the more accessible thru coartacion), while others had never known slavery. Though
much united the FPOC, they were by no means a monolithic group. Barth’s second point
about ethnicity as both ‘self-ascription and ascription’ is key to understanding and
historically situating them. While the FPOC took care to erect and enforce their own
group boundaries, they were also seen from the outside as the non-white ‘other.’ The
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For discussions of this, see Dominguez’s White by Definition and Hirsch and Logsdon’s Creole New
Orleans for lengthy discussions of how and why the FPOC were ‘othered’ at various points in the
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systemic process o f manumission that enabled their population growth in the late
eighteenth century, generations of property inheritance and wealth transmission,
quadroon balls, French-language newspapers and exclusive societies all served the needs
and reinforced the bounded interests of this group. Over the course o f the nineteenth
century, American legislators and authorities would see the FPOC not as equals or near
equals, but as a group standing on the wrong side of the racial dividing line. The one-drop
rule, Jim Crow segregation and white supremacy all served to ascribe a second-class
status to the FPOC that placed them on equally unprivileged footing with other
‘Negroes.’ The more American racial dichotomies took hold of Louisiana custom and
law, the more this group faced displacement and were disadvantaged.
Barth’s third point that “cultural features of greatest import are boundaryconnected” gives meaning to what was at stake in the Plessy v. Ferguson case (Barth
1969:6). The ability for this group to continue existing as such had been steadily
challenged throughout the century. An erosion of rights and protections in the postReconstruction era sealed their fate. As external pressures and the country’s Zeitgeist
continued to change and shift, the alliances and shared commonalities of FPOC with
other people of color also changed. The end of slavery softened the demarcation between
freedom and enslavement, and several decades of Americanization brought closer
together black Anglophone Americans and Francophone FPOC.34 By the end of the
nineteenth century, the fight for Homer Plessy’s right to travel on a first-class railway car
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Both books also serve as excellent historiographical references that
easily point the interested reader in the right direction for further reading.
34
Logsdon and Bell argue that the fight for quality education, a stronger connection to other people of
African descent through political organizations, and social gatherings brought the FPOC and other African
descendant peoples together in the second half of the nineteenth century (Logsdon and Bell 1992:242-245).
The authors describe this process as ‘creolization’ (Logsdon and Bell 1992:244).
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within the state of Louisiana represented the mobility and freedom of all people of color,
who shared the burden o f racism and systemic discrimination. The isolation of the FPOC
separate and apart from other blacks at the time became less sensible and feasible as the
threat of absorption or dissolution became real.
This chapter examines how the FPOC embodied the definition of an ethnic group
based on Barth’s criteria: “largely biologically self-perpetuating”; “shares fundamental
cultural values, realized in overt unity in cultural forms”; “makes up a field of
communication and interaction”; and has a membership which identifies itself, and is
identified by others, as constituting a category distinguishable from other categories of
the same order” (Barth 1969:10-11). The parameters of Barth’s theoretical grounding o f
what ethnic groups are and how they function is useful, as is his emphasis on agency.
He explicitly writes against a positivistic, ecologically determined evolution that views
the perpetuation and extinction o f some cultures as inevitable. The struggle over power
and control in New Orleans was shaped in part by events and ideologies elsewhere in the
United States. The responses o f various groups to different struggles and challenges
happened phenomenologically, or on the ground. Put simply, this chapter looks at how
“the agents of change” reaffirmed, defined, strengthened and solidified the identity and
relevance of the FPOC during the nineteenth century (Barth 1969:33).
35

For an application of Barth’s theories of ethnicity with regard to New Orleans white and black Creoles,
see Virginia Dominguez’s seminal book White by Definition. She premises her look at creole identities on
the contradictory idea that white creoles and creoles of color (or free people o f color) by the very definition
of each group’s boundaries can not accept the existence o f the other. Each group’s desire to hold onto a
history that is largely shared (though experienced differently) is ironic, problematic and difficult for any
scholar to understand. She uses Fredrik Barth’s notions of ethnicity as a starting point for understanding
racial/ethnic categorization and classification in New Orleans. Dominguez successfully shows how
individual relationships and structural entities interlock to exclude and include, and what this means for the
rights and opportunities of the various groups involved.
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The FPOC’s activities, aspirations, struggles and identity formation will be
examined in accordance with the chronology o f the nineteenth century. The century’s
major time periods that will guide this discussion are the ante-bellum period, the Civil
War, Reconstruction, and Post-Reconstruction. More generally, the FPOC’s rights and
opportunities before and after the Civil War serve as a marker of comparison. The rights
and status of all people of color dramatically changed during and after the Civil War,
beginning with the Emancipation Proclamation and Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments, and continuing with other legislative and judicial laws passed through the
Reconstruction era. The FPOC suddenly had to cast their lot with other people of African
descent, whether they liked it or not. The group’s self-preservation shifted from a strong
focus on French ancestry and heritage to the retention and protection of the rights and
freedoms they had enjoyed until the Civil War. In short, external circumstances and
events of the nineteenth century dramatically changed the position and status of the
FPOC. A look into how this history is remembered among Creoles today would nicely
complement this thesis, but is beyond the text’s scope.
In Chapter Four, the ways in which the FPOC directly responded to the erosion
of their rights with a legislative challenge o f Plessy v. Ferguson will be described. Their
significance and historical impact will be contextualized and examined through their
deliberate actions and initiations. As Barth states: “ .. .people’s categories are for acting,
and are significantly affected by interaction rather than contemplation” (Barth 1969:29).

Nativism and the Problematic Definition of ‘Creole’
The question of nativism and who deserves to have citizenship rights are central
problems that play out on the nineteenth-century American stage. The question of
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who is an American and what characteristics define one as such became a locus of
struggle. In New Orleans, the native-born New Orleanians fought diligently to retain the
customs and realms of power with which they were acquainted. This fight to define
oneself ethnically, racially and politically was also taking place at the national level,
where restrictions on immigration were signaling who was deemed fit to join this new
nation.36
The term ‘Creole,’ as it refers to a person native to Louisiana, was written in
lowercase letters in the eighteenth century, but began to be capitalized in the nineteenth
century (Dominguez 1997:96-97).

In New Orleans, ‘Creole’ has had an amazingly

complex history.38 After the Civil War, when New Orleans began to be more divided
along racial lines, white Creoles claimed that they held reign over the term. ‘Creole,’
when referring to a white New Orleans native was a noun, and became an adjective when
used by, or in reference to a person of color.39 Dominguez’s book looks in detail at how
and why white Creoles do not acknowledge that there is any such group as Creoles of

To the larger historical question of who was excluded and included in American citizenship,
Trachtenberg writes: “We must begin with the paradox of saying ‘native’ in a nation of immigrants. For the
least disputable statement one can make about the United States of America is that it has always been and
always will be a nation of immigrants of all hues. All Americans, whether of the United States or of any
country in the hemisphere, derive in historical time from elsewhere— all, that is, except for the natives
whom Columbus misnamed Indians...That exception makes the name ‘American’ an exceptionally rich,
multiple signifier with a diffuse ambiguity that affects all aspects of the story that unfolds in the pages that
follow” (Trachtenberg 2004:7).
37
There are three different ‘ideological theories’ of the ethnogenesis of the Louisiana Creole: an
exclusively French origin, ‘hybrid’ origin and African origin (Gehman 2000:230).
38
Dominguez finds seven categorical uses of ‘Creole’ in Louisiana. She asks if this is just the resulting
confusion o f the same term being claimed and recycled by different people who then lend a different
meaning to the term, or if this multi-varied/multi-meaning word is the product of “conceptual, institutional,
and individual manipulation?” (Dominguez 1997:15).
39
‘Creole’ as a singular noun referred in the early nineteenth century to a native of the state, whether black
or white, free or enslaved. During this same time period, as a plural noun, ‘Creole’ designated white
creoles as l‘ancienne population, or the group of white creoles native to the state (Tregle 1992:140).
36
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color (i.e., who are not white).40 Similarly, Creoles of color do not recognize that anyone
who says they are a New Orleans Creole is also white; even if someone ‘looks white,’ the
Creoles of color community believe them to fair-skinned, but still a person of color.
From 1720 until the Civil War, being ‘creole’ simply meant being native to New
Orleans (Martin 2000:58). The New Orleans Creoles were made up of both white
(slaveholding/non-slave-holding) and black (enslaved and free) residents bom in
Louisiana who spoke French as their native tongue, practiced Catholicism and were
visibly proud of their French heritage (which may or may not have also included Spanish
descent). These cultural elements clashed vividly with those of the white and black
American migrants who were English speaking and largely Protestant. This is connected
with these groups’ different histories o f colonization that led to different value systems.
A particular point of contention was over differences in how the city o f New
Orleans and the United States South (indeed, arguably, the United States at large)
practiced and viewed racial categorization. Elsewhere in the South, and especially in
states that were previously British colonies, people were largely categorized (and
differentially treated) based on whether they were black or white. A group o f mixedrace people did not fit into this binary under which European and Caribbean/Africandescended immigrants were subsumed. They did, however, in New Orleans, and held a
substantial amount of economic, social and political power (although not necessarily
legal protection).41 Most importantly, the FPOC owned property throughout New

40 The term ‘Creole of color’ first came into use during the nineteenth century (Hanger 1997:177).
41
Dominguez argues that throughout Louisiana’s history (and, one can argue all over the nation)
legislative law—and not biological genes—has determined racial boundaries, and thereby influenced the
political, social, economic and legal ramifications o f what someone ‘is’ based on what they look like
(Dominguez 1997:56).
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Orleans in the Creole Sectors.42 As Theresa Singleton points out, communities o f free
people of color arose in every ‘slave society throughout the Americas,’ but differed
widely in terms o f how much political, economic, and social agency individuals within
this group had (Singleton 2001:196).
The FPOC were often threatening to slave-holding and non slave-holding whites
alike; the former because o f a potential alliance with slaves that could lead to
insurrections against slave-holders and the latter because o f the competition they
presented for entry-level jobs (ibid). Singleton argues that archaeologists have often
catalogued site reports dealing with free blacks as ‘gray literature,’ when this group is
addressed at all; often, questions o f identity, agency and responses/reactions to racism
have been left unasked by archaeologists, and therefore remain unanswered (Singleton
2001:198).
If it is true, as Singleton argues, that identity is closely tied to agency, then it is
indeed very important to understand the ways in which free people of color negotiated
their own racial identities, with regard to their social positioning and sense of self
(Singleton 2001:197). To what extent was it necessary for a free person o f color to
distance himself/herself from contact with slaves, if at all?
Although there were groups of free people o f color living throughout the South in
cities such as Charleston, South Carolina and parts of the coastal Chesapeake, the

42 The thrust of Dominguez’s book, White by Definition is her look at how Louisiana legislature, and at
times national law, has influenced, shaped, protected, undermined and/or presented how New Orleanians
themselves racially conceive of their culture. Though much has been written about how socially tolerant
New Orleans has been with regard to interracial and mixed marriages, a long history of anti-miscegenation
law in the state suggests that the law has not always coincided with social realities of the time. Against the
wishes of the Spanish government, the Catholic Church sanctioned inter-marriage.
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difference was that in New Orleans they were tolerated43 (or at least not persecuted). It
was not just the fact that free people o f color held certain positions o f political and
economic power, but that they were not actively prevented from doing so, because of
their African heritage. Hall argues that New Orleans slaves created “arguably the most
Africanized slave culture in the United States”44 (Hall 1992:65). The black population
grew through natural increase and became remarkably cohesive during the early part of
the French colonial period. At the same time that the white population decreased through
out-migration, mortality and the lack o f immigrants (Hall 1992:66). Additionally, the
FPOC in New Orleans were the largest, wealthiest and most educated group of free
blacks in the entire country. They alone enjoyed certain rights, such as being able to
testify against whites in the court of law and to travel freely (Foner 1988:47). The FPOC
were quite simply remarkable in their standing and accomplishments in comparison to
other free blacks in the South and North (ibid.).
When New Orleans became an American city, it inherited among other things the
assimilationist, melting-pot doctrine that defined who was and who was not ‘American’
(Johnson 1997:57) 45 Governor W.C.C. Claiborne became the first American governor of
Louisiana in 1803, an office he would hold until 1816 (Dunbar-Nelson 2000:18). Almost
immediately, he began curbing (although cautiously at first) the rights of enslaved and
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To my knowledge, free people of color outside of New Orleans were not referred to, nor did they refer to
themselves as, Creoles, except for a part of California where many settled together. One reason may be that
this group’s history is not considered an intrinsic part of national memory, and so historical categorizations
remain locally, and not nationally, significant.
44 ‘Americanize’ is meant here as a derogatory term, which was first used in England to refer to early
nineteenth century journalism that was not taken seriously (Trachtenberg 2004:42).
45 Fear of immigration strengthened this nationalist exclusion o f those deemed ‘unfit’ to be Americans. See
Trachtenberg’s second chapter, “Conceivable Aliens,” for further detail on the American government’s
policies that included some and excluded others.
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free people of color. Legislation passed in 1806 put various limitations into law,
including the ability to ‘initiate manumission,’ carry firearms and testify against whites in
court (Berlin 1998:356). In the early years of Louisiana’s American status, distinctions
were drawn more readily across nativity than race and class. It was not until after the
Louisiana Purchase that native-born New Orleanians began using such references as
‘Creole’ to separate themselves from non-native New Orleanians who migrated from
elsewhere (Kein 2000:xiii). ‘Creole’ included whites and the FPOC who shared a
common language (French), the Catholic faith and the residue o f French-inspired cultural
customs.
Within the FPOC were three distinct ‘subclasses,’ which included: “a small upper
class made up of professionals and proprietors, a middle class composed o f artisans such
as shoemakers, tailors, cabinet makers and cigar makers.. .and a lower class o f unskilled
laborers, mostly blacks who had only recently obtained their freedom” (Ochs 2000:61).

The Louisiana Purchase

When Napoleon first came to power, he envisioned Louisiana as grand and
profitable as Saint-Domingue had once been (Bureau 1968:14). But, the Haitian
Revolution and the impending independence from France in 1804 meant that Louisiana
was no longer of much use to Napoleon’s France. Although at one time Saint-Domingue
had been the most profitable colony in the New World, by 1803 the land was ravaged and
stripped from over a decade of revolutionary fighting. With the loss of Haiti, it no longer
made sense to hold onto Louisiana. By that point, Napoleon’s strength in the region had
been severely enervated. Napoleon figured the money he would gain from Louisiana’s
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sale would help finance France’s looming war with England by enabling more maritime
power (Bureau 1968:13). The Louisiana Purchase of 1803 secured the transfer of
Louisiana to the American government as a territory, until it became a state in 1812.
Louisiana was sold for a total o f fifteen million dollars, or four cents/acre (Sexton 1993:
19). The financial gain from the Louisiana Purchase would affect how the native New
Orleans population viewed the flood o f American newcomers (Dominguez 1997:110).
The transition of Louisiana from French colonial rule to American statehood (the
Spanish briefly transferred New Orleans back to the French, who were only able to hold
on to the colony for a couple months before selling it to the United States) was abrupt and
sharp. The sudden change in leadership was felt almost immediately. Claiborne had little
tolerance or patience for pluralism. One of the first things he did was to remove Spanish
colonial fortifications that bordered the Vieux Carre, and open up the streets that would
become Canal, Rampart, and Esplanade (Bureau 1968:14). With the severance of French
and Spanish colonialism came a loosening of state ties to French Canada and the colonial
Caribbean, and a stronger relationship to major international trade partners such as
Canada and Mexico (ibid.). Louisiana officially became an American state in 1812.
Governor Claiborne prolonged Louisiana’s status as an official American state by
invoking the stereotype of the native population as uneducated and ignorance (LaChance
1992:122).46
Claiborne was bound and determined to quickly make New Orleans into an
American city. His policies were unfriendly to the FPOC and slaves, in comparison to
those enforced under French and Spanish colonial rule. Upon taking office as governor,
46 Such rationale has a twinge of irony considering that Claiborne himself married into a native, ‘white
creole’ family (Tregle 1992:162).
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he tried to “retain but not enlarge” the free black militia, although subsequent legislature
greatly enervated the military group (Hanger 1997:164). His primary motivation for
reducing the size and strength o f the free black militia, which took away an important
avenue from wage labor to their freedom, was his suspicion o f the group’s loyalty
(ibid.).47 The various challenges he faced showed just how ‘foreign’ New Orleans really
was when the United States purchased it. The use of legislation to restrict, limit and
enervate the rights of the FPOC first came into real use under Claiborne (Hanger
1997:164). He was less than sympathetic to the painful adjustments o f native New
Orleanians who found this new American leadership very different and strange. The free
black militia fought back with a petition that articulated their loyalty to the United States
and their desire to continue serving as successfully as in the past (Hanger 1997:165).
Their status remained tenuous, however, which reflected the general uncertainty o f the
FPOC’s position in this new American city.
Reminiscent in both name and intent, the 1806 Black Codes sought to legislate the
actions and movement o f enslaved persons and the FPOC (ibid.). The new law ruled that
the FPOC and other freed persons must carry identification with them that stated their
status (ibid.). It restricted manumission to individuals over thirty years o f age, and
prevented the immigration o f free black persons from anywhere outside the city,
especially the West Indian islands (ibid.). As would be expected, the Black Codes were
explicit in regulating the most threatening o f interactions, interracial unions. Enslaved
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Hanger’s exact words are worth recounting: “Like most local whites, Claiborne suspected the loyalty of
trained, well-equipped free blacks who might very readily join with rebellious slaves and Spanish
conspirators to challenge Louisiana’s planter-merchant-bureaucrat elite” (Hanger 1997:164).
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persons were forbidden from marrying freed persons o f color, and no white person could
marry a person of color, whether enslaved or free (ibid.).
Incorporating Louisiana into the United States proved to be a challenge. Many
Creoles did not speak or understand English, while few Americans (white or black)
understood or spoke any French. The Protestant ethic that colored how many Americans
understood history— and their place in it— shared little with a French Catholic ethos that
viewed social connections as more important than labor and wage earning. Claiborne’s
strategy of bringing some semblance of order to New Orleans was to play various groups
off of one another, usually to the disadvantage of the FPOC. For example, the FPOC
became an economic ‘counterweight,’ direct competition, to the French planter class
(Berlin 1998:355). Soon, they would begin losing ground against the ‘planter-dominated
legislature’ (Berlin 1998:356). In addition to economic rivalries, manumission and self
purchase were made much more difficult, and therefore severely decreased, after the
Louisiana Purchase (Berlin 1998:333). The diminished capacity of the free black militia
was a key loss for free men of color, who as black soldiers fought in exchange for wages
that could be used for self-purchase or manumission (Hanger 1997:164). This became
less possible as Claiborne reduced the size and strength of the free black militia (Berlin
1998:356). The leniency of certain French and Spanish colonial policies and laws
affecting slave and free blacks eroded over time under American leadership. Indeed, the
“collapse of free people’s struggle for equality cleared the way for the expansion of
slavery” (Berlin 1998:357).

49

The Antebellum Period
The fight over who would control New Orleans began almost immediately after
the Louisiana Purchase. This period is one of the most fascinating in all of New Orleans
history. Nativity preceded racial divisions and superiority, as native-born Creoles fought
for their city.

AO

The future direction of New Orleans was at stake. In the end, perhaps both

sides won to an extent. The Protestant-inspired American work ethic never quite caught
on, and the French language slowly died (though perhaps not entirely).
The influx of ‘white’ and ‘black’ Americans and immigrants from various
countries into New Orleans, especially from the 1830s on, heightened the CreoleAmerican rivalry (‘Creole’ in this sense is used in reference to nativity). LaChance dubs
this period “the linguistic turning point for the white population of New Orleans”
(LaChance 1992:119). In one comer stood native-born, French speaking, Catholic New
Orleanians who were (to grossly oversimplify) happy with the way things were and did
not appreciate someone new coming in and changing things. In the other comer were the
largely Protestant, English speaking Americans who came to New Orleans looking for
prosperity and a chance to have a hand in transforming this former colony into an
American city-state.49 Added into this mix were ‘white’ immigrants from various
European countries (particularly Germany and Ireland) and ‘black’ immigrants from
Saint-Domingue/Haiti and France (Hirsch and Logsdon 1992:96). Great numbers of Irish
48

“Antebellum New Orleans struck contemporaries and continues to strike historians as sui generis in the
ethnic composition of its population. It had a full-fledged three-caste racial system: whites, free persons of
color, and slaves” (LaChance 1992:101).
49
See Axtell’s The Invasion Within for a comparative look at the role Catholic and Protestant religious
conversion played in New World colonial endeavors (Axtell 1985:278). Eccles articulates what must have
been perceived as an American invasion of sorts to the New Orleanians: “...the Louisiana Creoles were
soon swamped by the hordes of Americans who swarmed across the Mississippi and set about the final
onslaught on the Indian nations” (Eccles 1998:270).
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and German immigrants helped raise the white population from 20,110 to 61,131 in the
span of a decade (LaChance 1992:119; Tregle 1992:164). Tregle argues that by the year
1850, ‘foreign-born residents’ comprised fifty-one percent o f the ‘white population;’
thirty-percent were bom in the United States and the remaining nineteen percent were
bom in Louisiana (Tregle 1992:164). Yet, wherever they came from, in the initial
decades o f the nineteenth century, the Irish and German immigrants rather quickly found
their seats on the ‘white’ side of the Creole-American divide. Local county governments
(called ‘parishes’) were established in 1805 and parish jurisdictions were put into place in
1807. Each group would make good use of their local power. These European immigrants
largely displaced jobs FPOC had performed, including that o f “free black waiters, hotel
workers, peddlers, cabbies, draymen, stevedores, and steamboat roustabouts” (Bell
1997:80). Economic competition also extended into the property ownership game, from
which the FPOC emerged as the losers (ibid.).
When the population doubled between 1805 and 1810, the Creole-American
opposition became apparent in the physical separation of Creole and American residential
and business areas (Dominguez 1997:118). Black Americans and FPOC did not live in
the same neighborhoods. By 1850 many FPOC lived in the Creole sections of town,
downriver from Canal Street (Logsdon and Belli 992:207). Settlement patterns reveal
completely different ways of living and organizing work and residential spaces and
continued well into the twentieth century.50

50 The large lawns and elaborate mansions that still line St. Charles and other streets in the Garden District
characterized the American’s value of space and privacy. Work and home functions were kept distinctly
separate. The Creoles, meanwhile, settled downriver. Many of their homes were also elaborate and stately,
but houses were often much narrower (like many buildings in the French Quarter). Business and home lives
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Hirsch and Logsdon rightly state that “the long contrast between the creoles and
the Americans proved a major force in shaping the unusual character of New Orleans
(Hirsch and Logsdon 1992:91). At any rate, the influx o f Americans into this French
creole town was a direct challenge to the culture that had developed, prospered and
dominated here throughout the nineteenth century. For a couple o f decades, it looked as
though the white Creoles and FPOC might be able to retain a large amount of power.
In reaction to the many divisive, even discriminatory, mutual sentiments and acts
between the two ethnic groups, New Orleans was carved into three municipalities in
1836. Business and residences were separated according to the Creole and American
divisions, reflecting the hostility that had flared up between the two contingents. Soon
after, the FPOC and white creoles began to lose the political, social and economic
domination they had fought so hard to retain during the first three decades of the
nineteenth century.51 Many factors contributed to this, one of the most obvious perhaps
being the tremendous waves of Irish and German immigrants into the city between 1830
and 1860 (Tregle 1992:164). The division marked the beginning of the end for the
Creoles (especially the white Creoles’ interests); by the 1890s, creole society was
“already an anachronism in the city where once it had been the vital present” (Tregle
1992:184).
The role of various immigrants into the city also played a key role in factional
alliances and divisions. The retention o f the French language was a direct result o f the

often intersected in the same building, with a bottom floor serving as a store or business and the top
(usually 2nd) floor as living space. Canal Street was the neutral zone which belonged exclusively to no one.
51 Divisions sometimes carried on in death as in life; with the founding o f the St. Louis Cemetery No. 2
came segregated areas in Catholic cemeteries for FPOC and slaves (Ochs 2000:52).
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Saint-Dominguan and French immigrants who helped create and maintain Frenchlanguage newspapers, theater and conversation. Irish and German immigrants, eager to
fit into American society and start a new life were absorbed by the white American
population. Nation-wide backlash against the arrival of hundreds of thousands of Irish
Catholics “stirred the first outbreak of nativist reaction” (Trachtenberg 2004:98).
European Frenchmen also migrated to New Orleans (LaChance 1992:113).
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Between 1832 and the start of the Civil War, the third largest group of immigrants into
New Orleans, after the Irish and Germans were the French (LaChance 1997:112). New
Orleans served as a sort o f refuge for ‘French political exiles (LaChance 1997:114). 53
This constant flow o f French speakers into the city helped to maintain French as the
city’s un-official spoken language for much of the ante-bellum period. In fact, the
majority o f New Orleans’ white residents were French-speaking until around 1830
(LaChance 1992:117).
The Haitian Revolution and subsequent independence had a large impact on New
Orleans. Many of the migrants who began fleeing in 1791 when the Saint-Domingue
Revolution began, eventually found their way to New Orleans. Some initially traveled to
Spanish colonial Cuba, which was closer in proximity than New Orleans (LaChance
1992:103). They were forced to leave in 1809; Napoleon had angered Spanish officials in
Cuba with his “deposition of Ferdinand from the Spanish throne” (Berlin 1998:333).
These Saint-Dominguan refugees were also a liability because o f their proximity to the
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Some were political exiles from the French Revolution (LaChance 1992:113-114). Others fled France
after the fall of Napoleon Bonaparte (ibid.).
53
This may also have helped reinforce the FPOC’s cultural connection to France that spurred the former to
imbibe the “intellectual and political currents associated with both the 1789 and 1848 revolutions in
France” (Ochs 2000:56).
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Haitian Revolution and for what it stood. Slaveholders throughout the Caribbean and
southern United States feared these emigres who were thought to carry ideas of abolition,
independence and revolt with them (Dunbar-Nelson 2000:18). Between May o f 1809 and
January of 1811, 9059 refugees from Saint-Domingue came into New Orleans from
Cuba, upon expulsion from the Spanish-governed island. The Cuban government feared
that the French black refugees were “carriers of revolution” (LaChance 1992:106). The
largest wave o f refugees was in the year 1809 (Hall 1997:86).54
Former Saint-Dominguans made important cultural, economic, political and social
contributions to the city. Many o f the refugees chose Louisiana because o f a common
language, relatively close proximity and the reputation New Orleans had acquired as a
most ‘Un-American’ city. It was considered one of the few places where people of color,
whether formerly enslaved or not, would not immediately be enslaved upon stepping foot
into the city.
Some have even argued that the tri-partite caste/class systems o f Saint-Domingue
and colonial Louisiana were similar enough to be almost parallel, or at least
comparable.55 Pragmatically speaking, New Orleans may have also been the safest refuge
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White, black and gens de couleur libre refugees each came in this last and largest wave from war-torn
Haiti. LaChance lists the following figures: 2731 whites, 3102 gens de couleur, 3226 slaves (LaChance
1992:105).
55 “The effect of caste on the moral integrity of the Negro race in America has thus been widely disastrous;
servility and fawning; gross flattery of white folk and lying to appease and cajole them; failure to achieve
dignity and self-respect and moral self-assertion, personal cowardliness and submission to insult and
aggression; exaggerated and despicable humility; lack of faith of Negroes in themselves and in other
Negroes and in all colored folk: wealth and arrogance, cunning, dishonesty and assumptions of superiority;
-the exaltation of laziness and indifference as just as successful as the industry and striving which invites
taxation and oppression; dull apathy and cynicism; faith in no future and the habit of moving and
wandering in search of justice; a religion o f prayer and submission to replace determination and effort.”
(Du Bois 1992:702). See the parallel Eccles draws between Saint-Dominguanpetits blancs and Canadian
habitants {Eccles 1998:174).
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in North America for these migrants because the various laws and ‘attitudes’ regarding
FPOC were more forgiving, or ‘lenient’ than elsewhere (Duggal 2000:163). This would
soon change under American governance. Yet, since Louisiana did not become part of
the United States until the better part of the Haitian Revolution was over and Haitian
Independence was just on the horizon, migratory conditions for those emigrating during
the last decade o f the eighteenth century and first decade of the nineteenth century were
little affected.
The Saint-Dominguan/Haitian immigrants’, or gens de couleur libre— knowledge
of sugar plantation technology enabled sugar production to become lucrative and
widespread. States Dunbar-Nelson: “Imagination refuses to picture what would have
been the case but for the refugees from San Domingo” (Dunbar-Nelson 2000:16). Those
refugees who had been planters in Saint-Domingue brought with them their expertise on
how to cultivate sugarcane and transformed Louisiana once again into a thriving
plantation economy (Berlin 1998:342; Dunbar-Nelson 2000:15). Mendez and Solis built
sugar machines and Etienne de Bore “made sugar granulate” (Dunbar-Nelson 2000:16).
Sugar production in New Orleans not only benefited from the expertise of former SaintDomingue sugar planters, but from also not having to compete with its war-torn West
Indian cousin. In just a few years, “sugar became king in lower Louisiana (Berlin
1998:343).56
Not everyone welcomed the European and Haitian immigrants, however. In the
1850s, New Orleans received more immigrants—or “foreign-born newcomers”—than

56 Sugarcane was brought to the United States by Christopher Columbus on his 1493 (and second) voyage
from the Canary Islands (Mintz 1985:32). In the New World, sugarcane was first grown in Spanish-ruled
Santo Domingo (ibid.).
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any other city except for New York City (Ochs 2000:48-49). Unwelcome political
response came in the form of the short-lived Know-Nothing Party (Ochs 2000:49). At the
eve o f the Civil War, the FPOC were a prosperous, property holding group. According to
Du Bois’ calculations, their combined property value was $15 million dollars in 1860 (Du
Bois 1992:154). They were an educated group whose accomplishments in various fields
was impressive by any standards. Literary success is one such example. In 1845, they
published the first collection of poetry written exclusively by persons o f color, entitled
Les Cenelles (ibid.).

By the 1850s, though, the population growth of the FPOC had

stagnated (Ochs 2000:60).

Civil War
Black soldiers fought on both sides o f the Civil War, proving through their military
contribution their worth and status (Foner 1988:8).

CO

The military offered many black

men, several o f whom had been slaves, the opportunity to become literate and access the
power that came with it (ibid.). Louisiana black soldiers participated in great numbers in
the Civil War. The New Orleans fighting men of color represented the “only organized
body o f Negro soldiery on the Confederate side during the Civil War” (Dunbar-Nelson
2000:31). Louisiana also contributed more troops to the Confederate cause than any other
state (Dunbar-Nelson 2000:32).
The implications o f their service to a side that supported the continuation of slavery
and white supremacy raises interesting questions about the doors military service was
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This anthology’s editor and publisher was Armand Lanusse, who was also the principal of a premier,
private Catholic School, L ’Institution Catholique des Orphelins dans I ’Indigence (Ochs 2000:54).
58
There were in all about one hundred black officers who fought in the War (Ochs 2000:207).
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seen to potentially open. This military service also created alliances across color and
socio-economic lines. Military participation provided a viable way for some black male
soldiers to earn wages and heroism. The New Orleans men of color who fought on the
Confederacy side during the Civil War were the only organized black militia to do so (all
others fought on Union side)59. Color hierarchies existed within the ranks.
The 1st Louisiana Native Guard was the first official unit o f black soldiers to serve
in the Union army, o f which Andre Cailloux became a leader (Ochs 2000:77). Cailloux,
who died in the line o f fire at Port Hudson, became “the first nationally publicized black
warrior-hero of the Civil War” (Ochs 2000:156). His heroic death became a symbol of
unity and determination uniting FPOC and Anglophone blacks to fight against injustice
and inequality (Ochs 2000:185). Military service was upheld as proof of loyalty.
New Orleans was captured quickly and easily in 1862. Shortly thereafter, General
Butler left Virginia to take over the latest city to fall to the Confederacy (Du Bois
1992:67). Taking advantage of the many ‘fugitive slaves’ being held in New Orleans,
Butler “organized colonies of fugitives, and regulated employment” as the Confiscation
Act allowed and War Department permitted (Du Bois 1992:68). In one o f the Civil
W ar’s many ironies, the FPOC made Butler’s stay in New Orleans much more
comfortable through their entertainment and hospitality (ibid.). In return, Butler kept the
Free Black militia (in particular the officers) intact and active (ibid.). Slaves who had
escaped their masters to New Orleans were received and put to work, first by General
Butler and then by his replacement, General Banks (ibid.).
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Ingersoll describes it this way: New Orleans was “terribly scarred by the Civil War and Reconstruction:
it was occupied by an army larger than any community in the history of the country, a violent inter-regnum
that confirmed a chaotic image of the place” (Ingersoll 1999:36).
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As Foner states, the Civil War “permanently redrew the economic and political
map of the white South” (Foner 1988:17). Years of war that left the South on the losing
side had devastating consequences on the economic health and vitality of this region
(ibid.). Yeoman who lived off of the land in the southern upcountry were particularly
hard hit, and the “planter class” subsequently split apart (ibid.).
The FPOC played a central role in the realm of black suffrage. They were able to
do what neither Radical Republicans, Sea Island blacks or Unionists could do, which was
to force Lincoln’s hand through a petition drive (Foner 1988:62; Ochs 2000:189).60 Their
political influence demanded that black suffrage be politically dealt with immediately and
fairly (ibid.). Efforts to exert change at the state level had proven nary. For example,
Louisiana state legislature shot down a bill Governor Banks even supported, the
Quadroon Bill, which gave free men o f color who had “three quarters white blood” the
right to vote (ibid.). L ’Union, the political predecessor to the Tribune, had been
publishing its support o f suffrage for free men of color from 1862-1864 (Foner
1988:63).61 The FPOC fought for voting rights for free men o f color on the basis of
Treaty rights,’ which granted citizenship rights and privileges to Louisiana’s “ancienne
population”(Ochs 2000:186).'62 The FPOC clearly fit this bill, having lived in the area for
well over a century.
What some have called the tAffo-Creole radicals’ campaigned long and hard the
entire second half of the nineteenth century for equal rights and privileges. They formed
in 1862 a Freedmen’s Aid Association, or the Comite Central des Natifs (Ochs
60 The petition intentionally did not include the signatures of recently freed slaves. Only FPOC and white
supporters of the cause (Ochs 2000 :189).
61 L ’Union was the first ‘black newspaper’ to come from the South (Foner 1988:63).
62
This was stated in the Louisiana Purchase Treaty, Article III (Ochs 2000:186).
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2000:187). The Thirty-Eighth Congress did not immediately reach consensus over how to
go about implementing and directing Reconstruction (Foner 1998:66). The Senate did,
however, approve the Thirteenth Amendment in 1864, which then passed in the House in
1865 and subsequently sent to the States for ratification (ibid.).
Large, looming questions remained over how to restructure the economy with the
abolishment of slavery and in the wake of war’s consequences. One of the most pressing
issues was over land tenure. The Tribune's proposal of instituting ‘self-help banks’ in
place of compulsory labor contracts was refuted by General Bank’s successor, Stephen A.
Hurlbut (Foner 1988:65). His proposals for “compulsory yearly contracts, fixed wages, a
pass system” stood in stark opposition to ideas laid out by the Tribune and supported by
the New Orleans black community (Foner 1988:65).
The Civil War had profound effects on New Orleans socially, politically and
economically.

The freeing of slaves and subsequent changes in the country’s

postbellum industrial age changed the FPOC’s socioeconomic positioning. Organizations
like the Freedmen’s Bureau helped deal with “the postemancipation crisis of health
among the former slaves” (Foner 1988:151).
Reconstruction
“The nation’s post-Civil War obsession with racial marking placed the Creole of
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Foner eloquently writes: “Like a massive earthquake, the Civil War and the destruction o f slavery
permanently altered the landscape of Southern life, exposing and widening fault lines that had lain barely
visible, just beneath the surface. White society was transformed no less fully than black, as traditional
animosities grew more acute, long-standing conflicts acquired altered meanings, and new groups emerged
into political consciousness (Foner 1988: 11).
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color in a position of life or death” (Senter 2000:289). This was especially true in the
shifted power away from the FPOC. During this time period directly after the Civil War
white creole loyalty permanently shifted from that of other native-born creole New
Orleanians to other white Americans. It was no longer American against Creole, but an
Americanized version of white against black. The Louisiana Unification Movement, an
interracial coalition of white Louisiana residents and FPOC, proved to be an exception to
the increasingly segregated and racist political divisions to come after Reconstruction
ended.64 Frederick Nash Ogden, a vigorous opponent of Unification created the Crescent
City White League in 1874 (Benfey 1997:184-185).65 This white supremacy terrorist
organization was “openly dedicated to the violent restoration of white supremacy” and
had military backup to encourage the implementation of its aims (Foner 1984:550;
Benfey 1997:186).66
In conjunction with the Democratic Party, the White League mounted several
intimidating campaigns of violence and terror, including the placement of certain
Republican leaders on a hit list, interruption of court proceedings, and tactics to drive

64 See the article “An Appeal to the Unification of the People of Louisiana,” quoted in Olsen 1967:36-39.
65 Unification involved putting in the current Republican administration’s place ‘interracial conservation
coalitions’ (Foner 1984:547). On a state level, the Louisiana Unification Movement o f 1873 was intended
to be “a political alignment independent of the two existing parties that promised to restore racial harmony,
economic prosperity, and social peace to the state” (ibid.). Such far-reaching goals included land tenure for
freedmen, equal accommodation in public spaces and education (ibid.). As part of the Unification
Movement, Aristide Mary, who would later help form the Citizens’ Committee that would bring the Plessy
v. Ferguson case, actively protested the re-segregation o f schools (Medley 2003:31).
Military reinforcements included the First Louisiana Regiment and many of its own members (Benfey
1997:186).
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away newly enfranchised black voters (Foner 1984:550). Their activity culminated in the
1876 gubernatorial race when the White League tried to force candidate John McEnery,
who had been defeated in the 1872 election, into office (Foner 1984:550-551). Thirty-five
hundred White Leaguers overtook the statehouse, arsenal and city hall, and only left
when federal troops showed up (Foner 1984:551). The White League declared the
occasion a success, dubbing it ‘the Battle of Liberty Place; however, the event was
reported in the ‘black press’ as ‘the Metropolitan Police Riot.’ (Gehman 1994:100).
Amazingly, some white supporters of civil rights and Unification supported or had some
connection to the White League, including George Washington Cable and Kate Chopin
(Benfey 1997:17).
In order for the White League’s goal of (re)instituting white supremacy to manifest
itself, the tri-partite or ternary system of racial classification had to be reduced to the
Americanized binary (Dominguez 1997:138). Dominguez’s exact words are worth
recounting: “the mulattoes or metis had to be downgraded in personal worth and social
value; mulattoes had to be denied social and legal status as a separate race; and absolute
purity of white blood had to be demanded of all those in the white category” (ibid.). The
French-language white creole newspaper, Le Carillon, documented and promoted the
White League’s message and agenda (ibid.). The rise of such organizations as the White
League, the Ku Klux Klan, Knights o f the White Camellia and literary vehicles such as
Le Carillon and later, L 'A beille, indicated the alliance and unification of white creoles
with white Americans (Bryan 2000:56; Dominguez 1997:136).
On July 30, 1866 riots in New Orleans precipitated by whites opposed to the politics
and aims of Reconstruction (Foner 1988:262). Tensions came to a head between
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policemen and activists supporting black voting rights (Logsdon and Bell 1992:241).The
Riots had the unfortunate effect of bringing into question the effectiveness and goals of
Presidential Reconstruction (Foner 1988:263).
One major problem in the political transition to Reconstruction from the bloody Civil
War years was the lack o f an accompanying shift in how to talk and think about this
period: “At the outset of Reconstruction most Republicans still adhered to a political
vocabulary inherited from the antebellum era, which distinguished sharply between
natural, civil, political, and social rights” (Foner 1988:231). The question of what was a
right versus a privilege, and how to grant it if at all posed tremendous political
challenges. Where the domain of the national government and/or the state government to
exercise authority began, ended or overlapped would lie at the heart of postReconstruction policies, ideals and protests around the country. What to do with the
States that had tried to secede? Had they, in effect usurped their own rights to the national
government? Indeed, President Johnson used such logic to force southern states to ratify
the Thirteenth Amendment. However, as time would tell, even Constitutional
Amendments could be ignored (Foner 1988:243).
Though their rights were being slowly eroded amidst the dust that had barely settled
from the Civil War, the FPOC continued to make use of the literary, social, political and
economic tools they had been developing for several decades. The uncertainty of
Reconstruction would give way to devastation for all people o f color in the decades to
follow, but for now, the FPOC and others held on. Carpetbagger Henry Clay Warmoth
represented a type of ally and foe with whom the FPOC had to contend. An Union
officer, Warmoth moved to Louisiana in 1865 (Du Bois 1992:461). He became part of the
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newly formed Union Republican Party of Louisiana, which in September o f 1865 held a
convention calling on Congress to make Louisiana a territory and give complete equal
rights, both politically and legally, to persons o f color (Foner 1988:111). Two months
later, the Republicans sponsored a “voluntary election” that brought black voters to the
polls in droves (ibid.). With the majority of black votes in his favor, Warmoth became the
“Territorial Delegate” to Congress on behalf o f Louisiana (Foner 1998:111; Du Bois
1992:463). Warmoth won the nomination for governor over the Tribune’s favored
candidate, Francis E. Dumas. The paper’s refusal to support Warmoth cost it dearly; it
was forced to stop publication upon losing its “state and federal printing contracts (Foner
1998:331-2).67 Warmoth would eventually become the first Republican governor of
Louisiana (Foner 1988:295).
Never content to simply sit back and react to external changes and shifts in power
relations and hierarchy, the FPOC fought back with their own organizations, newspapers
and literature. The Tribune de la Nouvelle-Orleans, L ’Union, the Crusader, the New
Orleans Republican and the Daily Crusader insured a textual space in which to combat
and make sense of their positioning, needs, goals and identity (Bryan 2000:56). The
Tribune was their most important newspaper. Publisher Dr. Louis Charles Roudanez and
initial editor Paul Trevigne saw its purpose “as an embodiment of and advocate for the
imagined nation” (Senter 2000:279). Jean-Charles Houzeau, a Belgian-born astronomer
and journalist whose story is as fascinating as any during this period, soon took over as
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Foner reflects: “The Tribune's demise deprived the South of an eloquent advocate of Radicalism just as
Republican rule, which it had done so much to bring about, commenced” (Foner 1988:332).
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editor68 . Though originally published only in French, an English-language version soon
appeared (ibid.). The paper was published daily during the year of 1865, though its
circulation became weekly in its subsequent circulation years, giving it the distinction of
being the “first Negro daily in America” (Du Bois 1992:456). The Tribune forcefully
engaged in contemporary debates over voting rights, equality among races,
disadvantageous labor laws, and the state of the nation from a distinctively FPOC point
of view (Senter 2000:277; Du Bois 1992:456).
For an American audience, the paper’s international scope must have been a bit
unusual. Published articles, editorials and poems drew on French history and philosophy,
the Haitian Revolution and events around the globe (ibid.). During its years o f circulation
from 1864 to 1868, “these writers specifically linked the dream of Reconstruction to
Creole history” (Senter 2000:278). Much hope and promise lay in the immediate
aftermath of the Civil War, and the Tribune editors dreamed about the direction they
wanted the country to go in, particularly in the domain of race relations: “a new
nation...philosophically, one based on human rights, and culturally, Anglo-American,
and they were willing to negotiate with the latter in order to achieve the former” (Senter
2000:282).
The political Comite des Citoyens or Citizens Committee spearheaded the legislative
challenge to segregation and discrimination. The elite Societe d ’Economie represented
the class interests of upper-crust FPOC, while the unpretentious Societe des Artisans
catered to professional FPOC less concerned with exclusivity (Hirsch and Logsdon
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Houzeau’s political beliefs had been influenced by both the Enlightenment and the philosophy behind
the French Revolution (Foner 1988:63). The paper’s outlook reflected this.
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1992:193).69 Logsdon and Bell argue that “the organizational structure of black creole
society was largely intact” by the year 1867 (Logsdon and Bell 1992:235). The 1845
publication of poetry written by FPOC, Les Cenelles, proved the literary prowess and
capability of this group (Kein 2000:131).70
White creoles enjoined their agenda with that of white Americans as non-Creole
black Americans linked their allegiance to northern, Protestant African Americans
(Senter 2000:293). The largely Catholic FPOC did not see religiously eye to eye with the
mostly Protestant black American community. Divisions had as much to do with the
different ways these denominations viewed moral and spiritual custom and duty, as it did
with the role of the Protestant and Catholic churches in the New Orleans community.
Both white and black Protestants had little use for “the city’s deeply rooted Afro-Latin
way o f life that offended their Anglo-Protestant sensibilities” (Logsdon and Bell
1992:236). The rowdiness o f regular social gatherings and open lasciviousness of Mardi
Gras probably bewildered ordinary Protestants not used to this kind of socializing, and
such activities were put down by Protestant ministers (ibid.).
All except one of the Catholic clergy were foreign-born and trained, until the 1860s
(Logsdon and Bell 1992:233). The Catholic Church’s open support of slavery and the
Confederacy caused many FPOC to turn away in disgust to Masonic lodges and
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If it so desired, this organization could boast of its most famous member, acclaimed playwright Victor
Sejour (Desdunes 1973:29).
70
This collection was also the nation’s first body of poetry written entirely by African-Americans (even
though the FPOC may not have made this connection in quite the same way as present-day scholars who in
hindsight often lump all persons of color together) (Kein 2000:131). The collected poems were written
entirely in French, with one poem in the New Orleans Creole language (ibid.).
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spiritualist societies
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(Logsdon and Bell 234). Some Catholics remained members of

Masonic lodges and Catholic churches72 (Ochs 2000:64). French Freemasonry was
particularly attractive around the time of the 1848 Revolution in France; it espoused
tolerance, fraternity and anti-elitist ideals that appealed to the FPOC (ibid.). Catholic
religious communities flourished amongst the FPOC, as evidenced in church records and
registers. By most standards, Catholics of color likely experienced less racism than in the
New Orleans Catholic churches than elsewhere (Ochs 2000:51).
The most important difference between Protestantism and Catholicism revolved
around views of race.

n 'i

While Catholic FPOC saw integration among the races as integral

and essential, black Protestants who had cultivated the institution o f the ‘black church’
were loath to integrate (Logsdon and Bell 1992:236-237). Black Protestants interpreted
the FPOC’s hesitation to join their church community as evidence o f elitism (ibid.).
Aware of the deep rift among the FPOC and black Americans in New Orleans, the
Tribune put forth an extra effort to bridge the gap between the groups (ibid.).74 A white
Catholic priest, Claude Paschal Maistre, sharply criticized the Catholic Church for its
racist policies and sympathies for the Confederacy (Ochs 2000:6).

71

n c

Freemasonry had a membership in New Orleans stretching back to the eighteenth century (Ochs
2000:63). The Spiritualist Movement taught that humans could themselves communicate with the spirit
world, and explicitly rejected the church as an institution (Ochs 2000:65).
72
See Chapter Five in Caryn Cosse Bell’s Revolution, Romanticism, and the Afro-Creole Protest Tradition
(1997) for an extensive look at the FPOC and Freemasonry.
73
Catholicism’s influence reaches back to provisions for slave baptisms in the French Code Noir and
Spain’s recognition/adherence to conversion during its rule (Ochs 2000:21).
By contrast, the Black Republican newspaper deliberately provoked already existing antagonisms
between FPOC and black Americans in its pages (Logsdon and Bell 1992:239).
75
Maistre practiced a kind of ‘protest Catholicism’ that converged Unionist political tendencies with
Catholic morality, serving as an important leader during the Civil War (Ochs 2000:200).
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More than half of the Louisiana state legislature in 1868 was composed of FPOC
(Dunbar-Nelson 2000:38).76 Ratification of the fourteenth amendment which granted
citizenship rights to all African Americans was one of the top priorities during
Reconstruction . The FPOC’s long entrenchment in New Orleans politics and society
gave them some leverage during this period when the pendulum was still, at least to some
degree, in their favor.
Revolutionary Republicanism spread throughout North America at the end of the
nineteenth (Berlin 1998:350). Renowned French painter Edgar Degas noted during his
brief stay in New Orleans that it was “a city with one foot in the eighteenth century and
one foot firmly in the nineteenth” (Benfey: 1998:84). Much has been written about this
period in history, including George Washington Cable’s well-known and controversial
work, The Grandissimes.77 The political unraveling of rights for FPOC, newly
emancipated slaves and free blacks across the nation began with the anticipated failure
(by some) of Reconstruction. The “War o f Reconstruction in Louisiana” was set into
motion in the 1864 Constitutional Convention (Dunbar-Nelson 2000:35).

Post-Reconstruction up to Plessy v. Ferguson
The end of the Reconstruction marked some of the worst and most difficult years for
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Du Bois lists the following non-white Louisiana officials, from 1874-1876: Congressman Charles E.
Nash, Lieutenant Governor and then Governor P.B.S. Pinchback, Lt. Governor Oscar J. Dunn, Lt.
Governor C.C. Antoine, Secretary of State P.G. Deslonde, State Treasurer Antoine Dubuclet, and
Superintendant of Public Education W.G. Brown (Du Bois 1992:470).
77
As Benfey states, it is an “allegory of Reconstruction, an elaborate portrait of New Orleans after the
Louisiana Purchase” (Benfey 1997:201).
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the FPOC (Anthony 2000:301). Legal segregation in the form of Jim Crow laws and
discrimination emerged in the 1880s, enduring into the first half of the twentieth century
(Lofgren 1987:9). The refusal of African Americans to automatically demur and defer to
whites in myriad situations provoked an outcry (especially) among southern whites who
called for retribution (Lofgren 1987:25). The desire to keep African Americans ‘in their
place’ drove much of the passage and enforcement of Jim Crow legislation (ibid.). Legal
protections and rights steadily eroded during this time. Yet, this group’s amount of
wealth, property holdings, skilled trades, literacy, advanced education, political
appointments/offices and social organizations helped enable them to struggle valiantly
against increasing oppression (Senter 2000:294).
The Civil Rights Bill granted citizenship to everyone bom in the United States, with
the exception of Native Americans (Foner 1988:243). This bill was spearheaded by
Senator Lyman Trumbull, who chaired the Judiciary Committee and was a moderate
(ibid.). The Civil Rights Bill “represented the first attempt to give meaning to the
Thirteenth Amendment, to define in legislative terms the essence of freedom” (Foner
1988:244). Debates raged amongst moderate and Radical factions of the party who
disagreed over which rights were fundamental enough to be insured by law (ibid.).
Voting rights were considered by some to be rights that automatically came with
citizenship, while others considered suffrage to be a privilege restricted to a minority
(Foner 1988:245). The Civil Rights Bill was aimed first and foremost at incidents of
injustice that took place within the public sphere (ibid.). As with any piece of legislation,
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some interpreted the scope and intent o f the Bill narrowly, while others saw its purpose as
broad in scope (ibid.).
In a surprising turn of events, President Johnson vetoed the Civil Rights Bill, just as
he had the Freedmen’s Bureau Bill (Foner 1988:250). His rejection of the Civil Rights
Bill was grounded in the racist principle that giving blacks citizenship rights in effect
discriminated against whites (ibid.). Such rhetoric echoes cries o f reverse discrimination
and opponents to affirmative action who claim that racial preferences disadvantage
whites.
President Johnson’s vetoes prompted the Republican party to put into the Constitution
rights the North had fought for and won during the Civil War (Foner 1998:251).
Constitutional Amendments fall outside o f Presidential discretion. The challenge of
reconfiguring voter representation after the War was a pressing problem; Southern slaves
who before had counted as three-fifths of a man would now be counted as an entire
person, dramatically increasing Southern representation in both the Electoral College and
the House of Representatives (Foner 1998:252). The Fourteenth Amendment was
dreamed up as a compromise that still denied women, aliens and illiterate people the right
to vote. What would become the Fourteenth Amendment stated “that when a state denied
any citizen the right to vote because of race, all members of that race would be excluded
from enumeration” (ibid.).
In the post-Reconstruction period, neither major political party protected the rights
the FPOC had previously enjoyed, or fought for a greater extension of privileges and
opportunities. It was time for an alternative, and the Unification Movement of 1873
proved a welcome change (Foner 1988:547). Recognizing that Carpetbaggers were no
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more prone to look out for the FPOC’s interests than former Confederates, this
Movement promoted racial harmony and integration under the tutelage of like-minded
whites and FPOC (ibid.). It was not to last long, though, since many FPOC were unable
to completely trust the motives o f whites in favor of Unification (ibid.).
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE CONTEXT AND IMPACT OF PLESSY V. FERGUSON

A high number of non Anglo-Saxon and non Protestant people from eastern and
southern Europe immigrated into the United States during the 1890s, the same decade in
which the Citizens Committee to Test the Constitutionality o f the Separate Car Law
7R

brought forth the Plessy v. Ferguson lawsuit (Trachtenberg 2004:98) . The question of
where and if these newly arrived people fit into a country that unequally distributed
power and privilege among a select few provoked backlash and fear among many white
Americans. A related fear of black Americans attaining the same degree of power as
whites prompted a series of restrictive and racialized (if not racist) laws and attitudes.
The need to regulate and control the rights, movement and protection of people of color
that began in Louisiana with the 1724 Black Codes continued a century and a half later
after Reconstruction ended (Medley 2003:67).
The 1896 Supreme Court case Plessy v. Ferguson challenged the 1890 Separate
Car Act that legalized and mandated segregated railway travel. The Free People of Color
carefully prepared plaintiff Homer Plessy’s arrest when he purchased a first-class ticket
and proceeded to sit in the whites-only, first class car. The FPOC were trying to
accomplish several things with this test case, which they thought they might lose. The
first goal was to expose the arbitrariness o f skin color as a marker of one’s ‘race.’ As a
man with one-eighth of African American blood heritage, this light-skinned man could
‘pass’ for white if he so chose. Plessy was a shoemaker and part of the FPOC middle
78

The same year the Supreme Court decided Plessy v. Ferguson, 1896, more people came to the United
States from Italy, Poland, Russia and Hungary than (the preferred origin countries of) Scandinavia,
England, France and Germany (Trachtenberg 2004:98).
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class. He was representative of the FPOC, who had long straddled the divisions between
‘white5 and ‘black.5 As we have seen from the previous chapters, the FPOC did not fit
into any neat race/class dichotomy. Although Plessy was not ‘purely5 white, his welldressed appearance and manner reflected his social standing as an established member of
the New Orleans community. For all intents and purposes, his image and behavior
reflected that of an upstanding, ‘white5 citizen who was fit to sit in a first-class car. By
making such a person the plaintiff, the Citizens5 Committee hoped to point out the fallacy
of skin color, the ‘one-drop rule,5 and the essentialist conflation o f ‘whiteness5 and
success. It is not fair or accurate to pre-judge someone solely on the basis of skin color, a
point the Committee wanted to drive home. The lawsuit also attempted to get rid of
discriminatory legislation such as the Separate Car Act, which stripped all people of color
of their civil and social rights in the public sphere.
Through the Citizens5 Committee, the FPOC fought for their rights, and the rights
of all African Americans who had borne the brunt of prejudicial laws, policies and
attitudes. The end of Reconstruction marked the beginning of a dark period for equal
rights and protection for African Americans. Fighting back through the very legal system
that had consistently penalized people of color demonstrated a degree o f political
acumen. It also stated for the record that racism and discriminatory practices would not
endure without a fight. Expressing their views in Louis A. Martinet's FPOC newspaper,
Crusader, the Committee had been vocal locally about their vehement opposition to the
Separate Car Act (Medley 2003:103).79 The FPOC had the social and political
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As with the prior L ’Union and the Tribune newspapers, the Crusader proved an important vehicle
through which to communicate the social, political and economic opportunities, grievances, and struggles
of the day (Medley 2003:104).
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connections, economic resources and a serious stake in the outcome to bring forth a case
that would go all the way to the Supreme Court: Plessy v. Ferguson.
In Plessy v. Ferguson, Plaintiff Homer Plessy was fighting for more than his right
to travel on a first-class train within Louisiana’s state borders; he was fighting for the
retention o f his reputation as a man ‘white’ enough to sit in the train’s first class cabin. 80
Medley succinctly sums up what was at stake: “[The Committee’s] six-year quest through
America’s political and legal system traversed many crucial issues in American
jurisprudence: states’ rights, federal authority, individual liberties, rights of association,
racial classification, the regulation of interstate and intrastate commerce, and the central
question o f the Supreme Court’s role in defending the individual rights of American
citizens” (Medley 2003:14).81
In her seminal article, “Whiteness as Property,” legal scholar Cheryl A. Harris probes
the relationship between property and racial identity (Harris 1993:1). As an identity,
status and property, ‘whiteness’ in a United States context evokes power and privilege
dependent upon the subordination and exclusion of others (Harris 1993:7). The historical
legacy of slavery and discrimination is reflected on myriad levels, but is cast most starkly
in the legal trail o f precedents, opinions and court decisions that have upheld white
privilege and denied equal opportunity. In the nineteenth century, it was possible to be
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“Over 20,000 passengers annually traveled the East Louisiana Railroad. Only Plessy had case to wonder
what the Supreme Court might think about his trip” (Medley 2003:14).
81
Plessy v. Ferguson raised many key questions: “Could states regulate people based on race? Didn’t the
Fourteenth Amendment’s equality clauses prohibit such discrimination? Who was qualified to assign racial
categories? Could states intrude into such intimate decisions as marriage and relationships because of the
races of the betrothed? Were people o f color citizens, slaves, or something in between? Were they less than
human? Did the United States Constitution guarantee them any rights at all?” (my emphasis, Medley
2003:15).
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socially, but not legally white (Harris 1993:11). Yet, social definitions of who was
considered ‘white’ and who was not varied from place to place.
For a group such as the New Orleans Free People of Color, who had in their history
enjoyed many of the privileges reserved for whites in most parts of the country, their
objective was to reclaim part o f their previous power. Nation-wide, the last few decades
o f the nineteenth century proved how quickly and systematically prior realms of
influence and power could be taken away. In Louisiana, people of color did not lose all of
their rights or all at once; the Louisiana legislature in 1888 included eighteen people of
color (Medley 2003:91). Locally-based New Orleans social and political organizations
such as the American Citizens’ Equal Rights Association, the Unification Movement and
the Citizens’ Committee fought against discriminatory laws and policies (Medley
2003:92). Despite active resistance and a degree of influence and participation in the
economic, political and social spheres of New Orleans, the 1890s proved to be a terrible
time for people of color. In 1891, eighteen prominent men of color organized into what
became known as the Citizens Committee (Lofgren 1987:29).
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Among the possible avenues of protest and resistance they chose to challenge the
legal system; the law could ensure the best protection against racist politicians and local
authorities who preferred to keep all people o f color in the position of second-class
citizenry. Socio-economic and political stratification intensified during the course of the
nineteenth century, creating the need for a more organized and diligent resistance. The
degree o f protection in favor of African descendant people reached its peak during
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The gendered division of the Citizens’ Committee, which excluded females, reflected the sharp
separation of men and women in economic, political and social spheres. Free women of color worked
mostly as seamstresses or ran boarding houses (Medley 2003:23).
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Reconstruction, and nadir during post-Reconstruction. The authority shift from federal
enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment and similar measures to states’ narrow
interpretations and policies proved disastrous for the FPOC and others.
Using the law to determine one’s racial status and ancestry began well before the
Citizens Committee orchestrated Plessy’s arrest . With the support of some in the New
Orleans court system, people of color in New Orleans won numerous local and state
lawsuits against discrimination (Lofgren 1987:20).
What came to be known as Jim Crow laws in the South had precedents in ante
bellum northern laws (Thomas 1997:2). The passage and upholding of Jim Crow laws
were only feasible because of Reconstruction’s failure (Thomas 1997:5). As discussed in
Chapter Three, the Post-Reconstruction era unraveled one civil, political and/or legal
right after another. In the 1880s, four states put into place laws instituting segregation,
with more prohibitive and discriminatory state legislation to come (Thomas 1997:3;
Lobel 2003:100). The end of Reconstruction not only meant the discontinuance of
policies to bring together the South and North, but an end to northern abolitionist
involvement/interference in southern race dynamics and interaction (Lobel 2003:101).

The Citizens’ Committee

During Reconstruction, Louisiana pushed the envelope o f integration and equality on
behalf of African Americans more than any other southern state; the 1868 Louisiana
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In what became known as the Toucoutou Affair, one child sued another for being called a ‘Negro’
(Desdunes 1973:61). The offended child went to court to prove her ‘whiteness’ (ibid.). Though the child
lost the case after proof was presented o f her African ancestry, the issue o f ‘passing’ for white remained a
debated, complicated and multi-faceted one in Louisiana (ibid.).
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Constitution even “outlawed racial segregation in public schools and public
accommodations, secured to blacks the right to vote and hold office, and required all state
officeholders to take an oath accepting the civil and political equality of all men” (Lobel
2003:101). In the span of five years, nine states passed Jim Crow laws directed at railway
transportation (Lofgren 1987:21).
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In general, steamboats and streetcars were the most

and least segregated forms o f transportation, respectively (Lofgren 1987:9). The official
wording o f the laws at the time was “equal but separate” (Lofgren 1987:26). By contrast,
in Louisiana railway transportation companies were loath to enforce segregation among
rail cars because it usually cost more; separating races within a single car was easier and
less expensive (Lofgren 1987:14).
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Its prime location as a port city made New Orleans

the final destination for many of the top railway companies, and represented a
cornerstone o f New Orleans’ economy (Medley 2003:134). If the railway business had
had any say in the passage or enforcement o f the Separate Car Act purely on business
economic grounds, it likely would not have passed. Segregating cars meant physically
adding more railway cars, which the companies saw as an unnecessary expense (ibid.).
Lofgren suggests that the difficulty the Committee had in setting up a test case to
challenge the 1890 Separate Car Act illustrates the variable degree to which Jim Crow
laws were in effect (Lofgren 1987:17).
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The location and date of Jim Crow laws passed in the South reads as follows: 1887 in Florida, 1888 in
Mississippi, 1889 and 1891 in Texas, 1890 and 1894 in Louisiana, 1891 in Alabama, Georgia and
Tennessee, 1891 and 1893 in Arkansas, 1892 in Kentucky (Lofgren 1987:22).
85
When African descendant people were segregated by car, persons of color—except for black wet-nurses
in some instances who could sit in the nicer cars with a white companion—had to sit closest to the engine.
The unhealthy combination o f soot, engine smoke and cigarette smoke proclaimed this unfortunate area the
‘smoking car’ (Lofgren 1987:10).
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The Citizens’ Committee formed in September of 1891 to fight discrimination and
overturn the Separate Car Act, passed by the Louisiana legislature—section 2 of Act
111— that mandated “separate but equal accommodations for the white and colored
o sr

races” (Thomas 1997:3) . Each o f the Committee’s (exclusively male) members were
distinguished and accomplished in their own right. Vice-president C.C. Antoine had
served as Lt. Governor o f Louisiana; ‘Haitian-born’ Arthur Esteves owned New Orleans’
premier ‘sailmaking company’; and Rodolphe Desdunes, who had been a law classmate
of Louis Martinet, brought wide attention to the FPOC through his book Nos Hommes et
Notre Histoire (Lobel 2003:104). They represented a sort of southern ‘talented tenth’
(Medley 2003:125). Besides opening the door for equality and equal rights through a
potential legal win, the Committee believed that the Supreme Court should have to
explicate how Jim Crow laws could be allowed in the first place; why could segregation
exist coterminously with the Fourteenth Amendment? (Lobel 2003:105).
The FPOC found segregated travel an egregious example of unfair discrimination.
The political and social climate o f the early 1890s was not favorable to what the
Committee was fighting for, but they believed that it was important to contest the laws
anyway (Lobel 2003:100).
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Once they established legal counsel and raised the

Aristide Mary officially came up with the idea to form such a committee; Louis Martinet, a physician
and accomplished man of many talents served as the de facto leader (Lobel 2003:104). Desdunes, himself a
member o f the Committee, lists the members: “Arthur Esteves, President; C. Antoine, vice-president;
Firmin Christophe, secretary; G.G. Johnson, undersecretary; Paul Bonseigneur, treasurer; Laurent Auguste,
R.L. Desdunes (author of text from which this list was taken), Alcee Labat, Pierre Chevalier, N.E.
Mansion, A.B. Kennedy, R.B. Baque, A.J. Guirenovich, L.A. Martinet, L.J. Joubert, M.J. Piron, Eugene
Luscy, E.A. Williams (Desdunes 1973:141).
87
Lobel quotes Louis Martinet, a New Orleans attorney, free man of color and Committee member as
saying: “the fight we are making is an uphill one” (Lobel 2003:100). He goes on to comment: “For
Martinet and his compatriots, the decision to resist was not calculated the way a tort lawyer weighs the
chance o f success before undertaking a negligence suit but sprang from an internal predisposition to fight
injustice” (Lobel 2003:105).
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appropriate amount o f funding, the Citizens Committee began staging their first arrest to
test the consequences of blatantly breaking the law. Daniel Desdunes, son of prominent
FPOC leader, Rodolphe Lucien Desdunes, first challenged the segregated interstate law
(Thomas 1997:6).88 Albion W. Tourgee acted as official lead counsel, while local
attorney James Walker did much of the actual strategizing and leg work for this first test
case (Lobel 2003:109). It is no accident that the main leaders in the Committee’s test case
involving Homer Plessy, including Tourgee, Walker, and dissenting Supreme Court
Justice John Marshall Harlan, were heavily involved in Radical Reconstruction politics
(Olsen 1967:18).

Homer Plessy
Litigation was seen as one avenue towards dismantling segregation and recovering
previous rights (Lobel 2003:104). After successfully challenging segregated seating on
interstate travel, the Committee wanted to carefully select someone who could test the
intrastate travel law. They chose thirty-four year old shoemaker Homer Plessy—whose
full name was Homere Adolphe Plessy (Lobel 2003:104; Medley 2003:18). A literate
man who also worked as “clerk, laborer and collector for a black-owned insurance
company,” Plessy came from a family of free people (Medley 2003:16).

88

OQ

Plessy’s range

Abolitionists had long been using the legal system to fight for rights and equality. The FPOC were no
stranger to the domain either; Committee membership itself included several attorneys (Lobel 2003:103).
Lobel rightly argues that although the American legal system is set up to be winner-take-all, losing cases
such as Plessy v. Ferguson are still vitally important (Lobel 2003:7). He makes the point that the cause of
“abolitionists, woman suffragists and advocates of equality for ffeedmen” alike relied on “test case
litigation” (Lobel 2003:48).
His parents, Adolphe Plessy and Rosa Debergue were both FPOC (Medley 2003:20). His father’s father,
a white Frenchman named Germain Plessy, came to New Orleans via revolution-stricken Saint-Domingue
in the early nineteenth century (Medley 2003:21). Germain Plessy married Catherina Mathieu, a free
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o f occupations reflected the main occupations of free men o f color, including that of
carpenter, laborer, cigar maker, shoemaker, and draymen (Medley 2003:23). His primary
profession of shoemaker possibly reflected the influence of his natural father’s line of
carpenters and his mother’s job as seamstress (Medley 2003:28).90
Plessy’s young adult years coincided with the shift from Radical power during
Reconstruction to Democrat power after Reconstruction ended, a power change that had
dramatic consequences for all people o f color (Medley 2003:30). New Orleans schools
that had previously been integrated and o f high quality, were re-segregated in 1877, soon
after the Hayes-Tilden compromise (Medley 2003:31). Plessy became involved in the
fight against re-segregation, serving as Vice-President in the Justice, Protective,
Educational and Social Club (Medley 2003:31).
In 1888, a twenty-five year old Homer Plessy married nineteen-year old Louise
Bordenave (Medley 2003:32). The young couple moved to the socially vibrant Faubourg
Treme area, an area where many FPOC lived (ibid.). Treme neighbored other vibrant and
historically notable areas, such as Congo Square, St. Louis Cemetery #1, and Storyville,
known simultaneously as the birthplace of Jazz and the “nation’s first red-light district”
(Medley 2003:34). In 1890, the Louisiana legislative body passed the Separate Car Act,
which legally restricted movement and rights to a degree Plessy had not yet endured in
his lifetime.

woman of color, and produced eight children (ibid.). Not as much is known about Homer’s maternal
family, though his mother, Rosa, was bom into the FPOC class (Medley 2003:22).
90
Plessy’s father Adolphe Plessy, died in 1869, when Homer was just five years old (Medley 2003:24).
His mother remarried another free man o f color in 1871, Victor M. Dupart (Medley 2003:25). The Dupart
family’s active role in social and political organizations may have heavily influenced Homer’s decision to
get politically involved (Medley 2003:26).
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Plessy decided to do something about this, and other, infringements upon rights
and legal protections. A comparatively young Committee member when he joined at
thirty-years o f age, Plessy volunteered to be the agitator in the Committee’s test case to
challenge segregated intrastate travel (Medley 2003:17). A legal challenge required
involving the legal system through an arrest, which the Committee planned in detail.
Plessy purchased a first-class passenger ticket on the East Louisiana Railway (which
never left Louisiana) traveling between New Orleans and Covington, Louisiana. On June
7, 1892, he would commit “a crime o f ethnicity” (Medley 2003:17, 141; Lobel
2003:104).
His arrest and booking were staged; indeed, had he not informed the conductor
checking tickets of his status as a ‘colored’ man, he might not have been arrested at all!
This was precisely the Committee’s point. It was their hope that positing Plessy as the
plaintiff would point out the “arbitrariness of racial laws” (Lobel 2003:110). In a 1891
letter Louis Martinet wrote to Albion Tourgee shortly after the latter agreed to serve as
the Committee’s official counsel, Martinet describes why the idea o f “a lady too nearly
white” might not make for a good plaintiff (Olsen 1967:56-57). Once it was decided to
challenge the restricted Louisiana law on intrastate travel, the Committee agreed that it
4

would be best to have a light-skinned free man of color, i.e. someone who could ‘pass’
for white, break the law (Thomas 1997:4). There is indeed something ironic, as Lobel
points out, in a man who could pass for white serving as a test case to locate the
boundaries between ‘black and white’ (ibid.).
The Committee wanted the best legal representation possible. Albion Winegar
Tourgee turned out to be the man for the job. He was “a former Reconstruction-era
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carpetbagger and America’s most vocal, militant, persistent, and widely heard white
advocate o f racial equality during the last two decades o f the nineteenth century” (Lobel
2003:105). A descendant of the Huguenots, Tourgee was leader of the North Carolina
Radical Republicans, an acclaimed author, and deep believer injustice (Medley
2003:54).91 His career included a series o f legal fights on behalf of rights for people of
color that earned him the title/nickname of ‘Apostle of Agitation’(Lobel 2003:108).
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After some negotiation, he agreed to become the Committee’s official attorney,p ro
bono (Thomas 1997:4). He remained in New York during the early stages of the
Committee’s fight. A reliance on long-distance correspondence perhaps slowed down the
process a bit, but enabled Tourgee to work from his northern office without too much
disruption.
The Committee believed they also needed local counsel experienced in New
Orleans politics and legislature. James C. Walker, who had plenty of experience with
local Republican politics, fit the bill.

He in effect took the legal helm, until Plessy v.

Ferguson became a Supreme Court case.94 Walker and Tourgee began formally
communicating and working together on January 2, 1892 (Lofgren 1987:32). The trust

91 His book, A F ool’s Errand, became a bestseller when it was published in 1879 (Lobel 2003:106). In the
original text, Tourgee does not list his name as author, instead citing that the writer was ‘One of the Fools’
(ibid.). The book’s philosophical and psychological examination o f what separates fools from martyrs and
prophets underlines Tourgee’s own beliefs about the difference between those who remain woefully and
willingly ignorant and passive, versus those who act wisely and actively to enact change (Lobel 2003:1067).
92
Olsen argues that with the exception of Tourgee, no prominent white leaders were “resolutely promoting
Negro equality during the 1890s” (Olsen 1967:23).
93
Walker served as a Confederate private in the Civil War, and Tourgee served as an Union officer
(Medley 2003:199).
94
The case became known as Plessy v. Ferguson once Tourgee and Walker appealed Judge Ferguson’s
1892 state Supreme Court ruling upholding the Separate Car Act’s constitutionality (Olsen 1967:14).

between the two attorneys strengthened a great deal as Walker’s suggestions on how to
proceed yielded results.

Plessy v. Ferguson*s Journey to the Supreme Court

Before Homer Plessy challenged the law pertaining to intrastate travel, the
Committee staged Daniel F. Desdunes’ arrest on interstate railway travel. Twenty-one
years of age and the octoroon son o f author and Committee member, Rodolphe Lucien
Desdunes, Daniel Desdunes’ arrest was planned for February 24, 1892. As Homer Plessy
would do four months later, Desdunes bought a first-class ticket. The supposed trip was
between New Orleans and Mobile, Alabama on the L & N Railway company (Lofgren
1987:33). Desdunes’ arrest only marked the beginning o f the fight; in order for the test
case to be effective, it needed to be solidly grounded legally. Tourgee and Walker
decided to contest the Separate Car Act on the constitutional grounds of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which supposedly recognized and protected Desdunes as a United States
citizen (Lofgren 1987:35). Desdunes’ arrest could also be challenged on state legal
grounds, though Tourgee argued against this (Lofgren 1987:36). The division of federal
and state authority remained a central issue in this case and the various stages of Plessy’s
suit; if a state ruled against Desdunes, it was not clear whether a federal judge would
interpret that decision as immutable or not (Lofgren 1987:37). The interpretation of the
Constitution’s Tenth Amendment, which guaranteed states’ rights, came into play95.
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The Tenth Amendment states: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people” (See Bill o f Rights).
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Much o f the strategizing to appeal and challenge Desdunes’ arrest proved to be
moot; the Criminal District Court for the Parish of Orleans arraigned him on March 18,
1892 and dismissed the case on July 13 (Lofgren 1987:39, 41). The preparation and
events of the Desdunes test case increased the Committee’s determination to press
forward. Arrangements for a second test case, this time to challenge the legality of
intrastate segregated travel, were made. Thirty-four year old shoemaker Homer A. Plessy
became the plaintiff. Like Desdunes, Plessy was an octoroon and considered ‘light
skinned’ enough to ‘pass’ for white.
For the sake of Plessy’s safety and the legitimacy of the Committee’s case, his
arrest needed to take place before the train actually left the New Orleans station.
Ironically, his light complexion and nicely tailored clothes and appearance meant that he
might not be arrested unless he made it clear that he was non-white. Plessy therefore
approached the conductor and said “I have to tell you that, according to Louisiana law, I
am a colored man” (Fireside 2004:1). Conductor J.J. Dowling o f this East Louisiana
Railroad Company hesitated to arrest Plessy and in the process held up the train’s
departure (Fireside 2004:2). Well-prepared by the Committee, Plessy asked to go with
Private Detective Chris Cain, who took him to the Fifth Precinct Station and jailed him in
Orleans Parish (ibid.).
Waiving his right to a hearing, Plessy found a bondsman who released him on bail
and sent him home (Fireside 2004:3). Tourgee and Walker worked furiously to make a
strong case for why the Separate Car Act was unconstitutional. As with Desdunes’ case,
the lawyers invoked Plessy’s citizenship rights as stated under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Walker and Tourgee filed a fourteen-point plea that Judge Ferguson
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overruled when he heard Plessy’s case on November 18, 1892 (Fireside 2004:6). Walker
then decided to shift Plessy’s plea from ‘not guilty’ to habeas corpus, followed by an
immediate petition to the Louisiana State Court (Lofgren 1987:42). Ex parte Plessy
became the name of the case heard before the Louisiana State Supreme Court (ibid.).
The state of Louisiana stood by its decision that the Separate Car Act did not in fact
undermine or conflict with the Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendments (Lofgren 1987:43).
Failing to overturn this law at the state level, Walker and Tourgee next turned their
attention to the federal court level, shifting their focus from New Orleans to Washington,
D.C. (ibid.).
Walker and Tourgee submitted an ‘assignment o f errors’ to the United States
Supreme Court, which listed what the attorneys perceived to be mistakes the Louisiana
state court had made in their interpretation of Plessy’s case (Lofgren 1987:44).96 This
document is important because it laid out the framework for the attorneys’ argument and
revealed their logic and focus. Tourgee and Walker argued that the Separate Car Act did
in fact violate Plessy’s rights under both the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments
because it linked him, as a man of color, to the legacy of slavery viz. a ‘badge o f
servitude’ (Lofgren 1987:46). The law’s violation of Plessy’s Fourteenth Amendment
protections was key; the attorneys argued that the Act “constituted both a denial of equal
protection and a punishment without due process” (ibid.). Another important document is
Tourgee’s brief to the Supreme Court, filed in 1895. It contains in detail the prosecution’s
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See the document in Olsen 1967:74-77.
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main arguments and logic, some of which can be found in Justice Harlan’s dissenting
• •
97
opinion.

Judge Ferguson countered the due process argument by stating that the only right
denied to Plessy was the right to do as he wished (Lofgren 1987:48).
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The law said that

as a member o f the African American race, Plessy could not sit with whites; whether he
had a first-class ticket or not, Plessy’s racial standing precluded his personal wishes
(ibid.). Ferguson dismissed other arguments Plessy’s attorneys made, the first of which
was that the Separate Car Act was null and void: “it was not a valid police measure
because it established a classification that, as a matter of law, violated (1) the Thirteenth
Amendment’s ban on badges o f servitude, (2) the Fourteenth Amendment’s
establishment of national citizenship, and (3) the latter Amendment’s guarantee against
state abridgement o f privileges or immunities” (Lofgren 1987:49). Ferguson responded
by arguing that the Separate Car Act in fact did exist as a valid police measure and
sidestepped the degree to which the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments protected
Plessy (ibid.). It is worth looking in greater detail at what these two landmark
Amendments stated and how they related to both sides o f the Plessy v. Ferguson case.
As a northern transplant in New Orleans, the cultural and historical milieux of
Ferguson’s Massachusetts background contrasted with what he found in the ‘Big Easy.’
Massachusetts’ English and Puritan legacies little resembled the French and Spanishinfluenced New Orleans’ social life that included drinking, prostitution and gambling
See pages 80-103 in Olsen 1967.
Judge John Howard Ferguson originally hailed from a state native residents considered “the birthplace of
freedom,” Massachusetts (Medley 2003:42). After finishing law school in Boston in the 1860s, he decided
to pursue the carpetbagger’s dream of making it big in the newly defeated South (Medley 2003:45).
Ferguson married into an abolitionist Unionist family when he married the daughter o f outspoken antiConfederate Thomas J. Earhart, Virginia Earhart(ibid-).
98
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(Medley 2003:46). The strong Protestantism that characterized Boston clashed with the
strong Catholic constituency in New Orleans (ibid.). Finally, the legacy of freedom that
rejected the practice of slavery in Massachusetts diverged widely from the institution’s
ongoing practice in Louisiana until the Civil War (ibid.). A number of people contributed
to his strict interpretation of law, notably Benjamin Hallett, Thomas Earhart and Francis
Nicholls, who were mentors and prominent lawyers (Medley 2003:49). In the beginning
o f his career Ferguson did not publicly proclaim his opinions on race, though he did take
a strong stand against the practice o f gambling in New Orleans (Medley 2003:51)."
His stringent views on which protections and rights did and did not extend to
African Americans played a decisive role in Plessy’s case making its way to the Supreme
Court. In fact, the Citizens’ Committee wanted the case to go to the Supreme Court,
because the federal courts had the authority to overturn Louisiana’s— and by extension
other southern states’—discriminatory laws (Medley 2003:126).
This case did not spark a windfall of media attention, perhaps because numerous
acts o f civil disobedience took place in the year 1892 (Medley 2003:147). Conflict
between “militant labor unions and intransigent capitalists locked horns in their own
bloody guerre a mort” (Medley 2003:147). Presidential politics came again into the fore
with that year’s Democratic and Republican and—for the first time, third party
Populist— conventions (ibid.). Thirty years after the Union army freed New Orleans and
Lincoln composed the Emancipation Proclamation, 1892 also marked the highest number
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Medley comments that, quite ironically, “Plessy and Ferguson had the same skin color” (Medley
2003:162).
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o f lynchings ever recorded (ibid.).100 The pendulum’s swing away from Reconstructionera politics towards white supremacy and the regulation of people of color was also a
factor in the little media attention and outcry the Supreme Court’s decision in Plessy v.
Ferguson provoked.

The role of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments

A particular interpretation of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments is
essential to understanding Plessy v. Ferguson. The Thirteenth Amendment’s primary
purpose was to outlaw slavery (Thomas 1997:11). Although this may seem simple and
clear-cut, it in fact is not, because those who passed this Amendment did not foresee the
(necessity of the) passage o f the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments (ibid.). There was
no consensus on how wide the Thirteenth Amendment’s net should be cast, and what it
should specifically encompass (Thomas 1997:12). Some, like President Johnson who
opposed many of the legislative measures to enfranchise African Americans, viewed the
Thirteenth Amendment’s purpose solely as ending slavery (ibid.). Others, like Senator
Trumbull who was instrumental in the Freedman’s Bureau Bill and the Civil Rights Act,
thought the Thirteenth Amendment should effectively ban all discrimination (ibid.). As it
turned out, strict interpretations in cases invoking the Thirteenth Amendment only
addressed the abolition o f slavery; had the Amendment been more broadly interpreted, it
could have perhaps offered protection against all forms of discrimination, and precluded
the need for the next two amendments (Thomas 1997:22). In parallel reasoning, Justice
100 Glenn estimates that 2,585 lynchings occurred between 1885 and 1903 throughout the South (Glenn
2002:109).
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Field said that if the Fourteenth Amendment had protected and ensured political and civil
rights, then the Fifteenth Amendment would have been unnecessary (Thomas 1997:23).
The 1866 Civil Rights Act much more explicitly banned racial discrimination
(ibid.). Here, an important distinction should be made between civil, social and political
rights. Thomas insightfully sets up political rights on a vertical axis, and social rights on a
horizontal axis, with civil rights falling somewhere in between (ibid.). Political rights
come directly from a governmental body and are regulated by law; voting is an example
o f a political right (ibid.). A civil right, such as being able to walk down the street without
being harassed or discriminated against, is less cut and dry and more circumstantial. The
1866 Civil Rights Act argued that the right to not be discriminated against is a civil right
that ought to be legally protected (Thomas 1997:13).
The issue of whether the state or federal government enforces and protects one’s
civil rights strikes at the heart o f the power struggle among the then still-divided South
and North (Thomas 1997:14). States were not allowed to become part of the Union
unless they ratified the Fourteenth Amendment, which is much more complex than either
the Thirteenth or Fifteenth Amendments (ibid.). The Fourteenth Amendment is directed
at United States citizens, but citizenship was never defined in the Constitution. In
addition to the struggle between various states and the federal government was the fight
over who should be allowed to become a citizen (ibid.). Should the granting of
citizenship fall within the states’ domain, or be issued from the federal level? This
question was resolved in sentence two o f the Fourteenth Amendment: “No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States...” (Thomas 1997:14).

Sentence one of the Fourteenth Amendment overturned the ruling in the 1857
Dred Scott case that denied citizenship to all African Americans: “All persons bom or
naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States and of the State wherein they reside (ibid.).101 Another key element, the
‘due process clause’ protects all people, not just citizens: “nor shall any State deprive any
person o f life, liberty, or property, without due process o f law ...” (emphasis added,
ibid.).102
Several cases tested the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments more than two
decades before Plessy v. Ferguson case (Thomas 1997:18). The first cases to do so were
The Slaughter-House Cases of 1873. The defendants were white butchers from New
Orleans who argued that the state restriction (or monopoly) of slaughterhouses to only
two companies violated the butchers’ livelihood and property rights (ibid.). Though the
butchers lost in the case, the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment had been tested. To the
ultimate detriment of African Americans, it was interpreted narrowly and favored state
over federal authority (ibid.). States were given the final right to appeal cases that would
make them uphold or enact legislation they did not care to, such as banning racial
discrimination (Thomas 1997:22). For those African Americans living in the South, this
was a treacherous decision. How narrowly or broadly, specifically or generally judges
interpreted the application o f legislation directly impacted how those affected laws would
be enforced in the future. One ruling that did recognize African American’s rights was

101 The second half of this sentence did not apply to American-born African Americans but had great
consequences for various immigrant groups, who could be denied citizenship based on their country of
origin and its relationship with the United States (Thomas 1997:16).
102
The addition of these two words, ‘any State’ makes this clause different from what is stated in the Fifth
Amendment (Thomas 1997:16).
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the 1880 Strauder v. West Virginia case that struck down West Virginia’s law banning
African Americans from serving on juries (Olsen 1967:7).
However, most case rulings clearly favored corporate business interests. One
particularly influential example o f this is the 1886 Santa Clara County v. Southern
Pacific Railroad Company case. In it, protections granted by the Fourteenth Amendment
were extended to corporations. Corporations were essentially given the same protective
rights as individuals (Thomas 1997:20).

im

The power of corporations was greatly

expanded by an interpretation in this case that legally recognized corporations as
“artificial legal ‘persons.’ It followed that corporations would be protected under the due
process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment” (ibid.). Corporations
today continue to benefit from the enormous power granted to them from this precedent.
The 1875 Civil Rights Bill, spearheaded by long-time advocate of African
American rights, Charles Sumner, passed in Congress after his death in 1874 (Thomas
1997:23). This bill guaranteed the ability o f all people to use the same public facilities
and enjoy the same public accommodations (ibid.). Five cases contesting this bill had
landed in the Supreme Court’s docket by 1883 (ibid.). Heard and decided together in the
Civil Rights Cases, the ruling found most of the 1875 Civil Rights Bill unconstitutional
(Thomas 1997:24). One o f the Justices who ruled in the majority, Justice Bradley, stated
his discomfort with the vast umbrella of protections the Bill covered (ibid.). Making the
distinction between social and civil rights, he iterated that the majority o f individual
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Olsen analyzes such court opinions this way: “In pursuit of this end, the same court that so thoroughly
minimized the intended equalitarian promise o f the Fourteenth Amendment, shockingly stretched its
m e a n in g in behalf o f the privileged few. In what has been pronounced ‘a calamitous, indeed a well-nigh
ruinous, form of judicial displacement of majority will,’ the Supreme Court erected a bulwark in defense of
property rights by atrociously attaching and by freely utilizing the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment in behalf of railroads, corporations, and public land and land holders” (Olsen 1967:19).
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rights should be social rights, outside of the direct jurisdiction of law (ibid.). The 1875
Civil Rights Bill’s federal ban on discrimination against individual persons in public
places was deemed unconstitutional because it fell outside of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s domain, which only protected from “state-imposed discrimination” (Lobel
2003:282). Bradley understood the Fourteenth Amendment to protect the rights of states,
and not individuals (Thomas 1997:24).
Dissenter Justice Harlan, who would be the only judge to dissent— and the only
Supreme Court judge from the South!— in the Plessy v. Ferguson ruling, argued for a
broad interpretationyapplication of the Thirteenth Amendment (Thomas 1997:25, 165).104
He also said that the “new national citizenship” provided for in the Fourteenth
Amendment carried the right to not be discriminated against. Harlan upheld that the 1875
Civil Rights Bill was in fact constitutional because “it enforced the affirmative rights
implied by the new national citizenship created by that sentence” (ibid.).

Plessy v. Ferguson

It did not take long for the case against Judge John Howard Ferguson’s ruling to
move up through the Louisiana state courts; the case landed before the Supreme Court in
1893 (Lobel 2003:110). Meanwhile, in February of 1893 Plessy’s case came before the
United States Supreme Court, where it stayed without action (Medley 2003:173). While
the case stalled, the Citizens’ Committee directed their efforts and cause to the fighting

104 Harlan dissented from the Court’s majority opinion a total o f 119 times during his tenure on the Court
(Medley 2003:197).
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pages of the Crusader. They voiced opposition to places that became segregated, such as
Catholic churches and biased juries comprised only of white men (Medley 2003:189).
Though Tourgee and Walker felt that their chances o f actually winning this
Supreme Court case were slim, two arguments did carry the potential of winning the
Court’s favor. Guaranteed as a citizen by the Fourteenth Amendment, Plessy should be
able to retain his property rights as an individual, which include the retention of his
nearly ‘white’ appearance and conduct as a form of property. The reader will recall
Cheryl Harris’ argument that ‘whiteness’ has historically and legally been regarded as a
form of property ownership, along the same lines as homeownership or business
ownership (Harris 1993:1). Plessy’s legal team thought the Court might be sympathetic to
segregation as a violation of his property rights as a citizen (Medley 2003:200). The
second potential winning argument concerned business sense and basic economics; the
railway companies saw the necessity o f having to add additional cars for the purpose of
enforcing segregated travel as an expensive and unnecessary burden (Medley 2003:200).
Although the discourse of Plessy’s property rights and the railway companies’
economic success were convincing arguments, for the FPOC this case represented much
deeper ethical concerns. Discriminatory legislation—i.e. Jim Crow laws— defied the
spirit and intent of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, which as a
whole guaranteed and protected the citizenship rights of African Americans (ibid.).
Would a country that had abolished slavery more than four decades prior stand for
legislated discrimination? Would African Americans be forever proscribed as secondclass citizens?
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Tourgee’s brief to the Supreme Court placed the issue of national citizenship at
the heart o f the issue over civil and social rights (Lobel 2003:110). Tourgee asked the
Court to consider what the Amendment actually did allow and guarantee (ibid.). The
Fourteenth Amendment’s phrase ‘new national citizenship’ should mean a
correspondingly new, all-encompassing definition o f ‘equality’ (Lobel 2003:111).
Ultimately, the Supreme Court ruled 7-1 in favor of Judge Ferguson to uphold the
Louisiana Separate Car Act. In effect, the country’s highest court stated that segregation
was not only acceptable, but the law. The Citizens’ Committee suffered a bad defeat, but
did not entirely lose. Aside from forcing the judicial system to take a stand on Jim Crow
laws and defend it on the record, Judge Harlan’s dissent “became a beacon for future
civil-rights lawyers who would later challenge segregation” (Medley 2003:205). The
Supreme Court’s majority upheld in law the reputation, power and reality of whiteness as
property.
Lofgren correctly states that this landmark case was “a compound of bad logic,
bad history, bad sociology, and bad constitutional law” (Lofgren 1987:4). As a relatively
uncontroversial verdict, Plessy v. Ferguson serves as one measurement of the country’s
late nineteenth-century judicial, political, moral, social and cultural temperature. The
eugenics movement and scientific racism that completely eclipsed the ideals and laws of
Reconstruction and the fight for equality shifted things from bad to worse. Racist
ideology and discriminatory practices moved from the realm of socio-economic
justifications for slavery, and later indentured servitude, sharecropping and other
economically dependent labor systems to the sphere of scientific doctrine. Coercive labor
was legally justified and socio-economically legitimated long after Lincoln signed the

93

Emancipation Proclamation into law.105 In 1895, the same year that the prominent
African American leader Frederick Douglass passed away, Booker T. Washington
emerged as the pre-eminent black leader. Touting accommodation to whites as a way for
African Americans to fit into society, his views “undercut and outshined” the very
equality the FPOC struggled for (Medley 2003 :192). Washington’s perspective of what
African Americans could do and where they fit in American society diverged sharply
with the Committee’s (ibid.). Washington’s message appealed to many moderate whites
in the North and South, who viewed it as a compromise with which they could live
(Thomas 1997:120). Washington’s famed ‘Atlanta Exposition Address’ of September 18,
1895 brought him, and his accomodationist ideals, into the spotlight (Thomas 1997:119).
Even President Cleveland praised Washington (Thomas 1997:120). His famous metaphor
o f one united hand made up o f five separate fingers was quite passive, in contrast to the
Committee’s active methods and goals (Thomas 1997:122).106

105 See Glenn’s chapter “Blacks and Whites in the South” for an historicized look at how racialized labor
practices, and what she terms “legal peonage” severely disadvantaged African Americans well into the
twentieth century (Glenn 2002:102).
106 In his address, Washington stated: “Casting down your bucket among my people, helping and
encouraging them as you are doing on these grounds, and to education of head, hand, and heart, you will
find that they will buy your surplus land, make blossom the waste places in your fields, and run your
factories. While doing this, you can be sure in the future, as in the past, that you and your families will be
surrounded by the most patient, faithful, law-abiding, and unresentful people that the world has seen...we
shall stand by you with a devotion that no foreigner can approach, ready to lay down our lives, if need be,
in defence (sic) of yours, interlacing our industrial, commercial, civil, and religious life with yours in a way
that shall make the interests of both races one. In all things that are purely social we can be as separate as
the fingers, yet one as the hand in all things essential to mutual progress” (Thomas 1997:122).
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Conclusion

Returning to Cheryl Harris’ argument that ‘whiteness’ signals property
ownership, status and identity, the forced economic dependence of many African
Americans practically spelled continued enslavement, and represented the opposite of
citizenship. The inability to climb out of debt to completely own one’s property rendered
these individuals, families, and communities less powerful and autonomous. Ideals of
freedom, self-sufficiency and economic independence have always been linked in the
American conceptualization o f citizenship (Glenn 2002:59). This has often meant
defining oneself in opposition to what they are not, namely African Americans: “It is no
accident and no mistake that immigrant populations (and much immigrant literature)
understood their Americaness as an opposition to the resident black population. Race in
fact now functions as a metaphor so necessary to the construction of American-ness that
it rivals the old pseudo-scientific and class-informed racisms whose dynamics we are
more used to deciphering” (Harris 1993:41).
The intentional and systemic denial of citizenship rights and privileges to African
Americans, immigrant groups and Native Americans reveals an American past shrouded
in exclusionary practices that bespeaks the opposite o f universalistic and inclusive ideals.
One way to judge this is by the most recent commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of
Brown v. the Board o f Education last year (2004), which generated commentary on how
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much ‘progress’ schools have made. Pedro Noguera and Robert Cohen responded with
this sentiment: “Sadly, on Brow n’s fiftieth anniversary the only deliberate speed we see is
toward resegregation; today less than a third of African-American students attend racially
integrated schools” (Noguera and Cohen 2004:18). They attribute the lack of high quality
schools for students of color to “white flight and legal barriers” (ibid.). Patricia Sullivan
goes even further: “In 2004 the profile o f educational opportunity for a significant
segment o f African-American children mirrors the pre-Brown era. Predominantly black
and minority schools are most often housed in crumbling facilities, suffer from starved
budgets and lack essential resources” (Sullivan 2004:20,22).
Certainly more non-white students have more educational opportunities nation
wide today than during the 1890s, when Plessy v. Ferguson was being decided. Yet, just
because legal inequality is no longer mandated in the court o f law does not mean that
equal rights have been achieved. As we have seen, the Thirteenth Amendment effectively
ended the institution o f slavery. However, a narrow/strict state and federal interpretation
o f what that actually meant allowed the ‘badge of servitude’ to continue in the form of
discriminatory laws, policies, and attitudes long after the Thirteenth Amendment and
Emancipation Proclamation. Sullivan continues: “The persistence of racial inequality—as
measured by income, joblessness and underemployment, and rates of incarceration— is
closely linked to an educational system that barely functions for a large number of black
children and fails to address the needs of many more” (Sullivan 2004:22). Writing about
Brown v. Board's “mixed legacy,” Cheryl Harris states: “Brown held that the
Constitution would not countenance legalized racial separation, but Brown did not
address the government’s responsibility to eradicate inequalities in resource allocation
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either in public education or other public services...Brown modified Plessy’s
interpretation o f the Equal Protection Clause and accommodated both Blacks’ claims for
‘equality under law’ and the global interests o f white ruling elites” (Harris 1993:16).
Harris drives her point home and correctly portrays the state of affairs today: “What
remained consistent was the perpetuation o f institutional privilege under a standard of
legal equality. In the foreground was the change of formal societal rules; in the
background was the ‘natural’ fact o f white privilege that dictated the pace and course o f
any moderating change. What remained in revised and reconstituted form was whiteness
as property” (ibid.).
Harris goes on to argue that ‘whiteness as property’ is legally protected and
publicly justified through a doctrine of colorblindness, which is “the assertion that race is
color and color does not matter” (Harris 1993:19). The retraction o f affirmative action
programs is just one recent example o f equal rights being stripped away. Affirmative
action programs are meant to ‘level the playing field,’ so that historically under
represented groups can enter a wide array of schools and professions to which members
of their group were previously denied access. In some cases, such as Regents o f the
University o f California v. Bakke, affirmative action was discontinued while ‘legacy’ and
other programs that increase a prospective student’s admission chances were retained
(ibid.). Such is the direction of our nation’s present-day politics.
The country’s intolerance of diversity and multiculturalism in the nineteenth
century, combined with a rigid exclusionary ideology o f who actually represented
American citizenship, would only accelerate over the next few decades. Under President
Theodore Roosevelt’s rule, various immigrant groups were subjected to Americanization
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programs that forced individuals to completely renounce their country o f origin and
replace their customs with American traditions (Trachtenberg 2004:xxi).
Nativism and racism gained speed and became more violent. African Americans
were particularly vulnerable from the 1890s through the First World War. The FPOC
gradually lost their distinctiveness in New Orleans as Jim Crow laws eclipsed their
historical uniqueness. Those who were not already significantly wealthy or somehow
economically independent became just as vulnerable to the period’s virulent racism as
other non-FPOC persons. Judith Shklar describes voting and earning as the “two great
emblems o f public standing” (Shklar 1991:3). The systemic lack of access to these two
institutional avenues o f power kept many in bondage, until the 1960’s Civil Rights
Movement reinstated and newly created legal protections and policies.
The FPOC’s struggle against the political tide of exclusionary practices and laws
is an important story of resistance. As an ethnic group, the FPOC saw themselves
differently from how others considered and categorized them. Their story is exceptional,
not just because o f the degree of power and wealth they had secured by the ante-bellum
period that was later used to fight against their eroding rights, but because their history is
largely buried. The right to define oneself and autonomously create spheres o f power and
opportunity in the face of racialized and gendered ideologies and practices is an example
of why national, regional and ethnic identities matter. What was at stake for the FPOC
when the Citizens Committee challenged the legal constitutionality of state and federal
legislation was the ability to fulfill the ideals of the Republic through self-sufficiency,
property ownership and economic independence. Their marginality as persons o f color
was very much a product of the nineteenth-century period. Its ramifications are, however,
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very much in existence today. Olsen writes: “This shameful Plessy decision, together
with the pervasive segregation it encouraged, clearly contributed to the intensified
oppression of the Negro. The racial disenfranchisement, exploitation, intimidation, and
violence that characterized succeeding years are in part attributable to that decision, as is
the strength of an awesome heritage o f prejudice that continues to afflict this nation and
the world today” (Olsen 1967:17). Olsen’s words, written almost forty years ago, ring
just as true in 2005.
The continuous state and federal disenfranchisement of African American voters
(not least seen in the most recent 2000 and 2004 Presidential races in the states of Ohio
and Florida) and institutional racism that make ‘diversity’ the exception rather than the
rule are just two examples of racialized policies and practices that preclude the idea of
equal opportunity. The ‘American Dream’ is not attainable for everyone. Understanding
the historical connections between political ideals and temporal realities can help
motivate resistance and change. There is nothing inevitable about discriminatory
practices and attitudes, but change must start with awareness of those who have
previously struggled. The ways in which the FPOC fought against the odds provide a
starting place for what is possible.
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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: TIMETABLE OF NINETEENTH-CENTURY AND TWENTIETHCENTURY EVENTS RELATED TO PLESSY V. FERGUSON
1857: Dred Scott v. Sanford Supreme Court decision denies citizenship rights to African
Americans
1861: Civil War begins
1862: Homer A. Plessy is bom a free person o f color in New Orleans
1863: The Emancipation Proclamation frees enslaved persons in much of the South (over
3 million)
1865: Civil War ends when Confederate Leader Robert E. Lee surrenders to Union leader
Ulysses S. Grant; Thirteenth Amendment is ratified in the House of Representatives; the
Ku Klux Klan is established in Tennessee; southern states enact Black Codes into law
that “re-impose the caste division of the slave system” (Fireside 2004: xiii); President
Lincoln is assassinated; Andrew Johnson is sworn in as President
1866: Civil Rights Act makes citizenship for African Americans implicit
1867: Reconstruction Acts militarily control the South; former Confederate states are
allowed back into the Union i f they ratify the Fourteenth Amendment
1868: Fourteenth Amendment ratified; Congress starts the process of impeachment for
outgoing President Johnson; Ulysses S. Grant elected President
1870: Fifteenth Amendment ratified
1872: President Grant is re-elected
1873: The Supreme Court strictly interprets the protections and rights issued forth by the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments in the Slaughter-House Cases
1876: Rutherford B. Hayes elected president after promising southern voters he would
not enforce the Fifteenth Amendment
1877: Presidential Reconstruction ends
1880: James A. Garfield, known prior in Congress as an African American civil rights
advocate is elected President
1881: President Garfield is shot in July, passes away in September; Chester A. Arthur is
sworn in as President
1884: Grover Cleveland, the first Democratic President since the Civil War, is elected
1886: The Supreme Court rules that corporations have the same protections as persons
and is thus granted protection under the Fourteenth Amendment in Santa Clara County v.
Southern Pacific Railroad Company
1888: Homer Plessy marries Louise Bourdenave
1890: Louisiana legislature passes Act No. 111 o f the Separate Car Act, mandating
segregated travel on railway cars
1891: The Citizens’ Committee to Test the Constitutionality o f the Law is formed;
Albion Tourgee becomes the Committee’s official lead counsel
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1892: In February, the Citizens’ Committee stages Daniel F. Desdunes’ arrest in their
first test case; Homer Plessy’s arrest is staged in June; Louisiana state supreme court
rules that the Separate Car Act is constitutional; President Cleveland is re-elected
1893: The Louisiana Supreme Court upholds Judge Ferguson’s ruling in Ex parte Plessy
1895: Frederick Douglass dies; Booker T. Washington gives his famed ‘Atlanta
Exposition address’
1896: The Supreme Court rules in favor of Judge John Ferguson in the Plessy v.
Ferguson case, ushering in a period of ‘separate but equal’ Jim Crow laws
1905: W.E.B. Du Bois establishes the Niagara Movement, which later becomes the
NAACP
1909: The NAACP, or National Association for the Advancement of Colored People is
formed
1925: Homer Plessy dies in New Orleans
1951: Federal court upholds segregation schooling in Brown v. Board o f Education o f
Topeka
1954: Rosa Parks breaks the law when she does not yield her seat to a white passenger on
a Montgomery bus; the Supreme Court rules in Brown v. Board o f Education that
segregated schools are unconstitutional because they violate the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments
1955: In Brown I f the Supreme Court orders the desegregation of schools ‘with all
deliberate speed’
1960: A lunch counter sit-in at a Greensboro, North Carolina Woolworth’s department
store sparks similar acts o f resistance throughout the South
1961: President John F. Kennedy signs the first affirmative action law that decrees nondiscriminatory hiring practices
1962: U.S. Department of Justice officially bans all segregated interstate travel after two
years of ‘freedom rides’ put together by the Congress of Racial Equality
1964: The Civil Rights Act is passed
1965: President Lyndon B. Johnson spearheads the Voting Rights Act
1965: A Mississippi federal jury convicts for the first time seven white men responsible
for murdering three civil rights workers
1977: The Supreme Court orders that Allan Bakke, a white student denied admission to
the University of California at Davis medical school who sued on claims o f ‘reverse
discrimination’, be admitted
2003: In similar lawsuits concerning admissions criteria and affirmative action, the
Supreme Court rules the University of Michigan’s point quota system unconstitutional,
while holding up the University o f Michigan Law School’s admissions criteria that takes
a prospective student’s race into account
2005: In a Republican-controlled Congress, the Republican Senate threatens to dismantle
the filibuster to block judicial nominations
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APPENDIX B

PLESSY V. FERGUSON: 163 U.S. 537:
(http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/)

May 18, 1896. [163 U.S. 537, 538] This was a petition for writs of prohibition and
certiorari originally filed in the supreme court of the state by Plessy, the plaintiff in error,
against the Hon. John H. Ferguson, judge of the criminal district court for the parish of
Orleans, and setting forth, in substance, the following facts:
That petitioner was a citizen of the United States and a resident of the state of Louisiana,
of mixed descent, in the proportion of seven-eighths Caucasian and one-eighth African
blood; that the mixture of colored blood was not discernible in him, and that he was
entitled to every recognition, right, privilege, and immunity secured to the citizens of the
United States of the white race by its constitution and laws; that on June 7, 1892, he
engaged and paid for a first-class passage on the East Louisiana Railway, from New
Orleans to Covington, in the same state, and thereupon entered a passenger train, and
took possession of a vacant seat in a coach where passengers of the white race were
accommodated; that such railroad company was incorporated by the laws of Louisiana as
a common carrier, and was not authorized to distinguish between citizens according to
their race, but, notwithstanding this, petitioner was required by the conductor, under
penalty of ejection from said train and imprisonment, to vacate said coach, and occupy
another seat, in a coach assigned by said company for persons not of the white race, and
for no other reason than that petitioner was of the colored race; that, upon petitioner's
refusal to comply with such order, he was, with the aid of a police officer, forcibly
ejected from said coach, and hurried off to, and imprisoned in, the parish jail of [163 U.S.
537, 539] New Orleans, and there held to answer a charge made by such officer to the
effect that he was guilty of having criminally violated an act of the general assembly of
the state, approved July 10, 1890, in such case made and provided.
The petitioner was subsequently brought before the recorder of the city for preliminary
examination, and committed for trial to the criminal district court for the parish of
Orleans, where an information was filed against him in the matter above set forth, for a
violation of the above act, which act the petitioner affirmed to be null and void, because
in conflict with the constitution of the United States; that petitioner interposed a plea to
such information, based upon the unconstitutionality of the act of the general assembly,
to which the district attorney, on behalf of the state, filed a demurrer; that, upon issue
being joined upon such demurrer and plea, the court sustained the demurrer, overruled
the plea, and ordered petitioner to plead over to the facts set forth in the information, and
that, unless the judge of the said court be enjoined by a writ o f prohibition from further
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proceeding in such case, the court will proceed to fine and sentence petitioner to
imprisonment, and thus deprive him o f his constitutional rights set forth in his said plea,
notwithstanding the unconstitutionality of the act under which he was being prosecuted;
that no appeal lay from such sentence, and petitioner was without relief or remedy except
by writs of prohibition and certiorari. Copies of the information and other proceedings in
the criminal district court were annexed to the petition as an exhibit.
Upon the filing of this petition, an order was issued upon the respondent to show cause
why a writ o f prohibition should not issue, and be made perpetual, and a further order that
the record o f the proceedings had in the criminal cause be certified and transmitted to the
supreme court.
To this order the respondent made answer, transmitting a certified copy o f the
proceedings, asserting the constitutionality of the law, and averring that, instead of
pleading or admitting that he belonged to the colored race, the said Plessy declined and
refused, either by pleading or otherwise, to admit [163 U.S. 537, 540] that he was in any
sense or in any proportion a colored man.
The case coming on for hearing before the supreme court, that court was of
opinion that the law under which the prosecution was had was constitutional and
denied the relief prayed for by the petitioner (Ex parte Plessy, 45 La. Ann. 80, 11
South. 948); whereupon petitioner prayed for a writ of error from this court,
which was allowed by the chief justice o f the supreme court o f Louisiana.
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APPENDIX C

MAJORITY OPINION BY JUSTICE HENRY BILLINGS BROWN
(http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/)
Mr. Justice BROWN, after stating the facts in the foregoing language, delivered the
opinion of the court.
This case turns upon the constitutionality of an act of the general assembly of the state of
Louisiana, passed in 1890, providing for separate railway carriages for the white and
colored races. Acts 1890, No. I l l , p. 152.
The first section of the statute enacts 'that all railway companies carrying passengers in
their coaches in this state, shall provide equal but separate accommodations for the white,
and colored races, by providing two or more passenger coaches for each passenger train,
or by dividing the passenger coaches by a partition so as to secure separate
accommodations: provided, that this section shall not be construed to apply to street
railroads. No person or persons shall be permitted to occupy seats in coaches, other than
the ones assigned to them, on account of the race they belong to.'
By the second section it was enacted 'that the officers of such passenger trains shall have
power and are hereby required [163 U.S. 537, 541] to assign each passenger to the coach
or compartment used for the race to which such passenger belongs; any passenger
insisting on going into a coach or compartment to which by race he does not belong, shall
be liable to a fine of twenty-five dollars, or in lieu thereof to imprisonment for a period of
not more than twenty days in the parish prison, and any officer of any railroad insisting
on assigning a passenger to a coach or compartment other than the one set aside for the
race to which said passenger belongs, shall be liable to a fine of twenty-five dollars, or in
lieu thereof to imprisonment for a period of not more than twenty days in the parish
prison; and should any passenger refuse to occupy the coach or compartment to which he
or she is assigned by the officer of such railway, said officer shall have power to refuse to
carry such passenger on his train, and for such refusal neither he nor the railway company
which he represents shall be liable for damages in any o f the courts of this state.'
The third section provides penalties for the refusal or neglect of the officers, directors,
conductors, and employees of railway companies to comply with the act, with a proviso
that 'nothing in this act shall be construed as applying to nurses attending children of the
other race.' The fourth section is immaterial.
The information filed in the criminal district court charged, in substance, that Plessy,
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being a passenger between two stations within the state of Louisiana, was assigned by
officers of the company to the coach used for the race to which he belonged, but he
insisted upon going into a coach used by the race to which he did not belong. Neither in
the information nor plea was his particular race or color averred.
The petition for the writ o f prohibition averred that petitioner was seven-eights Caucasian
and one-eighth African blood; that the mixture of colored blood was not discernible in
him; and that he was entitled to every right, privilege, and immunity secured to citizens
o f the United States of the white race; and that, upon such theory, he took possession o f a
vacant seat in a coach where passengers of the white race were accommodated, and was
ordered by the conductor to vacate [163 U.S. 537, 542] said coach, and take a seat in
another, assigned to persons of the colored race, and, having refused to comply with such
demand, he was forcibly ejected, with the aid o f a police officer, and imprisoned in the
parish jail to answer a charge of having violated the above act.
The constitutionality o f this act is attacked upon the ground that it conflicts both with the
thirteenth amendment of the constitution, abolishing slavery, and the fourteenth
amendment, which prohibits certain restrictive legislation on the part o f the states.
1. That it does not conflict with the thirteenth amendment, which abolished slavery and
involuntary servitude, except a punishment for crime, is too clear for argument. Slavery
implies involuntary servitude,-a state of bondage; the ownership o f mankind as a chattel,
or, at least, the control o f the labor and services of one man for the benefit of another, and
the absence o f a legal right to the disposal of his own person, property, and services. This
amendment was said in the Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, to have been intended
primarily to abolish slavery, as it had been previously known in this country, and that it
equally forbade Mexican peonage or the Chinese coolie trade, when they amounted to
slavery or involuntary servitude, and that the use of the word 'servitude' was intended to
prohibit the use of all forms of involuntary slavery, of whatever class or name. It was
intimated, however, in that case, that this amendment was regarded by the statesmen of
that day as insufficient to protect the colored race from certain laws which had been
enacted in the Southern states, imposing upon the colored race onerous disabilities and
burdens, and curtailing their rights in the pursuit of life, liberty, and property to such an
extent that their freedom was of little value; and that the fourteenth amendment was
devised to meet this exigency.
So, too, in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 , 3 Sup. Ct. 18, it was said that the act of a
mere individual, the owner of an inn, a public conveyance or place of amusement,
refusing accommodations to colored people, cannot be justly regarded as imposing any
badge of slavery or servitude upon the applicant, but [163 U.S. 537, 543] only as
involving an ordinary civil injury, properly cognizable by the laws o f the state, and
presumably subject to redress by those laws until the contrary appears. 'It would be
running the slavery question into the ground,' said Mr. Justice Bradley, 'to make it apply
to every act of discrimination which a person may see fit to make as to the guests he will
entertain, or as to the people he will take into his coach or cab or car, or admit to his
concert or theater, or deal with in other matters o f intercourse or business.'
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A statute which implies merely a legal distinction between the white and colored races-a
distinction which is founded in the color of the two races, and which must always exist so
long as white men are distinguished from the other race by color-has no tendency to
destroy the legal equality of the two races, or re-establish a state of involuntary servitude.
Indeed, we do not understand that the thirteenth amendment is strenuously relied upon by
the plaintiff in error in this connection.
2. By the fourteenth amendment, all persons bom or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are made citizens of the United States and o f the state
wherein they reside; and the states are forbidden from making or enforcing any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, or shall
deprive any person o f life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any
person within their jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
The proper constmction of this amendment was first called to the attention of this court in
the Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, which involved, however, not a question of race,
but one of exclusive privileges. The case did not call for any expression of opinion as to
the exact rights it was intended to secure to the colored race, but it was said generally that
its main purpose was to establish the citizenship of the negro, to give definitions of
citizenship of the United States and o f the states, and to protect from the hostile
legislation of the states the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, as
distinguished from those o f citizens of the states. [163 U.S. 537, 544] The object of the
amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality o f the two races before the
law, but, in the nature o f things, it could not have been intended to abolish distinctions
based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguish d from political, equality, or a
commingling o f the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either. Laws permitting, and
even requiring, their separation, in places where they are liable to be brought into contact,
do not necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the other, and have been
generally, if not universally, recognized as within the competency of the state legislatures
in the exercise of their police power. The most common instance o f this is connected with
the establishment of separate schools for white and colored children, which have been
held to be a valid exercise of the legislative power even by courts of states where the
political rights of the colored race have been longest and most earnestly enforced.
One o f the earliest o f these cases is that o f Roberts v. City o f Boston, 5 Cush. 198, in
which the supreme judicial court o f Massachusetts held that the general school committee
of Boston had power to make provision for the instruction of colored children in separate
schools established exclusively for them, and to prohibit their attendance upon the other
schools. T he great principle,’ said Chief Justice Shaw, 'advanced by the learned and
eloquent advocate for the plaintiff [Mr. Charles Sumner], is that, by the constitution and
laws of Massachusetts, all persons, without distinction o f age or sex, birth or color, origin
or condition, are equal before the law. ... But, when this great principle comes to be
applied to the actual and various conditions of persons in society, it will not warrant the
assertion that men and women are legally clothed with the same civil and political
powers, and that children and adults are legally to have the same functions and be subject
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to the same treatment; but only that the rights of all, as they are settled and regulated by
law, are equally entitled to the paternal consideration and protection o f the law for their
maintenance and security.' It was held that the powers of the committee extended to the
establishment [163 U.S. 537, 545] o f separate schools for children of different ages, sexes
and colors, and that they might also establish special schools for poor and neglected
children, who have become too old to attend the primary school, and yet have not
acquired the rudiments of learning, to enable them to enter the ordinary schools. Similar
laws have been enacted by congress under its general power of legislation over the
District of Columbia (sections 281- 283, 310, 319, Rev. St. D. C.), as well as by the
legislatures o f many of the states, and have been generally, if not uniformly, sustained by
the courts. State v. McCann, 21 Ohio St. 210; Lehew v. Brummell (Mo. Sup.) 15 S. W.
765; Ward v. Flood, 48 Cal. 36; Bertonneau v. Directors of City Schools, 3 Woods, 177,
Fed. Cas. No. 1,361; People v. Gallagher, 93 N. Y. 438; Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind. 337;
Dawson v. Lee, 83 Ky. 49.
Laws forbidding the intermarriage o f the two races may be said in a technical sense to
interfere with the freedom of contract, and yet have been universally recognized as within
the police power o f the state. State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389.
The distinction between laws interfering with the political equality of the negro and those
requiring the separation of the two races in schools, theaters, and railway carriages has
been frequently drawn by this court. Thus, in Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 , it
was held that a law o f West Virginia limiting to white male persons 21 years of age, and
citizens of the state, the right to sit upon juries, was a discrimination which implied a
legal inferiority in civil society, which lessened the security o f the right of the colored
race, and was a step towards reducing them to a condition of servility. Indeed, the right of
a colored man that, in the selection of jurors to pass upon his life, liberty, and property,
there shall be no exclusion o f his race, and no discrimination against them because of
color, has been asserted in a number of cases. Virginia v. Rivers, 100 U.S. 313 ; Neal v.
Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 ; Cush v. Com., 107 U.S. 110, 1 Sup. Ct. 625; Gibson v.
Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565 , 16 Sup. Ct. 904. So, where the laws of a particular locality or
the charter of a particular railway corporation has provided that no person shall be
excluded from the cars on account o f [163 U.S. 537, 546] color, we have held that this
meant that persons of color should travel in the same car as white ones, and that the
enactment was not satisfied by the company providing cars assigned exclusively to
people of color, though they were as good as those which they assigned exclusively to
white persons. Railroad Co. v. Brown, 17 Wall. 445.
Upon the other hand, where a statute of Louisiana required those engaged in the
transportation of passengers among the states to give to all persons traveling within that
state, upon vessels employed in that business, equal rights and privileges in all parts of
the vessel, without distinction on account o f race or color, and subjected to an action for
damages the owner of such a vessel who excluded colored passengers on account o f their
color from the cabin set aside by him for the use of whites, it was held to be, so far as it
applied to interstate commerce, unconstitutional and void. Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U.S. 485 .
The court in this case, however, expressly disclaimed that it had anything whatever to do
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with the statute as a regulation of internal commerce, or affecting anything else than
commerce among the states.
In the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 , 3 Sup. Ct. 18, it was held that an act of congress
entitling all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States to the full and equal
enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges o f inns, public
conveyances, on land or water, theaters, and other places o f public amusement, and made
applicable to citizens of every race and color, regardless o f any previous condition of
servitude, was unconstitutional and void, upon the ground that the fourteenth amendment
was prohibitory upon the states only, and the legislation authorized to be adopted by
congress for enforcing it was not direct legislation on matters respecting which the states
were prohibited from making or enforcing certain laws, or doing certain acts, but was
corrective legislation, such as might be necessary or proper for counter-acting and
redressing the effect of such laws or acts. In delivering the opinion of the court, Mr.
Justice Bradley observed that the fourteenth amendment ’does not invest congress with
power to legislate upon subjects that are within the [163 U.S. 537, 547] domain o f state
legislation, but to provide modes o f relief against state legislation or state action of the
kind referred to. It does not authorize congress to create a code of municipal law for the
regulation of private rights, but to provide modes of redress against the operation o f state
laws, and the action of state officers, executive or judicial, when these are subversive of
the fundamental rights specified in the amendment. Positive rights and privileges are
undoubtedly secured by the fourteenth amendment; but they are secured by way of
prohibition against state laws and state proceedings affecting those rights and privileges,
and by power given to congress to legislate for the purpose o f carrying such prohibition
into effect; and such legislation must necessarily be predicated upon such supposed state
laws or state proceedings, and be directed to the correction of their operation and effect.'
Much nearer, and, indeed, almost directly in point, is the case of the Louisville, N. O. &
T. Ry. Co. v. State, 133 U.S. 587 , 10 Sup. Ct. 348, wherein the railway company was
indicted for a violation o f a statute of Mississippi, enacting that all railroads carrying
passengers should provide equal, but separate, accommodations for the white and colored
races, by providing two or more passenger cars for each passenger train, or by dividing
the passenger cars by a partition, so as to secure separate accommodations. The case was
presented in a different aspect from the one under consideration, inasmuch as it was an
indictment against the railway company for failing to provide the separate
accommodations, but the question considered was the constitutionality o f the law. In that
case, the supreme court o f Mississippi (66 Miss. 662, 6 South. 203) had held that the
statute applied solely to commerce within the state, and, that being the construction o f the
state statute by its highest court, was accepted as conclusive. 'If it be a matter,' said the
court (page 591, 133 U. S., and page 348, 10 Sup. Ct.), 'respecting commerce wholly
within a state, and not interfering with commerce between the states, then, obviously,
there is no violation of the commerce clause o f the federal constitution. ... No question
arises under this section as to the power o f the state to separate in different compartments
interstate passengers [163 U.S. 537, 548] or affect, in any manner, the privileges and
rights of such passengers. All that we can consider is whether the state has the power to
require that railroad trains within her limits shall have separate accommodations for the
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two races. That affecting only commerce within the state is no invasion of the power
given to congress by the commerce clause.'
A like course of reasoning applies to the case under consideration, since the supreme
court of Louisiana, in the case of State v. Judge, 44 La. Ann. 770, 11 South. 74, held that
the statute in question did not apply to interstate passengers, but was confined in its
application to passengers traveling exclusively within the borders of the state. The case
was decided largely upon the authority o f Louisville, N. O. & T. Ry. Co. v. State, 66
Miss. 662, 6 South, 203, and affirmed by this court in 133 U.S. 587 , 10 Sup. Ct. 348. In
the present case no question of interference with interstate commerce can possibly arise,
since the East Louisiana Railway appears to have been purely a local line, with both its
termini within the state of Louisiana. Similar statutes for the separation o f the two races
upon public conveyances were held to be constitutional in Railroad v. Miles, 55 Pa. St.
209; Day v. Owen 5 Mich. 520; Railway Co. v. Williams, 55 111. 185; Railroad Co. v.
Wells, 85 Tenn. 613; 4 S. W. 5; Railroad Co. v. Benson, 85 Tenn. 627, 4 S. W. 5; The
Sue, 22 Fed. 843; Logwood v. Railroad Co., 23 Fed. 318; McGuinn v. Forbes, 37 Fed.
639; People v. King ( N. Y. App.) 18 N. E. 245; Houck v. Railway Co., 38 Fed. 226;
Heard v. Railroad Co., 3 Inter St. Commerce Com. R. I l l , 1 Inter St. Commerce Com. R.
428.
While we think the enforced separation o f the races, as applied to the internal commerce
of the state, neither abridges the privileges or immunities of the colored man, deprives
him o f his property without due process o f law, nor denies him the equal protection o f the
laws, within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment, we are not prepared to say that
the conductor, in assigning passengers to the coaches according to their race, does not act
at his peril, or that the provision o f the second section of the act that denies to the
passenger compensation [163 U.S. 537, 549] in damages for a refusal to receive him into
the coach in which he properly belongs is a valid exercise of the legislative power.
Indeed, we understand it to be conceded by the state's attorney that such part of the act as
exempts from liability the railway company and its officers is unconstitutional. The
power to assign to a particular coach obviously implies the power to determine to which
race the passenger belongs, as well as the power to determine who, under the laws of the
particular state, is to be deemed a white, and who a colored, person. This question,
though indicated in the brief of the plaintiff in error, does not properly arise upon the
record in this case, since the only issue made is as to the unconstitutionality of the act, so
far as it requires the railway to provide separate accommodations, and the conductor to
assign passengers according to their race.
It is claimed by the plaintiff in error that, in an mixed community, the reputation of
belonging to the dominant race, in this instance the white race, is 'property,' in the same
sense that a right of action or of inheritance is property. Conceding this to be so, for the
purposes of this case, we are unable to see how this statute deprives him of, or in any way
affects his right to, such property. If he be a white man, and assigned to a colored coach,
he may have his action for damages against the company for being deprived of his socalled 'property.' Upon the other hand, if he be a colored man, and be so assigned, he has
been deprived of no property, since he is not lawfully entitled to the reputation of being a
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white man.
In this connection, it is also suggested by the learned counsel for the plaintiff in error that
the same argument that will justify the state legislature in requiring railways to provide
separate accommodations for the two races will also authorize them to require separate
cars to be provided for people whose hair is of a certain color, or who are aliens, or who
belong to certain nationalities, or to enact laws requiring colored people to walk upon one
side o f the street, and white people upon the other, or requiring white men's houses to be
painted white, and colored men's black, or their vehicles or business signs to be o f
different colors, upon the theory that one side [163 U.S. 537, 550] o f the street is as good
as the other, or that a house or vehicle o f one color is as good as one of another color. The
reply to all this is that every exercise o f the police power must be reasonable, and extend
only to such laws as are enacted in good faith for the promotion of the public good, and
not for the annoyance or oppression o f a particular class. Thus, in Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356 , 6 Sup. Ct. 1064, it was held by this court that a municipal ordinance of the
city of San Francisco, to regulate the carrying on of public laundries within the limits of
the municipality, violated the provisions o f the constitution of the United States, if it
conferred upon the municipal authorities arbitrary power, at their own will, and without
regard to discretion, in the legal sense o f the term, to give or withhold consent as to
persons or places, without regard to the competency of the persons applying or the
propriety o f the places selected for the carrying on of the business. It was held to be a
covert attempt on the part of the municipality to make an arbitrary and unjust
discrimination against the Chinese race. While this was the case of a municipal
ordinance, a like principle has been held to apply to acts of a state legislature passed in
the exercise of the police power. Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465 ; Louisville & N. R.
Co. v. Kentucky, 161 U.S. 677 , 16 Sup. Ct. 714, and cases cited on page 700, 161 U. S.,
and page 714, 16 Sup. Ct.; Daggett v. Hudson, 43 Ohio St. 548, 3 N. E. 538; Capen v.
Foster, 12 Pick. 485; State v. Baker, 38 Wis. 71; Monroe v. Collins, 17 Ohio St. 665;
Hulseman v. Rems, 41 Pa. St. 396; Osman v. Riley, 15 Cal. 48.
So far, then, as a conflict with the fourteenth amendment is concerned, the case reduces
itself to the question whether the statute of Louisiana is a reasonable regulation, and with
respect to this there must necessarily be a large discretion on the part o f the legislature. In
determining the question o f reasonableness, it is at liberty to act with reference to the
established usages, customs, and traditions of the people, and with a view to the
promotion of their comfort, and the preservation of the public peace and good order.
Gauged by this standard, we cannot say that a law which authorizes or even requires the
separation o f the two races in public conveyances [163 U.S. 537, 551] is unreasonable,
or more obnoxious to the fourteenth amendment than the acts of congress requiring
separate schools for colored children in the District of Columbia, the constitutionality of
which does not seem to have been questioned, or the corresponding acts o f state
legislatures.
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiffs argument to consist in the
assumption that the enforced separation o f the two races stamps the colored race with a
badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but
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solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it. The argument
necessarily assumes that if, as has been more than once the case, and is not unlikely to be
so again, the colored race should become the dominant power in the state legislature, and
should enact a law in precisely similar terms, it would thereby relegate the white race to
an inferior position. We imagine that the white race, at least, would not acquiesce in this
assumption. The argument also assumes that social prejudices may be overcome by
legislation, and that equal rights cannot be secured to the negro except by an enforced
commingling o f the two races. We cannot accept this proposition. If the two races are to
meet upon terms o f social equality, it must be the result of natural affinities, a mutual
appreciation o f each other's merits, and a voluntary consent of individuals. As was said
by the court o f appeals o f New York in People v. Gallagher, 93 N. Y. 438, 448: 'This end
can neither be accomplished nor promoted by laws which conflict with the general
sentiment o f the community upon whom they are designed to operate. When the
government, therefore, has secured to each of its citizens equal rights before the law, and
equal opportunities for improvement and progress, it has accomplished the end for which
it was organized, and performed all of the functions respecting social advantages with
which it is endowed.' Legislation is powerless to eradicate racial instincts, or to abolish
distinctions based upon physical differences, and the attempt to do so can only result in
accentuating the difficulties o f the present situation. If the civil and political rights o f
both races be equal, one cannot be inferior to the other civilly [163 U.S. 537, 552] or
politically. If one race be inferior to the other socially, the constitution of the United
States cannot put them upon the same plane.
It is true that the question of the proportion of colored blood necessary to constitute a
colored person, as distinguished from a white person, is one upon which there is a
difference of opinion in the different states; some holding that any visible admixture of
black blood stamps the person as belonging to the colored race (State v. Chavers, 5 Jones
[N. C.] 1); others, that it depends upon the preponderance o f blood ( Gray v. State, 4
Ohio, 354; Monroe v. Collins, 17 Ohio St. 665); and still others, that the predominance of
white blood must only be in the proportion of three-fourths (People v. Dean, 14 Mich.
406; Jones v. Com., 80 Va. 544). But these are questions to be determined under the laws
o f each state, and are not properly put in issue in this case. Under the allegations of his
petition, it may undoubtedly become a question of importance whether, under the laws of
Louisiana, the petitioner belongs to the white or colored race.
The judgment o f the court below is therefore affirmed
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APPENDIX D

DISSENTING OPINION BY JUSTICE JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN

Mr. Justice HARLAN dissenting, (http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/)
By the Louisiana statute the validity o f which is here involved, all railway companies
(other than street-railroad companies) carry passengers in that state are required to have
separate but equal accommodations for white and colored persons, 'by providing two or
more passenger coaches for each passenger train, or by dividing the passenger coaches by
a partition so as to secure separate accommodations.' Under this statute, no colored
person is permitted to occupy a seat in a coach assigned to white persons; nor any white
person to occupy a seat in a coach assigned to colored persons. The managers of the
railroad are not allowed to exercise any discretion in the premises, but are required to
assign each passenger to some coach or compartment set apart for the exclusive use of is
race. If a passenger insists upon going into a coach or compartment not set apart for
persons of his race, [163 U.S. 537, 553] he is subject to be fined, or to be imprisoned in
the parish jail. Penalties are prescribed for the refusal or neglect of the officers, directors,
conductors, and employees of railroad companies to comply with the provisions o f the
act.
Only 'nurses attending children of the other race' are excepted from the operation of the
statute. No exception is made o f colored attendants traveling with adults. A white man is
not permitted to have his colored servant with him in the same coach, even if his
condition of health requires the constant personal assistance of such servant. If a colored
maid insists upon riding in the same coach with a white woman whom she has been
employed to serve, and who may need her personal attention while traveling, she is
subject to be fined or imprisoned for such an exhibition of zeal in the discharge o f duty.
While there may be in Louisiana persons of different races who are not citizens o f the
United States, the words in the act 'white and colored races' necessarily include all
citizens of the United States of both races residing in that state. So that we have before us
a state enactment that compels, under penalties, the separation of the two races in railroad
passenger coaches, and makes it a crime for a citizen of either race to enter a coach that
has been assigned to citizens of the other race.
Thus, the state regulates the use o f a public highway by citizens of the United States
solely upon the basis of race.
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However apparent the injustice of such legislation may be, we have only to consider
whether it is consistent with the constitution of the United States.
That a railroad is a public highway, and that the corporation which owns or operates it is
in the exercise of public functions, is not, at this day, to be disputed. Mr. Justice Nelson,
speaking for this court in New Jersey Steam Nav. Co. v. Merchants' Bank, 6 How. 344,
382, said that a common carrier was in the exercise 'of a sort of public office, and has
public duties to perform, from which he should not be permitted to exonerate himself
without the assent o f the parties concerned.' Mr. Justice Strong, delivering the judgment
o f [163 U.S. 537, 554] this court in Olcott v. Supervisors, 16 Wall. 678, 694, said: 'That
railroads, though constructed by private corporations, and owned by them, are public
highways, has been the doctrine of nearly all the courts ever since such conveniences for
passage and transportation have had any existence. Very early the question arose whether
a state's right of eminent domain could be exercised by a private corporation created for
the purpose of constructing a railroad. Clearly, it could not, unless taking land for such a
purpose by such an agency is taking land for public use. The right of eminent domain
nowhere justifies taking property for a private use. Yet it is a doctrine universally
accepted that a state legislature may authorize a private corporation to take land for the
construction of such a road, making compensation to the owner. What else does this
doctrine mean if not that building a railroad, though it be built by a private corporation, is
an act done for a public use?' So, in Township of Pine Grove v. Talcott, 19 Wall. 666,
676: 'Though the corporation [a railroad company] was private, its work was public, as
much so as if it were to be constructed by the state.' So, in Inhabitants of Worcester v.
Western R. Corp., 4 Mete. (Mass.) 564: 'The establishment of that great thoroughfare is
regarded as a public work, established by public authority, intended for the public use and
benefit, the use of which is secured to the whole community, and constitutes, therefore,
like a canal, turnpike, or highway, a public easement.' 'It is true that the real and personal
property, necessary to the establishment and management o f the railroad, is vested in the
corporation; but it is in trust for the public.'
In respect of civil rights, common to all citizens, the constitution of the United States
does not, I think, permit any public authority to know the race o f those entitled to be
protected in the enjoyment o f such rights. Every true man has pride of race, and under
appropriate circumstances, when the rights of others, his equals before the law, are not to
be affected, it is his privilege to express such pride and to take such action based upon it
as to him seems proper. But I deny that any legislative body or judicial tribunal may have
regard to the [163 U.S. 537, 555] race of citizens when the civil rights of those citizens
are involved. Indeed, such legislation as that here in question is inconsistent not only with
that equality of rights which pertains to citizenship, national and state, but with the
personal liberty enjoyed by every one within the United States.
The thirteenth amendment does not permit the withholding or the deprivation of any right
necessarily inhering in freedom. It not only struck down the institution of slavery as
previously existing in the United States, but it prevents the imposition of any burdens or
disabilities that constitute badges of slavery or servitude. It decreed universal civil
freedom in this country. This court has so adjudged. But, that amendment having been
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found inadequate to the protection o f the rights of those who had been in slavery, it was
followed by the fourteenth amendment, which added greatly to the dignity and glory of
American citizenship, and to the security of personal liberty, by declaring that 'all persons
bom or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and o f the state wherein they reside,' and that 'no state shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person o f life, liberty or property
without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.' These two amendments, if enforced according to their true intent
and meaning, will protect all the civil rights that pertain to freedom and citizenship.
Finally, and to the end that no citizen should be denied, on account of his race, the
privilege o f participating in the political control of his country, it was declared by the
fifteenth amendment that 'the right o f citizens o f the United States to vote shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account o f race, color or
previous condition of servitude.'
These notable additions to the fundamental law were welcomed by the friends of liberty
throughout the world. They removed the race line from our governmental systems. They
had, as this court has said, a common purpose, namely, to secure 'to a race recently
emancipated, a race that through [163 U.S. 537, 556] many generations have been held
in slavery, all the civil rights that the superior race enjoy.' They declared, in legal effect,
this court has further said, 'that the law in the states shall be the same for the black as for
the white; that all persons, whether colored or white, shall stand equal before the laws of
the states; and in regard to the colored race, for whose protection the amendment was
primarily designed, that no discrimination shall be made against them by law because of
their color.' We also said: 'The words of the amendment, it is true, are prohibitory, but
they contain a necessary implication of a positive immunity or right, most valuable to the
colored race,-the right to exemption from unfriendly legislation against them distinctively
as colored; exemption from legal discriminations, implying'inferiority in civil society,
lessening the security of their enjoyment o f the rights which others enjoy; and
discriminations which are steps towards reducing them to the condition o f a subject race.'
It was, consequently, adjudged that a state law that excluded citizens of the colored race
from juries, because of their race, however well qualified in other respects to discharge e
the duties of jurymen, was repugnant to the fourteenth amendment. Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306 , 307 S.; Virginia v. Rives, Id. 313; Ex parte Virginia, Id.
339; Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 , 386; Bush v. Com., 107 U.S. 110, 116 , 1 S. Sup.
Ct. 625. At the present term, referring to the previous adjudications, this court declared
that 'underlying all of those decisions is the principle that the constitution o f the United
States, in its present form, forbids, so far as civil and political rights are concerned,
discrimination by the general government or the states against any citizen because of his
race. All citizens are equal before the law.' Gibson v. State, 162 U.S. 565 , 16 Sup. Ct.
904.
The decisions referred to show the scope of the recent amendments o f the constitution.
They also show that it is not within the power of a state to prohibit colored citizens,
because o f their race, from participating as jurors in the administration of justice.
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It was said in argument that the statute o f Louisiana does [163 U.S. 537, 557] not
discriminate against either race, but prescribes a rule applicable alike to white and
colored citizens. But this argument does not meet the difficulty. Every one knows that the
statute in question had its origin in the purpose, not so much to exclude white persons
from railroad cars occupied by blacks, as to exclude colored people from coaches
occupied by or assigned to white persons. Railroad corporations of Louisiana did not
make discrimination among whites in the matter of accommodation for travelers. The
thing to accomplish was, under the guise of giving equal accommodation for whites and
blacks, to compel the latter to keep to themselves while traveling in railroad passenger
coaches. No one would be so wanting in candor as to assert the contrary. The
fundamental objection, therefore, to the statute, is that it interferes with the personal
freedom o f citizens. 'Personal liberty,' it has been well said, 'consists in the power of
locomotion, o f changing situation, or removing one's person to whatsoever places one's
own inclination may direct, without imprisonment or restraint, unless by due course of
law.' 1 Bl. Comm. *134. If a white man and a black man choose to occupy the same
public conveyance on a public highway, it is their right to do so; and no government,
proceeding alone on grounds of race, can prevent it without infringing the personal
liberty o f each.
It is one thing for railroad carriers to furnish, or to be required by law to furnish, equal
accommodations for all whom they are under a legal duty to carry. It is quite another
thing for government to forbid citizens of the white and black races from traveling in the
same public conveyance, and to punish officers o f railroad companies for permitting
persons of the two races to occupy the same passenger coach. If a state can prescribe, as a
rule of civil conduct, that whites and blacks shall not travel as passengers in the same
railroad coach, why may it not so regulate the use of the streets of its cities and towns as
to compel white citizens to keep on one side o f a street, and black citizens to keep on the
other? Why may it not, upon like grounds, punish whites and blacks who ride together in
street cars or in open vehicles on a public road [163 U.S. 537, 558] or street? Why may it
not require sheriffs to assign whites to one side of a court room, and blacks to the other?
And why may it not also prohibit the commingling o f the two races in the galleries o f
legislative halls or in public assemblages convened for the consideration of the political
questions of the day? Further, if this statute o f Louisiana is consistent with the personal
liberty of citizens, why may not the state require the separation in railroad coaches of
native and naturalized citizens of the United States, or o f Protestants and Roman
Catholics?
The answer given at the argument to these questions was that regulations of the kind they
suggest would be unreasonable, and could not, therefore, stand before the la . Is it meant
that the determination of questions of legislative power depends upon the inquiry whether
the statute whose validity is questioned is, in the judgment of the courts, a reasonable
one, taking all the circumstances into consideration? A statute may be unreasonable
merely because a sound public policy forbade its enactment. But I do not understand that
the courts have anything to do with the policy or expediency of legislation. A statute may
be valid, and yet, upon grounds of public policy, may well be characterized as
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unreasonable. Mr. Sedgwick correctly states the rule when he says that, the legislative
intention being clearly ascertained, ’the courts have no other duty to perform than to
execute the legislative will, without any regard to their views as to the wisdom or justice
of the particular enactment.' Sedg. St. & Const. Law, 324. There is a dangerous tendency
in these latter days to enlarge the functions of the courts, by means of judicial
interference with the will of the people as expressed by the legislature. Our institutions
have the distinguishing characteristic that the three departments of government are co
ordinate and separate. Each much keep within the limits defined by the constitution. And
the courts best discharge their duty by executing the will of the law-making power,
constitutionally expressed, leaving the results of legislation to be dealt with by the people
through their representatives. Statutes must always have a reasonable construction.
Sometimes they are to be construed strictly, sometimes literally, in order to carry out the
legislative [163 U.S. 537, 559] will. But, however construed, the intent o f the legislature
is to be respected if the particular statute in question is valid, although the courts, looking
at the public interests, may conceive the statute to be both unreasonable and impolitic. If
the power exists to enact a statute, that ends the matter so far as the courts are concerned.
The adjudged cases in which statutes have been held to be void, because unreasonable,
are those in which the means employed by the legislature were not at all germane to the
end to which the legislature was competent.
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country. And so it is, in
prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth, and in power. So, I doubt not, it will
continue to be for all time, if it remains true to its great heritage, and holds fast to the
principles of constitutional liberty. But in view of the constitution, in the eye of the law,
there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste
here. Our constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among
citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law. The humblest is
the peer of the most powerful. The law regards man as man, and takes no account of his
surroundings or of his color when his civil rights as guarantied by the supreme law of the
land are involved. It is therefore to be regretted that this high tribunal, the final expositor
of the fundamental law o f the land, has reached the conclusion that it is competent for a
state to regulate the enjoyment by citizens of their civil rights solely upon the basis of
race.
In my opinion, the judgment this day rendered will, in time, prove to be quite as
pernicious as the decision made by this tribunal in the Dred Scott Case.
It was adjudged in that case that the descendants of Africans who were imported into this
country, and sold as slaves, were not included nor intended to be included under the word
'citizens' in the constitution, and could not claim any of the rights and privileges which
that instrument provided for and secured to citizens of the United States; that, at time of
the adoption o f the constitution, they were 'considered as a subordinate and inferior class
o f beings, who had been subjugated by the dominant [163 U.S. 537, 560] race, and,
whether emancipated or not, yet remained subject to their authority, and had no rights or
privileges but such as those who held the power and the government might choose to
grant them.' 17 How. 393, 404. The recent amendments o f the constitution, it was
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supposed, had eradicated these principles from our institutions. But it seems that we have
yet, in some o f the states, a dominant race,-a superior class of citizens,-which assumes to
regulate the enjoyment of civil rights, common to all citizens, upon the basis of race. The
present decision, it may well be apprehended, will not only stimulate aggressions, more
or less brutal and irritating, upon the admitted rights o f colored citizens, but will
encourage the belief that it is possible, by means o f state enactments, to defeat the
beneficent purposes which the people of the United States had in view when they adopted
the recent amendments of the constitution, by one of which the blacks o f this country
were made citizens o f the United States and o f the states in which they respectively
reside, and whose privileges and immunities, as citizens, the states are forbidden to
abridge. Sixty millions of whites are in no danger from the presence here o f eight
millions of blacks. The destinies o f the two races, in this country, are indissolubly linked
together, and the interests of both require that the common government of all shall not
permit the seeds o f race hate to be planted under the sanction of law. What can more
certainly arouse race hate, what more certainly create and perpetuate a feeling o f distrust
between these races, than state enactments which, in fact, proceed on the ground that
colored citizens are so inferior and degraded that they cannot be allowed to sit in public
coaches occupied by white citizens? That, as all will admit, is the real meaning of such
legislation as was enacted in Louisiana.
The sure guaranty o f the peace and security o f each race is the clear, distinct,
unconditional recognition by our governments, national and state, of every right that
inheres in civil freedom, and o f the equality before the law of all citizens o f the United
States, without regard to race. State enactments regulating the enjoyment of civil rights
upon the basis of race, and cunningly devised to defeat legitimate results of the [163 U.S.
537, 561] war, under the pretense of recognizing equality of rights, can have no other
result than to render permanent peace impossible, and to keep alive a conflict of races,
the continuance o f which must do harm to all concerned. This question is not met by the
suggestion that social equality cannot exist between the white and black races in this
country. That argument, if it can be properly regarded as one, is scarcely worthy of
consideration; for social equality no more exists between two races when traveling in a
passenger coach or a public highway than when members o f the same races sit by each
other in a street car or in the jury box, or stand or sit with each other in a political
assembly, or when they use in common the streets of a city or town, or when they are in
the same room for the purpose of having their names placed on the registry of voters, or
when they approach the ballot box in order to exercise the high privilege o f voting.
There is a race so different from our own that we do not permit those belonging to it to
become citizens of the United States. Persons belonging to it are, with few exceptions,
absolutely excluded from our country. I allude to the Chinese race. But, by the statute in
question, a Chinaman can ride in the same passenger coach with white citizens of the
United States, while citizens of the black race in Louisiana, many of whom, perhaps,
risked their lives for the preservation of the Union, who are entitled, by law, to participate
in the political control of the state and nation, who are not excluded, by law or by reason
of their race, from public stations of any kind, and who have all the legal rights that
belong to white citizens, ^re yet declared to be criminals, liable to imprisonment, if they
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ride in a public coach occupied by citizens of the white race. It is scarcely just to say that
a colored citizen should not object to occupying a public coach assigned to his own race.
He does not object, nor, perhaps, would he object to separate coaches for his race if his
rights under the law were recognized. But he does object, and he ought never to cease
objecting, that citizens o f the white and black races can be adjudged criminals because
they sit, or claim the right to sit, in the same public coach on a public highway. [163 U.S.
537, 562] The arbitrary separation o f citizens, on the basis of race, while they are on a
public highway, is a badge o f servitude wholly inconsistent with the civil freedom and
the equality before the law established by the constitution. It cannot be justified upon any
legal grounds.
If evils will result from the commingling of the two races upon public highways
established for the benefit of all, they will be infinitely less than those that will surely
come from state legislation regulating the enjoyment of civil rights upon the basis of race.
We boast of the freedom enjoyed by our people above all other peoples. But it is difficult
to reconcile that boast with a state o f the law which, practically, puts the brand of
servitude and degradation upon a large class o f our fellow citizens,-our equals before the
law. The thin disguise of'equal' accommodations for passengers in railroad coaches will
not mislead any one, nor atone for the wrong this day done.
The result of the whole matter is that while this court has frequently adjudged, and at the
present term has recognized the doctrine, that a state cannot, consistently with the
constitution of the United States, prevent white and black citizens, having the required
qualifications for jury service, from sitting in the same jury box, it is now solemnly held
that a state may prohibit white and black citizens from sitting in the same passenger
coach on a public highway, or may require that they be separated by a 'partition' when in
the same passenger coach. May it not now be reasonably expected that astute men o f the
dominant race, who affect to be disturbed at the possibility that the integrity of the white
race may be corrupted, or that its supremacy will be imperiled, by contact on public
highways with black people, will endeavor to procure statutes requiring white and black
jurors to be separated in the jury box by a 'partition,' and that, upon retiring from the court
room to consult as to their verdict, such partition, if it be a movable one, shall be taken to
their consultation room, and set up in such way as to prevent black jurors from coming
too close to their brother jurors of the white race. If the 'partition' used in the court room
happens to be stationary, provision could be made for screens with openings through [163
U.S. 537, 563] which jurors of the two races could confer as to their verdict without
coming into personal contact with each other. I cannot see but that, according to the
principles this day announced, such state legislation, although conceived in hostility to,
and enacted for the purpose of humiliating, citizens of the United States of a particular
race, would be held to be consistent with the constitution.
I do not deem it necessary to review the decisions of state courts to which reference was
made in argument. Some, and the most important, of them, are wholly inapplicable,
because rendered prior to the adoption of the last amendments of the constitution, when
colored people had very few rights which the dominant race felt obliged to respect.
Others were made at a time when public opinion, in many localities, was dominated by
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the institution of slavery; when it would not have been safe to do justice to the black man;
and when, so far as the rights of blacks were concerned, race prejudice was, practically,
the supreme law o f the land. Those decisions cannot be guides in the era introduced by
the recent amendments of the supreme law, which established universal civil freedom,
gave citizenship to all bom or naturalized in the United States, and residing ere,
obliterated the race line from our systems o f governments, national and state, and placed
our free institutions upon the broad and sure foundation of the equality of all men before
the law.
I am of opinion that the state of Louisiana is inconsistent with the personal liberty of
citizens, white and black, in that state, and hostile to both the spirit and letter of the
constitution o f the United States. If laws o f like character should be enacted in the several
states of the Union, the effect would be in the highest degree mischievous. Slavery, as an
institution tolerated by law, would, it is true, have disappeared from our country; but
there would remain a power in the states, by sinister legislation, to interfere with the full
enjoyment of the blessings of freedom, to regulate civil rights, common to all citizens,
upon the basis o f race, and to place in a condition of legal inferiority a large body of
American citizens, now constituting a part o f the political community, called the [ 163
U.S. 537, 564] 'People o f the United States,' for whom, and by whom through
representatives, our government is administered. Such a system is inconsistent with the
guaranty given by the constitution to each state of a republican form o f government, and
may be stricken down by congressional action, or by the courts in the discharge of their
solemn duty to maintain the supreme law of the land, anything in the constitution or laws
o f any state to the contrary notwithstanding.
For the reason stated, I am constrained to withhold my assent from the opinion and
judgment of the majority.
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